Herein lies a paradox of the U.S. political system: while surveys indicate many voters are convinced that elected officials are being bought off by special interest money, these same voters have shown considerable reluctance to provide the public funding necessary to replace it. Some insights into this conundrum are provided by a series of focus groups sponsored by the FEC in late 1990. The private research firm conducting focus groups reported: “It was often difficult to keep the group focused on the subject at hand (the checkoff) because of their anger at politicians and a perception of wasteful spending by government. Their anger associated with these concerns contaminated their consideration of presidential funding” (Babcock 1991).12
The FEC announced in late November 1990 that the presidential public funding program could suffer a cash flow problem during the 1992 presidential race (Campaign Practices Reports 1990, 2). To deal with this, FEC and U.S. Treasury officials are currently discussing two plans that would translate into candidates receiving less than the traditional dollar-for-dollar public match on private contributions during the prenomination period. Because restricting the availability of public funding in the early going could benefit better-known candidates, the FEC and Treasury are expecting any decision they make to face political and legal challenges.
Both alternatives being considered would require the use of checkoff money collected in 1992. That, in turn, would further worsen the deficit projected for the 1996 presidential year. While the FEC is stepping up efforts to educate taxpayers about the checkoff, several commission members said recently that Congress will have to decide whether to make a one-time grant to keep the fund out of debt or totally scrap the checkoff in favour of providing public funding through continuing legislative appropriations - a perilous possibility given U.S. budget deficits (Campaign Practices Reports 1990, 3).
Congressional Campaigns
The structure of the law under which members of Congress themselves must stand for election is a hybrid fashioned by legislative and judicial fiat and by FEC regulations and opinions. The absence of public funding for congressional candidates means that there has been no carrot with which to bring about voluntary acceptance of spending limits in House and Senate contests. Reformers subsequently sought to remedy this by lobbying Congress to create a system of expenditure limits and public funding similar to the presidential model. But 15 years after the Supreme Court linkage, Congress has yet to enact such legislation.
Table 1.4 Congressional campaign expenditures, 1972-90
(in millions of dollars)
Source: Citizens’ Research Foundation compilation based on FEC and other data.
A very sharp escalation has occurred in spending on contests for Senate and House seats. table 1.4 shows an increase in total spending from $77.3 million in the 1972 election cycle to $445.2 million in the 1990 cycle. There are 435 House seats elected every two years, and in the aggregate these are costlier than the 33 or 34 Senate seats elected every two years.
Even taking inflation into account, total expenditures in congressional campaigns showed a 160 percent increase between 1976 and 1988 when considered in constant dollars, according to FEC figures. The erosion of the dollar has been such that the $1 000 maximum individual contribution dropped about 60 percent in value between 1975 and 1988 when considered in constant dollars. At the same time, congressional candidates have increasingly pursued the PACs, whose maximum contribution per candidate each election is a higher $5 000.
The combination of escalating campaign costs and diminished participation by individual contributors has given rise to complaints that political challengers are being priced out of the market, while incumbent members of Congress are remaining in office by relying excessively on special interest donations. These two concerns are interwoven through several of the issues that have arisen during the campaign finance reform debate of the late 1980s.
The Rise of PACs
According to FEC figures, there were 608 PACs in existence at the end of 1974, when amendments to FECA loosened restrictions on their formation. By 1990, the number stood at 4 192, almost a sevenfold increase in 16 years. The sharpest increase came among corporate PACs, whose number jumped from fewer than 100 in 1974 to almost 1 800 in 1990 (Federal Election Commission 1990a, 1). There was a surge of new issue and ideological PACs in the early 1980s, but the total numbers have levelled off or even decreased in some categories, as shown in table table 1.5.
What particularly disturbs many advocates of reform is the increasing dependence of House and Senate candidates on PACs. PAC donations accounted for 24 percent of the contributions to Senate candidates and 40 percent of the contributions to House candidates during the 1987-88 election cycle; a small downturn to 22 percent in Senate campaigns and 38 percent in House campaigns occurred in the 1989-90 cycle. The growth of PAC contributions to Senate and House candidates over the years is shown in table 1.6.
In contrast, PACs play a relatively minor role in presidential contests. In 1988, these groups accounted for only 1.4 percent of all funding during the pre-nomination period, and four candidates during that period declined to accept PAC money (Alexander and Bauer 1991, 25).
Table 1.5 Growth of Political Action Committees, 1974-90
Source: Federal Election Commission.
* This category includes trade associations, membership and non-connected (so-called ideological)
Table 1.6 PAC contributions to congressional candidates, 1976-90
(in millions of dollars)
| Year | Amount |
| 1976 | 22.6 |
| 1978 | 34.1 |
| 1980 | 55.2 |
| 1982 | 83.6 |
| 1984 | 105.3 |
| 1986 | 132.7 |
| 1988 | 151.2 |
| 1990 | 150.6 |
Sources: Common Cause (1976); Federal Election Commission (1978-90).
Because many PACs are tied to powerful corporations, trade associations and unions with legislative interests in Congress, critics charge that wholesale vote buying is occurring. Such charges clearly overstate the case; studies of congressional behaviour have indicated that personal philosophy, party loyalties and an aversion to offending voting constituents are more influential factors than campaign contributions in determining the positions taken by members of Congress.
PACs, however, have created further perceptual problems at a time when Congress already is held in low regard by the American public. If PACs have not spawned vote buying, they have created a system in which money and access to legislators have become intertwined. Not only have reformers criticized PACs but so has the Republican congressional leadership in recent years, culminating in President Bush’s call for their elimination in his 1991 State of the Union address. This is ironic in view of the Republican record in the 1970s and early 1980s championing business PACs and encouraging their establishment. It was not until business PACs started to give more to Democratic incumbents that Republicans turned against PACs, at least in