This book will examine the activities of the organized working class in the period leading to the victory of the Cuban revolutionary forces in 1959. An analysis of these activities in the Cuban case can add to the wider debate about the relationship between working-class mass action and the armed struggle in the context of opposition to an authoritarian regime. The political economy of Cuba in the 1950s will be examined to determine the extent to which economic considerations affected the course of the revolution. The book will analyze why some groups of workers supported the rebels from an early stage, while others stayed loyal to their official leaders or to the Communist Party. The role of the Communist Party has been shrouded in an ideological mist arising from the Cold War. An examination of the party’s public statements and details from primary sources about the manner in which party members applied these policies paint a more nuanced picture than is usually given.
It is not my intention here to deny the importance of the guerrillas or the middle-class underground in the fight to overthrow Batista, but rather to argue that neither view presents a complete picture, that there was a third arm to the rebel forces, a revolutionary labor movement. The findings of my research clearly suggest there has been a silencing of this third dimension, intentional or otherwise. One obvious reason for this is that the story of a few heroic guerrillas overcoming seemingly impossible odds makes for a romantic story, whereas the recounting of dogged labor activity does not have the same appeal. In the early days of revolutionary Cuba, this romance was a weapon in the hands of the more radical elements in the leadership in their battles with those, often associated with the urban underground, who wished to slow the pace of change. From the other end of the political spectrum, the idea that the Cuban Revolution was the work of a few individuals without mass support also suited its enemies in the United States, and this helps explain their apparent belief that the death of Fidel Castro was all that was required to reverse the changes.
This book therefore challenges the notion that the revolution emerged from a rural guerrilla struggle in which the organized working class played no role and that the workers who did participate did so as individual citizens rather than as part of an organized labor movement. It will document substantial labor organizing, which played a pivotal role in key places and times in the 1950s, especially outside Havana and markedly in eastern Cuba. It is my intention to give organized labor its due credit for the role it played in the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship.
By focusing on the period from 1952 to 1959, my emphasis is on the insurrection rather than the outcome of the Cuban Revolution and thus the eventual effect on the structure of the state, the economy, and society. Nevertheless, understanding the social forces involved in the insurrection phase of a revolution is essential to an understanding of the subsequent changes in the structure of society. It is a question of examining the level of participation of workers in the events of the time, acting collectively rather than as individual citizens, and analyzing how workers’ class interests fitted into the wider class structure, national politics and the economy.
A picture emerges of a vibrant clandestine milieu in which working-class militants debated, collaborated, and competed for influence, but always in the context of organizing active opposition to the dictatorship. In order to recount the events considered vital to the analysis of the role of the Cuban working class in the insurrection, this narrative is organized on a chronological basis. Such an approach requires a periodization in order to be intelligible and, in terms of working-class politics and activity, we can divide the Batista years into distinct periods, divided by qualitative changes in the level of state repression. Tony Kapcia, writing about fifty years of the Cuban Revolution, punctuates this account by the various crises affecting Cuban society.3 This approach also proved useful as a method of dividing the period leading up to the rebel victory. Of course, it may be argued that the period was one of continual crisis, but within this, there were peaks and troughs that provoked changes and turns in the tactics of both the government and the rebels.
From Batista’s coup in March 1952 until the fraudulent elections of November 1954, little changed from the days of Batista’s predecessor, President Carlos Prío Socarrás. The fall in the price of sugar caused a crisis in the economy, and from the end of 1954 until the end of 1956, there was a concerted effort by the government and the employers to increase productivity by reducing workers’ wages and decreasing staffing levels. This was achieved by a combination of collaboration with the trade union bureaucracy and relatively low levels of state repression, with police habitually beating workers with clubs and dousing them with fire hoses but with very few deaths. The arrival of the Granma and the start of the rebel insurgency was a crisis for the regime, whose approach changed in early 1957 as the forces of the state began to confront the armed guerrillas in the mountains. From this point in time, the regime used death squads, routine torture, and “disappearances” in an attempt to make organized resistance cower to its rule. April 1958 proved to be a crisis point for the rebels as their attempt at a general strike failed disastrously. This crisis caused both the Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio (MR-26-7, Revolutionary Movement 26 of July) and the communist Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Popular Socialist Party) to rethink their tactics and their relationship with each other. It also gave increased confidence to the government and, during the summer and autumn of 1958, Batista launched a full-scale military attack on the rebels in their mountain strongholds. The failure to destroy the rebel army was the regime’s final crisis and created a situation in which a successful general strike would force the dictator from office. The chapter structure follows this periodization, with chapters 1 and 2 forming an introductory background, chapters 3 and 4 examining the period 1954 to 1956, chapters 5 and 6 dealing with 1957 to mid-1958, chapter 7 the second half of 1958, and chapter 8 taking the history into the first year of the revolutionary government.
Chapter 1 examines the nature and history of the Cuban working class, its political and industrial organization, informed by a discussion of the historical role of the trade union bureaucracy.
Chapter 2 considers the state of the Cuban economy in this period. Given the overwhelming importance of sugar in the national economy, the falling price on the world market led to an economic crisis. This in turn led Cuban employers to seek to maintain their profit margins by means of a productivity drive, which, given the strength of the trade unions, could only be achieved under an authoritarian regime. This is offered as an explanation for the support from business interests for the 1952 coup and subsequent dictatorship.
Chapter 3 recounts the history of the class struggles of the year 1955 and stresses the importance of these strikes for the relationship between militant workers and the July 26 Movement. In particular the battles of that year are analyzed in terms of the success or failure of the employers’ productivity drive.
Chapter 4 argues that the defeat in most of the 1955 disputes