Subsequently, with the arrival to power of liberalism, the strengthening of the nascent Communist Party and the appearance of important figures such as Gaitán, Law 22 of 1936 was issued, which in practice upheld the economic, political and social power of the landowner, granting a new legitimacy to private ownership whilst not necessarily democratizing land tenure.
The second period is determined by the plans of the Frente Nacional, in which Carlos Lleras Restrepo, president at that time, in order to end the unproductive estates of the landowners, proposed a new agrarian reform, stimulating the organization of the campesino population. This was consolidated through Law 135 of 1961 which allowed the use of strong mechanisms, such as land consolidation, to provide “Unidades Agrícolas Familiares” or “Household Farming Units” to smallholders affecting privately owned land, nearby and close to the smallholding areas, whatever their degree of exploitation (Villamil, 2015, p. 10). Despite the measures taken, in 1972, a coalition of large landowners, threatened by the empowerment of campesino organizations, prompted the “Pact of Chicoral” with the support of the National Government and the dominant political parties. This later became Law 4 of 1973, which prevented the legal structure of land tenure from being modified for the benefit of the Colombian campesinos, thus halting said reform.
Under similar circumstances, during the eighties, due to the expansion of the agrarian frontier:
Thousands of settlers arrived in remote and forgotten jungle areas, driven by the coffee crisis and the rise of agribusiness, mining, oil and coca. In these regions of recent colonization, the state presence had been very weak, resulting in armed groups, guerrillas to begin with and then also paramilitaries, taking their place. This in turn aggravated the economic opening processes promoted at the beginning of the nineties. (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, p. 53).
Finally, the third period is the one characterized by the agrarian reform of 1994, established with Law 160. This law focused on establishing a mechanism to affect the agrarian structure through the redistribution of land by trade, that is, through the direct purchase of land by campesinos, partially subsidized by the State and mediated by the institutional action of the “Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria” (Incora) or the “Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform”. However, this did not mean true redistribution, nor was the increasing dispossession and displacement caused by the armed conflict taken into account (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, p. 50).
In this sense, the same laws that should have favored the campesinos, turned out to be those that secured the landowner in the tenure of the land, which, together with the disappointment of the campesinos, ended up worsening conflicts over land. As Alfredo Molano puts it, “Law 200 is the axis around which agrarian conflicts have revolved since the armed struggle took root” (2015, p. 9), because not remedying the high levels of land tenure inequality and not providing legal settings that facilitate access to it, has led campesinos to continue fighting for the dream of agrarian reform, even if that means fighting with weapons (Pineda, 2016, p. 19).
Peace processes in Colombia: the intent and the reality of an effective agreement
The internal armed conflict, since its inception, has had a serious effect on social and institutional structures, prompting several governments to try and establish channels of dialogue with belligerent groups. These processes, although with varied interests and scope, failed to successfully consolidate a path to peacebuilding. They did, however, contribute to the identification of stakeholders, contexts, routes and, above all, generate lessons for the consolidation of the current peace process.
Thus, tradition in the face of negotiations has long been a part of the country’s history, dating back to the fifties where, after the coup d’état of General Rojas Pinilla, two initiatives to cancel the violence arose. The first of these was aimed at granting amnesty for the campesinos and day laborers aligned with the liberal guerrillas; and the second, was derived from the partisan agreement of traditional political groups that gave rise to the National Front. However, the exclusionary nature of these agreements and the lack of State protection for the nascent organizations and mobilizations prevented the initially established objective from being achieved.
Once the armed conflict intensified, with the appearance of new participants in the eighties, the Governments of Belisario Betancur and Virgilio Barco proposed a series of initiatives aimed at negotiation.
The government of Belisario Betancur foresaw, given the crisis of legitimacy of the institutional order, that it was urgent to make progress towards a political solution. In this way, they started by recognizing the political nature of the guerrillas and with that, opted for a proposal that combined direct dialogue with the armed groups and an impetus to reforms that would take the social problem into account. The first one was performed with a policy of political openness and amnesty for the armed groups, and the second, connected with other social programs with the national rehabilitation program. (López, 1999, p.249).
This was reflected in the signing of the first ceasefire agreement with the FARC-EP, the M-19 and the EPL, as well as in the creation of the “Unión Patriótica” or “Patriotic Union” as a political party. However, the breach of the agreements by the Government, the absence of guarantees to exercise a political opposition, the continuous attacks on the civilian population and the actions of the paramilitary groups, resulted in the signed agreements not culminating satisfactorily (García-Durán, 2010). Despite this, the Betancur period laid the foundations for future negotiations, helping to change perceptions about the guerrilla problem and the need to articulate dialogue with reforms (López, 1999, p. 250).
For its part, the government of Virgilio Barco adhered to the “outstretched and firm hand” formula, a strategy oriented both towards negotiations with guerrilla movements and to actions to counteract the objective causes of violence (López, 1999, p. 250). Its mandate was marked by the creation of the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar, made up of the FARC, ELN, M-19, PRT and the Quintín Lame movement, which aimed to unify the guerrilla movement in its political, military and organizational aspects to design a road map for the signing of a peace agreement. However, this initiative failed to consolidate, because years later the M-19 and part of the EPL signed a peace agreement with the Government with the other guerrilla groups being left out of that agreement.
The nineties, with an air of renewal derived from the “Asamblea Nacional Constituyente” or “National Constituent Assembly” and the transition to the “Estado Social de Derecho” or “Social State of Law”, was characterized by two scenarios: one, featuring various negotiations and demobilizations of armed actors and, the other, marked with the intensifying of the armed struggle and increased levels of military persecution by the State. Among the various negotiations and pacts of this stage, some of the more notable include the signing of peace agreements with: the PRT, the Armed Indigenous Movement “Quintín Lame”, a fraction of the ELN and another part of the EPL. There were also peace negotiations, albeit fruitless, with the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinating Board in Tlaxcala, Mexico, during the presidential term of César Gaviria and with the ELN and EPL during the term of Ernesto Samper. With Andrés Pastrana, new formal negotiations were initiated with the FARC in the Caguán peace process, as will be seen below. In the first decade of the 21st century, the dialogues with the armed groups took a new direction, as approaches and negotiations during the administration of Álvaro Uribe were held with paramilitary groups instead of with the still active guerrilla movements –mainly the FARC-EP and ELN–. As a result of this process, the Ralito Agreement was consolidated, which achieved the demobilization of several paramilitary structures.
Peacebuilding in Colombia
After more than half a century of armed confrontation and failed negotiations with the FARC-EP, a new process has been initiated in Colombia, aimed at building a stable and lasting peace involving structural reforms not addressed in previous processes. It is therefore essential to articulate the transitional justice mechanisms proposed in the Peace Agreement together with the existing state institutions. The successful implementation of the Agreement, which will surely be complicated and extensive, will depend to a large extent on ensuring the realization of the rights afforded to the victims of the armed conflict.
Transitional justice processes