Comparative Issues in Party and Election Finance. F. Leslie Seidle. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: F. Leslie Seidle
Издательство: Ingram
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Жанр произведения: Публицистика: прочее
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9781459718968
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law has done little to hold down political costs.

      The Role of Parties

      As with many other concerns, the role of the political parties is one that transcends strictly financial issues.

      The reforms of the early 1970s sharply curtailed the financial involvement of political parties in both presidential and congressional campaigns, thereby leading to a further weakening of these structures. As noted in the first section, several provisions of the FECA Amendments of 1979 were designed to respond to these concerns regarding presidential campaigns. In addition, there have been suggestions that the limited ability of the two major parties to finance congressional campaigns has led to diminishing partisan loyalties on the part of legislators, making it increasingly difficult to mobilize votes in Congress.

      However, the weakening of the political parties predates the appearance of campaign finance reform on the congressional agenda. To some degree, U.S. political parties have fallen victim to a more educated, more transient, more independent-thinking electorate. Television also has played an important role. Congress has been populated increasingly by non-traditional politicians who, rather than rising through the ranks of political parties, have ignored party structures and used some form of media to get their messages directly to the voters.

      In short, parties have lost a great deal of their effectiveness, with many of their functions absorbed by other institutions or left unfulfilled. What the reforms in the political process, including political finance laws, have done is to give rise to a number of institutions, such as PACs, providing candidate support and dialogue with the community. These changes are so basic that it is doubtful that any legislation could succeed in reversing them.

      The proposals to reinvigorate parties have, in part, been a response to the rapid growth of PACs. Advocates of this approach argue that channelling money to congressional candidates through political parties, which collect it from a variety of sources, is more desirable than the one-to-one dependence on special interest PACs. The reforms of the 1970s placed strict limits on the amounts of money that national, state and local party committees could give directly to a particular candidate (see table 1.1).

      The framework of the law, however, did permit coordinated expenditures under which national and state party committees could pay for certain expenditures undertaken by the candidate. The allowed amount of coordinated expenditures is based on a formula of two cents per voting age population, plus cost-of-living adjustments. In 1990, these expenditures could amount to large sums - as much as $2 million in a California Senate race - and as little as $100 560 in the smallest states. The House limit was $50 280 (see table 1.7). These amounts, which may or may not be spent on specific contests according to the availability of money and candidate need, are disclosed as disbursements by the giving committee(s) but not by the candidates on whose behalf the payments are made; accordingly, the actual costs of some Senate or House campaigns are understated, even in tabulations made by the FEC.

      The question of what role to give the parties is not without significant partisan motives. The Republicans, whose national party committees have regularly raised more funds than their Democratic counterparts by wide margins in recent years, would like to substantially loosen - if not altogether remove - the current contribution limits and coordinated expenditure limits on party spending in congressional races. Unsurprisingly, the Democrats, who have had trouble matching the Republicans in terms of party money channelled to congressional contests through either means, are leery of such proposals.

State Voting age population 1990 party spending limits ($)
Alabama 3 010 000 151 343
Alaska* 362 000 50 280
Arizona 2 575 000 129 471
Arkansas 1 756 000 88 292
California 21 350 000 1 073 478
Colorado 2 453 000 123 337
Connecticut 2 479 000 124 644
Delaware* 504 000 50 280
Florida 9 799 000 492 694
Georgia 4 639 000 233 249
Hawaii 825 000 50 280
Idaho 710 000 50 280
Illinois 8 678 000 436 330
Indiana 4 133 000 207 807
Iowa 2 132 000 107 197
Kansas 1 854 000 93 219
Kentucky 2 760 000 138 773
Louisiana 3 109 000 156 321
Maine 917 000 50 280
Maryland 3 533 000 177 639
Massachusetts 4 576 000 230 081
Michigan 6 829 000 343 362
Minnesota 3 224 000 162 103
Mississippi 1 852 000 93 119
Missouri 3 854 000 193 779
Montana 588 000 50 280
Nebraska 1 187 000 59 682
Nevada 833 000 50 280
New Hampshire 828 000 50 280
New Jersey 5 903 000 296 803
New Mexico 1 074 000 54 001
New York 13 600 000 683 808
North Carolina 4 929 000 247 830
North Dakota*

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