If we delve into the roots of this problem, a critical reading of the history of Colombia as a nation shows that, since its inception, the country has lived in a permanent state of conflict due –essentially– to two factors; the political power dispute and the control of the land and its natural resources.
Power and political participation
The constant limitations to democracy have been an incentive for the prolongation of the conflict. These are manifested in actions of state power that materialize in restrictive forms of political and citizen participation, protest and dissent, carried out through legitimate and illegitimate measures, as well as under the configuration of long derogation periods that lasted until the expedition of the current Political Constitution of 1991; circumstances that resulted in the decrease of individual rights and freedoms of citizens.
As a consequence of the political power dispute and the traditional competition between the elites, we witnessed the persecution and murder of presidential candidates, the privatization of public corporations, the extermination of social movements, raids, detentions, torture and disappearances, among other crimes committed under the shadow of constant disagreement between liberals and conservatives. But it was not until the murder of the liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, in April 1948, when the deepest differences between the two traditional political parties emerged, giving rise to the first guerrilla movements. These were initially sponsored by the liberal party as an armed response to the abuses of the conservative government of Laureano Gómez who, supported by military forces and some ecclesiastical sectors, had implemented a policy of extermination of the opposing party during the historical period known as “La Violencia” or “The Violence”.
However, the desire for power of both parties led to the liberal leaders, having fled the country before the conservative harassment in the toughest stage of La Violencia, making an agreement with Laureano Gómez and his party to form the coalition of the “Frente Nacional” or “National Front” and relieve the de facto president, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, from power. And so, a new political period of equitable distribution of power between liberals and conservatives began, replacing the previous efforts and achievements of pacifists, in large part, by social and guerrilla movements.
The guerrilla leaders that survived this period considered the agreed upon terms as a betrayal by the liberal chiefs, so they reoriented their discourse as liberal guerrillas towards Marxist ideas –encouraged, in turn, by the triumph of the Cuban Revolution– and began to nurture the prospect of taking power by force and defeating the government in power. They were especially motivated by their main objective; of ending the pact between liberals and conservatives, which had excluded them from any possibility of political participation within the State.
The dominant concept –from which power was approached, the conflict originated and the insurgency inspired– was based on the binary ideological schemes associated with the context of the East-West conflict, ignoring the diagnoses of the underlying social problems. This was a position shared by both private unions and the Government.
For example:
The military treatment given to the guerrilla movement was the same as that given to social protest, which was criminalized. The issuance of the “Estatuto de Seguridad” or “Security Statute” by the Turbay government, promulgated by Decree 1923 of September 6th, 1978, is proof of this. Through this statute, the military was granted the power to judge the common crimes of civilians, rendering the application of Habeas Corpus useless. (López, 1999, p. 1405).
Concurrent to the strengthening of the insurgency and the escalation of the armed conflict, drug trafficking appeared as a phenomenon that, although not a root cause of the conflict, has been one of the main causes of its intensification and aggravation. Drug trafficking, especially linked to the cultivation of coca and the production and export of cocaine, permeated all the social and political structures of the State. It brought with it almost unlimited resources, which resulted in an expansion and resurgence of the conflict that almost ended the State itself. (Vacas, 2015, p. 80).
Thus, in light of the attacks by different guerrilla groups on drug traffickers, emerald miners and cattle ranchers, particularly, under the government of Ernesto Samper, the go-ahead was given for the creation of the Convivir, Rural Security Cooperatives of a private nature in charge of informing agents of the State on the presence of guerrillas. These cooperatives eventually became the “Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia” or “United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia”, a paramilitary organization that, with the support of the “lords and landowners” was constituted as the largest criminal structure that ever existed in the country, turning the nineties and part of the new century into one of the most bloodthirsty and violent periods in Colombia’s history.
Both guerrillas and paramilitaries have instrumentalized the institutions and mechanisms of democracy according to their interests; not only the elections, but also the spaces for social participation, protest and social movements, such as community boards or unions. Both have violently punished the gestures of autonomy made by communities and social leaders. Democracy has been seen by all armed actors as both a positioning opportunity and, in turn, a threat to their war plans. Thus, the different forms of struggle have been combined, dangerously mixing war and politics. Therefore, from this perspective, the great victim of this conflict has been democracy itself (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, p. 52).
Armed conflict and land control
Together with political control, the agrarian question constitutes one of the central axes of the Colombian armed conflict. In the opinion of the “Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica” or “National Historical Memory Center”:
It is not only because the land remains an unfulfilled promise for a large part of the rural population, but also because until the Peace Accords are signed, there is a state deficit in the countryside and a strong, firmly rooted presence of armed groups that today have found adequate space for the exercise of illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, in the rural sector. (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, p. 49).
The land problem is not a recent issue, but instead has been brewing from the nineteenth century through to the present day. The land issue has been determined by different political, institutional and legislative actions over the different historical periods, and characterized by a common denominator; the continuance of the concentration of agricultural property in the hands of a minority, which is the main cause of the serious situation of poverty and social inequality that characterizes Colombia, especially in rural areas.
There are three fundamental periods to understanding the worsening of this conflict. The first, from the end of the 19th century until 1958, where the result of the Thousand Days’ War and the promulgation of the Political Constitution of 1886, consolidated a national project in which the elites held power, leaving out the rest of society. This caused a social upheaval, promoted mainly by the “campesino”1 population, who saw how wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few, resulting in conflicts between large landowners and smallholders. This occurred under the influence of three major crises: the demographic, which affected the balance between the population and natural resources, the opening of the land market and the integration of campesino production into trade channels, and the crisis of authority, which weakened the power of traditional elites and dislocated the mechanisms of domination (Bejarano, 1985).
In order to resolve such a conflict, Law 114 of 1922 authorized, for the first time, the creation of agricultural settlements under a policy of colonization of barren lands. With this, the role of the State was directed in two ways: to standardize certain guidelines to –apparently– favor the campesinos in need of land; and at the same time, use force mechanisms to prevent said population from taking over the land they cultivated. Thus, the institutional response to the demands of the campesinos oscillated between a policy of the allocation of plots with compensation