Another serious incident occurred in May 1811. HMS Guerriere had seized an alleged deserter from an American brig and Captain John Rodgers was ordered to take his frigate, President, to cruise off the east coast. He spotted a warship, thought it was the frigate Guerriere, and proceeded to prepare for action. It turned out to be a much inferior sloop, the Little Belt, and after exchanging broadsides for some forty-five minutes, the Little Belt had suffered eleven dead and twenty-one wounded to one wounded on the President. The badly damaged British ship proceeded to Halifax. A court of inquiry in the United States concluded that the Little Belt began the fight by firing first. In his annual address to Congress, the president criticized British policy, “With this evidence of inflexibility, in trampling on the rights which no independent nation can relinquish; congress will feel the duty of putting the U. States into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations.”[31] That belligerent talk reflected the feelings of many Americans while in Britain newspapers expressed outrage.[32] Even a settlement of the Chesapeake affair could not cool tempers. The two countries were moving ever closer to open war.
Back in June 1807, the Leopard and Chesapeake crisis brought on the real danger of an Anglo-American war that could mean invasion of the Canadas. Thomas Dunn and Brock were well aware of these developments, but it seems that only the colonel was worried about the state of Lower Canada’s defences.[33] Brock told Dunn there were only 300 militia armed and instructed, while the walls of Quebec were so old and decayed that they were useless for defence. He asked for 600 to 1,000 men to be hired to work on the city’s defences and a large call out of militiamen. He wanted the work and training of militia done before spring, when he expected the first American attacks might come.[34] Dunn and his executive council felt much less alarm and raised many objections — such as possible resistance to a call up of militia, the cost of paying the men, and the lack of arms — to Brock’s requests. Brock attended a council meeting and then wrote a strongly worded letter (July 23) about the weaknesses of Quebec’s defences and his surprise at the government’s reluctance to call out the militia. The councillors may have had some concern about the loyalty of Lower Canada’s population in case of an American invasion. Brock had no doubt that the people would resist vigorously but he was less certain of this if the invaders included French troops.[35] Although Dunn balloted one-fifth of the militia, Brock saw this as inadequate, so he kept his regulars concentrated at Quebec. He did achieve the completion of works enclosing the upper town and raised a battery of eight 36-pounders in the centre of the citadel to command the river and its opposite banks. All this made a small improvement to the defences.
Another indication of Brock’s concern about defending the Canadas was his reaction to a proposal he received early in 1807 from the lieutenant of the County of Glengarry in Upper Canada. This proposal was made in the previous year when it seemed unnecessary, but now the threat of war appeared greater.[36] John McDonell suggested raising a corps of Highland Fencible Infantry from local inhabitants. (Fencible meant a regiment raised for service only in North America and the men were trained as regulars.)[37] That county was settled by Scots as early as 1784, with the 1803 addition of a large influx of Roman Catholic highlanders led by their priest, Alexander MacDonnell. He had been chaplain of a corps of Glengarry Fencibles in Scotland and when that regiment was disbanded in 1802, rather than struggle in poverty in the old country, many men and families emigrated to Upper Canada. In light of the shortage of troops in Lower Canada, it is not surprising that Brock heartily supported the proposal. Glengarry County is just over the Lower Canadian border from Montreal and Brock saw the corps as strengthening the defences of that city and even of Quebec. He also hoped that the corps “would hereafter become a nursery, from which the army might draw a number of hardy recruits.”[38] The following year, Craig would order Brock to contact “the Glengarry people” but the governor, seeing too many difficulties to recruiting, cancelled the scheme. It would, however, be revived in 1811 and with support from Sir George Prevost as well as Brock, the regiment would be established.
Meanwhile, Upper Canada’s lieutenant governor, Francis Gore, was concerned about apparent American threats to his colony, particularly what looked like warlike preparations at Detroit. He asked Brock to send weapons for the militia. Instead, Brock sent Lieutenant-Colonel Pye, deputy quartermaster general, to convey the commander’s views to Gore, advise him on the defence of Upper Canada, and collect information for Brock. Brock made it clear that because of Lower Canada’s defence needs, he was unable to send arms or men to the upper province. Dissatisfied with Brock’s response, Gore travelled to Montreal for a face-to-face meeting. Brock continued his refusal to send troops and weapons, pointing out that he had sent 4,000 muskets to Upper Canada leaving only 7,000 for distribution in Lower Canada. He also made it clear that future responsibility for the defence of his province would rest with Gore, a burden that the lieutenant governor took on reluctantly.[39]
Francis Gore, lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada, 1806–11 and 1815–17, painted by George Theodore Berthon.
Archives of Ontario, 693125
The British government had made it clear to Craig that its strategy for the defence of the Canadas was based upon the preservation of Quebec City because of its fortifications and its accessibility to the Royal Navy. Brock would have been aware of this focus on Quebec and that Craig had informed Gore of the government’s strategic priorities, which meant that Upper Canada could expect little aid in the form of British troops. However, Craig suggested that Gore summon aboriginal leaders to a meeting to renew the traditional bond of friendship with the Crown. Gore, after making some changes in the Indian Department personnel, would organize meetings in 1808 for various native delegations at Amherstburg. At a public council in July, one of these leaders was the Prophet Tenskwatawa’s brother, Tecumseh. These concerns and developments might seem remote from Brock’s life, but in a few years they would become some of his most vital concerns.
Perhaps another reason that Brock could give little attention to Upper Canadian concerns was that he was distracted by a financial mess in the Commissary Department. A good deal of money flowed through this department because, while it was the army’s financial office, it also handled buying, storing, and distributing the army’s provisions and other supplies. John Craigie had been appointed deputy commissary general in 1781 and commissary general in 1784, but he had a lot of other business and political interests.[40] For whatever reasons, his accounts for 1806 contained many unexplained expenditures. When Brock raised questions about them, he was met with obstruction by Craigie, who claimed that he acted under a special arrangement agreed to by Brock’s predecessor and even had to the nerve to suggest that Brock lacked the authority to inquire into the commissary’s affairs. That was certainly not the way to respond to Isaac Brock. He continued to probe only to find an even worse situation. Craigie had received authority to draw £90,000 from the Treasury in Britain but had only paid a little more than half of this amount into the army’s fund. (The army’s bank in Canada was called the Military Chest.) Craigie refused, or was unable, to explain the discrepancy. While Craigie continued his obstruction, Brock reported to the British Treasury authorities that “no examination has occurred in his store account since the 24th of December, 1788. The account of fuel is likewise in arrear since the 24th of December, 1796, and the account of provisions since the 24th of June, 1800.”[41] Brock drew up regulations for the commissary but Craigie refused to implement them or to provide full information on his accounts to the government. It turned out that he was using army funds for his own uses. As a result, he was dismissed as commissary general in 1808 and sentenced to repay the missing money to the government. This had not been done by the time of his death, shortly after.
The mismanagement of government funds and dissimulation by government officials appeared in other instances. Upon learning of these problems, Brock liked to act quickly and decisively. For example, in 1807, when he learned that the pay of the men in the Marine Department at Kingston was seven months in arrears, he sent an officer there to conduct an inquiry. In the same year, he ordered all commissaries at posts in Upper Canada to send their accounts in proper form to Quebec or face dismissal.[42]
He was also involved in another controversy in 1807. He was