Baldwin distinguishes further between positive and negative sanctions: Whereas negative sanctions are punishments, positive sanctions are rewards.78 He emphasizes the power of positive sanctions and criticizes political science for excluding them from their concept of power.79 Other scholars classify the stopping of foreign aid as part of positive sanctions.80 Bergeijk, using a traditional ←38 | 39→neo-classical trade model, compares a non-sanction situation with economic interdependence and a sanctions situation with autarky.81
It is crucial to include the goal of sanctions into the definition of sanctions. The success of sanctions is usually assessed based on the goal and on the target’s compliance with the goal. A typical categorization of goals, based on official documents, is provided by the sanctions dataset by Portela et al.:82 democratization, support human rights, fight against narcotics, stop biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, end nuclear proliferation, termination of bellicosities and/or establishment of peace agreement, fight terrorism (including releasing of hostages).
Economic sanctions can be further categorized with dichotomous typologies like punishing or coercing, substantive or symbolic, expressive or instrumental, or coercive or symbolic. Whereas most scholars, like Hufbauer et al., base the categorization of sanctions goals on policy changes within the target country,83 few also mention symbolic goals such as punishment, appeasing the audience in the sender state, trying to appear active in the international arena,84 and trying to influence the behavior of third countries, e.g., deterring and preventing the development of nuclear weapons. Did sanctions against North Korea prevent South Korea and Japan from developing their own nuclear weapons? Sanctions “move freely – even simultaneously – between the world of preventive diplomacy and the world of coercive diplomacy.”85
Lindsay argues that economic sanctions have a high impact as international or domestic symbols and deterring states, though they likely fail when the goal is compliance.86 Symbolic sanctions can be aimed at reputation and be applied to areas of culture, education, or sports: “Images matter.”87 If sanctions are symbolic/expressive and show disapproval, they can hardly succeed according to their intended goal, though scholars evaluate them as “non-successful.” The fact that states pursue multiple objectives is an explanation why state leaders like sanctions so much despite the opposition from mainstream academia: “To the extent that sanctions impose an injury on the wrongdoer, international sanctions cannot but ‘work.’ ”88
Giumelli distinguishes between coercing, constraining and signaling sanctions. Coercing sanctions seek a behavioral change of the target regime. Constraining ←39 | 40→sanctions aim at undermining the capabilities of the target regime to achieve policy objectives (zero-sum game). Signaling sanctions do not try to reach a certain effect through material damage because they would be ineffective in such cases; instead, they aim at the domestic and the international audience, they stigmatize non-compliance with a norm.89
The challenge for scholars (and for the targets of sanctions) is to see the real goal of sanctions, to know what the sanctions are intended for. Information asymmetry can be part of the sender’s strategy. Sanctions are not always intended to succeed in their ostensible goal.90 “Targets and goals are usually multiple,” writes Baldwin;91 Kaempfer et al. distinguish between real and stated goal.92 In addition to Giumelli’s taxonomy, this book adds a distinction between de jure goal and de facto goal. Whereas the de jure goal refers to the official goal stated in the legal text, for example in the respective resolution of the UN Security Council, the de facto goal refers to the mechanism, what Giumelli describes as coercing, constraining or signaling. This categorization of sanctions has implications for the success debate: Often, sanctions pursue “high policy” goals (security or political issue).93 It is highly unlikely that a dictator will agree on retiring. Such sanctions are often intended as a signal. An evaluation of sanctions, based on the de jure goal, is, therefore, misinterpreting the very nature of sanctions.
There are different players in the sanctions game. The sender is the executive institution of a state (government), a regional organization (European Commission in the EU) or the UN (Security Council). The de jure target is related to another state or a state-like entity (such as state-like terror groups: ISIS/Daesh, Al Shaabab, Al Qaeda). The target can be further distinguished on the macro level (whole state or whole economy), the meso level (specific sectors or entities), or the micro level (individuals). Scholars mention further de facto targets: Barber distinguishes primary (target-related), secondary (sender-related) and tertiary (international system related) objectives.94 Sender or system-related goals are often justified with a target-related issue.95 Hufbauer et al. see a triple signal of sanctions: to the sender, to allies, to domestic audience.96
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Finally, sanctions can be distinguished according to their type. The sanctions dataset by Portela et al. provides a useful categorization of types of sanctions:97 arms embargo, freezing of financial assets held by individuals, aid sanctions, commodity embargo (import or export of selected commodities such as natural resources), comprehensive trade embargo (complete ban of trade and financial relations), diplomatic sanctions (also includes suspension of membership in international organizations), flight ban (prohibition of operating flights), financial sanctions (investment ban, ban on financial transactions), interruption of military cooperation, visa ban (includes travel ban).
Furthermore, sanctions can target soft power issues (such as cultural and academic cooperation or participation in sports events). Portela et al. add another category for sanctions imposed to enforce sanctioning. This type of sanctions, also called secondary sanctions, is similar to the other types of sanctions, they just refer to a new target. The mechanism (economic means, political goal) is the same.
In this book, sanctions are defined as a set of rules that restrict a state. Economic sanctions are a set of economic rules that restrict a state. They are imposed by a state, a regional organization or an international organization, on another state or entities or individuals related to that state. By coercing, constraining or signaling, sanctions are imposed to achieve a non-economic policy goal. Sanctions can include non-economic measures (such as arms embargo, visa ban, diplomatic sanctions). Sanctions