The discussion turned to Canada’s role in training air crew, including the effect of Canadian winter conditions on flying training, where instructors and trainer aircraft would come from, how American flyers might be recruited, and what airfields would be available. The influence of Mackenzie King prevailed; it was agreed that any air training in Canada would be under the control of the RCAF.
The notion of a “commonwealth” air training plan arose three days later. Vincent Massey, the Canadian high commissioner to the United Kingdom, spoke with his Australian counterpart, Stanley Bruce, about Britain’s weakness in the air. They then talked to RCAF Group Captain A.E. Godfrey and to two Australian officers, and finally to the Dominion Secretary, Anthony Eden, and other members of the British cabinet.
Massey claimed to have been the first to propose “that Canada might be able to make a decisive contribution to the common war effort by training Commonwealth airmen.” At a high commissioners’ meeting on September 16, 1939, the Canadian and Australian representatives together suggested that Eden consider “a scheme whereby Canadian, Australian and New Zealand air forces should be training in Canada on planes to be specially built in Canada.”
When British prime minister Neville Chamberlain sent a telegram containing the Massey-Bruce air training plan to Mackenzie King, he concluded his request for Canadian approval by saying, “We trust therefore, that this co-operative method of approach to the problem will appeal to your Government. The knowledge that a vast air potential was being built up in the Dominions where no German air activity could interfere with expansion might well have a psychological effect on the Germans, equal to that produced by the intervention of the United States in the last war.”
The proposal appealed not only to King’s sense of history, but also to his sense of political survival. As Canada’s major contribution to the Allied war effort, the mounting of a commonwealth air training scheme would not result in long casualty lists, nor would there be the political risk of conscription for a large army, because the Canadians in the RCAF would be volunteers. On September 28, King presented the proposal to his cabinet and wired Chamberlain Canada’s acceptance of the plan in principle, with a proposal for further discussions.
The horse trading began when the British negotiating team, led by industrialist Lord Riverdale, arrived in Ottawa in October 1939. Riverdale began by laying out the round numbers; the British proposal called for the training of 29,000 air crew (pilots, air observers, and wireless operator/air-gunners) each year. Elementary flying training would be conducted in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, with all service flying training to be done in Canada. In Canada, there would be twelve Elementary Flying Training Schools (EFTS), twenty-five Service Flying Training Schools (SFTS), fifteen Air Observer Schools (AOS), fifteen Bombing and Gunnery Schools (B&GS), three Air Navigation Schools (ANS), and a large Wireless School. Five thousand training aircraft would be required and 54,000 air force personnel. The total estimated capital and maintenance cost for three years (the length of time the war was expected to last) would be almost $1 billion, with three-quarters of that paid by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. While most felt the components of the scheme were appropriate, it was the bottom line that caught the Canadians off guard.
Mackenzie King and his finance minister, J.L. Ralston, proposed scaling down the costs and getting Britain to shoulder more of the financial burden, since this “was not Canada’s war in the same sense that it was Great Britain’s.” At the same time, the Canadian government expected Britain to buy more Canadian wheat, and it demanded that a ceiling be put on the amount of Canadian credit extended to the United Kingdom for war purchases. Riverdale had to weigh the value of this vital air support scheme against the loss of some credit purchasing power and increased spending on weapons and wheat. The plan won out. In return for this commitment, however, Britain asked that the air training scheme be given the highest priority in Canada.
The second phase of negotiations began when the Australian and New Zealand delegations arrived in Ottawa with their counterproposals. The plan’s price tag was on their minds too. Not only was it too high but so was the ratio of trainees they were expected to contribute. These figures were recalculated to reflect actual population ratios—57 percent of the trainees would come from Canada, 35 percent from Australia and 8 percent from New Zealand. Consequently, the size of the scheme was adjusted. Generally, the number of schools was reduced: the number of SFTSs was cut from twenty-five to sixteen, the AOSs and B&GSs from fifteen to ten, and the ANSs from three to two. There would be twenty-six smaller EFTSs instead of thirteen large ones, and four Wireless Schools instead of one large one. As well, the aircraft requirement was scaled down. The overall projected cost was pared back to just over $607 million—of which Britain would pay $185 million, Canada $287 million (excluding EFTS costs), Australia $40 million, and New Zealand $28 million— from the inception of the plan to its agreed termination on March 31, 1943.
Because of Mackenzie King’s earlier demands, there was no question about the control of the training plan. It would be administered by the Canadian government and commanded by the RCAF. With that battle apparently settled, the British wanted the agreement initialled as an “essential step forward in our joint war effort.” However, the Canadian prime minister was not yet ready to give his blessing. Mackenzie King wanted to protect his political interests at home (particularly among those Anglo-Canadians who might question the emphasis on an air training plan over and above the traditional mustering of a large land force). Just as the British had demanded that the plan be given top priority by Canada, King expected the British government to reciprocate by stating “that the air training plan should take priority over all other Canadian commitments not already entered into.” Believing this to be the last hurdle, Prime Minister Chamberlain agreed.
But King wasn’t finished. Even as the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan document was being put into its final form, he had second thoughts about the status of Dominion squadrons in the field. The agreement suggested that the United Kingdom would “initiate discussion” on the matter later. That wasn’t good enough for King. He was afraid that Canadian graduates of the BCATP would lose their RCAF identity completely and, after overseas posting, be swallowed up by RAF operational squadrons. The British Air Ministry dug in its heels. Even if an operational squadron were manned largely by RCAF air crew, its ground personnel would be largely RAF and would consequently outnumber the RCAF air crew; thus, the ministry would refuse RCAF designation of such a squadron. By December 15, 1939, the two sides had come to a stalemate.
Riverdale was at his wits’ end. King was adamant, but he wanted the agreement signed. He telegraphed Anthony Eden, the Dominion Secretary, to say that the entire BCATP was “imperilled.” The telegraph and telephone lines between London and Ottawa buzzed with new urgency. British Air Ministry officials huddled. King entreated the Governor General, Lord Tweedsmuir, who was ailing and bedridden at Government House, to support the Canadian position.
In spite of his political and nationalistic posturing, King was determined to finalize the BCATP agreement by mid-December. His resolve had little to do with the priorities of the Canadian government or the growing air war. December 17, 1939, would be his sixty-fifth birthday, and he wanted the agreement completed in honour of that occasion. He succeeded. By midnight on December 16, Lord Riverdale presented a formula to the effect that “Canadian pupils when passing out from the training scheme will be incorporated in or organized as units of the Royal Canadian Air Force in the field.” For the time being, though not forever, Mackenzie King had preserved the Canadian factor in the creation of the BCATP.
On Sunday evening, December 17, 1939, the prime minister addressed the Canadian people, stressing the important role the BCATP was about to play in the war. “In making provision for this vast undertaking,” he said, “the government has done so knowing that nothing can be left to haste or to chance. The intricate machine must be perfect. In every phase of their work, the men must be trained by the highest skill, and under the best conditions it is possible for the country to provide.
“Let there be no mistake about the significance of the present war. It is a desperate struggle for existence itself. On its outcome will depend the fate not of Canada alone, nor even the British Empire . . . but of humanity itself. To save mankind from such a catastrophe, the airmen of the British Commonwealth, whether