Painting by Peter Rindlisbacher
Brock anticipated the opening moves of the war and the capture of those two American posts would have precisely the effect he expected. He put the strength of the local militia at 700 men, too few for offensive operations. If a rupture seemed imminent, he proposed to reinforce Amherstburg with 200 regulars from Fort George and York, which would clearly indicate to both natives and militia that the government would resist an attack. Another vital need was to upgrade Fort Amherstburg. He sent Captain M.C. Dixon of the Royal Engineers to Malden in spring 1812 with the task of making improvements. On July 8th, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas St. George, the commanding officer, reported to Brock, “We are hard at work at the Fort and have done a great deal since you left us … [Walls had been strengthened and twenty cannon mounted.] In short, every exertion possible is made by us.”[35]
From Amherstburg to Fort Erie, Upper Canada depended for its defence on a naval force, but it consisted of only a ship and a schooner “of bad construction, old,” and badly in need of repair. Brock reported that the Americans had two vessels “both in perfect readiness for any service.” Whatever the disparity of force, when it came to the test the British would prevail by using their vessels effectively and by capturing the American brig. However, Brock pointed out that if Fort St. Joseph’s were to be maintained and (in the event of war) Michilimackinac attacked, “many vessels” would have to be hired or purchased.
He mentioned that the Americans were already manning a warship at Sackets Harbor on Lake Ontario. Indeed, a recruiting party had come to Buffalo and “a petty officer” even had the nerve to cross the border to seek recruits. The magistrates were informed but the American escaped. It seems Brock had sources of information on the other side.
Next he dealt with the Niagara frontier, where he believed the main invasion attempt would come “with a view to conquest. All other attacks will be subordinate, or merely made to divert our attention.” He estimated that nearly 3,000 militia and 500 native fighters could be collected along this line and, together with the regulars, they would provide and effective defence against anything but a very large force. Besides urging the need for regular troops, he pleaded for gunners, drivers, and horses to complete the Car Brigade. This was a volunteer corps of farmers who employed their horses in drawing field guns for the army. He also wanted a body of cavalry and reported that he had already received offers “from many respectable young men” to form a troop. All they needed from Lower Canada were swords and pistols.
Map of the Niagara Frontier.
Used with permission of Geoffrey Matthews
Brock dealt finally with Kingston and the eastern end of Upper Canada. He believed the militia from the Bay of Quinte to Glengarry County to be the most dependable in the province. Those from the Bay could be stationed at Kingston, but from the town eastward the men would prefer to remain to protect their property against raids from the American shore. Brock expected that the Americans would likely raid across the St. Lawrence and so it would be best to have the militia watching American movements since, whenever the men were needed elsewhere, they could be moved quickly. He praised Richard Cartwright, “the senior militia colonel at Kingston,” but because of that post’s distance from York or Fort George, Brock urged the appointment of a regular officer “of high rank” to direct any operations there. Major Donald Macpherson of the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion would take command at Kingston.[36]
He concluded by assuring Sir George, “It will ever be my utmost pride to meet your views and to merit your approbation.” When it came to actual campaigns in 1812, Brock would not always conform exactly to Prevost’s wishes, for the governor preferred passive defence whereas the major-general believed the best course was to attack first. In this letter of December 2nd, before he was swamped by the necessities of warfare, Brock showed his ability to outline a strategic vision. It is clear, also, that Brock expected Upper Canada to be defended vigorously whatever difficulties that involved.
The very next day, Brock returned to the most serious problem in terms of defending Upper Canada. He wrote to Prevost, “My first care, on my arrival in this province, was to direct the officers of the Indian Department at Amherstburg to exert their whole influence with the Indians to prevent the attack which I understood a few tribes meditated against the American frontier.” He believed these efforts had failed and that the natives faced destruction. Probably he was referring to their defeat at Tippecanoe, where their casualties were fewer than those of the Americans and neither their forces nor their spirit were destroyed.[37]
What is unusual is that Prevost used Brock’s letter in an unexpected way. He sent an extract of it to the British minister in Washington, A.J. Foster, so that he could use it to counter any charges that the British government was inciting native people against the United States. As well, Prevost enclosed an extract in a dispatch to Liverpool pointing out that Brock had anticipated Liverpool’s directions, dated July 28, 1811, to officials in Canada to do everything possible to restrain the Indians.
It was obvious that one of the major considerations for the defence of Upper Canada was the role of native nations. There was no unanimity among the Six Nations on the Grand River about supporting the British should war break out with the United States. The Iroquois in New York State had no choice because they lived on reserves surrounded by American settlements. For a variety of reasons — mainly concerns about their own safety — the New York Iroquois sought to persuade the Iroquois on the Grand to adopt a neutral stance in the event of war. British abandonment of native allies in 1783 (Treaty of Paris) and 1794 (Battle of Fallen Timbers) was remembered, not least among the Six Nations. On the Grand there were pro-American, pro-British, and neutralist factions. There was also discord between followers of John Norton, also known as Teyoninhokarawen, who favoured strong links with the British Army, and Deputy Superintendent-General William Claus, who sought to uphold the Indian Department’s influence. Brock’s efforts to gain aboriginal support for the defence of Upper Canada would be complicated by these many divisions and personal animosities among the Six Nations. These difficulties and the roles of Norton and Claus will be dealt with in later chapters.[38] In effect, the British found themselves between a rock and a hard place because their influence depended largely upon supplying natives with provisions, including weapons and ammunition. To cut off those supplies would remove any chance of restraint on their warriors’ actions. At the same time, the Americans believed that the British were providing the means for frontier warfare, if not actually encouraging attacks on settlers. “From the American perspective, the reality on the ground was a degree of co-operation between Britain and Natives that was a threat. As a consequence, defeating the Natives was, in part, to the Americans a way of hitting Britain, whether or not the two powers were at war.”[39]
Major John Norton, Teyoninhokarawen. Watercolor on ivory, 1805, by Mary Ann Knight.
LAC, C128832
The distribution of “presents,” rewards, and payments to native peoples was a recurrent theme before and during the war. There were both practical and symbolic reasons for this British policy. The army gave supplies to the Six Nations to persuade them to take up arms in defence of Upper Canada, and to western nations because their warriors could not support their families when on campaigns. In June 1812, on behalf of the Grand River people, Norton requested a “regular stipend” for warriors, “otherwise want [would] oblige them to return to their usual occupations for the Support of their families.” Brock replied that “he saw clearly the propriety of my remark,” at the same time adding that he thought “Goods might answer the purpose better than money.”[40] Although the Iroquois were being influenced by “the cash economy,” gifts of goods were of greater importance. Great quantities of these were given, including thousands of guns, gun locks, pistols,