Suggestions for Further Reading
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. J. Gray, 1998, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. G. Sher, second edition, 2001, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, ed. J. M. Robson, 1989, London: Penguin.
N. Capaldi, 2004, John Stuart Mill: A Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
J. Gray and G. W. Smith (eds), 1991, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty in Focus, London: Routledge.
J. Riley, 1998, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Liberty, London: Routledge.
W. Thomas, 1985, John Stuart Mill, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Detailed Summary of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty
Chapter I (pp. 5–19)
Introductory
The subject of this essay is not the ‘Liberty of the Will’, but ‘Civil or Social Liberty’: the ‘nature and limits’ of the power which society can legitimately exercise over the individual (p. 5). Recent social changes make it urgent to address this rarely discussed, but divisive, question.
The ‘struggle between Liberty and Authority’ is one with which study of the history of Greece, Rome and England makes us familiar (pp. 5–6). However, in the past, it took place between governments and their subjects, with the latter seeking ‘protection against the tyranny’ of the former (p. 6). Generally, the position of a country’s rulers was seen as ‘antagonistic’ to that of its subjects (p. 6). To protect the weak against the strong, it was necessary to have ‘an animal of prey stronger than the rest’, but, as rulers also preyed on the weak, ‘patriots’ sought to limit their powers (p. 6). One way of doing this was to obtain ‘political rights’, infringement of which would justify ‘rebellion’; another, the creation of ‘constitutional checks’, so that government acts required the ‘consent’ of a representative body (p. 6). Most European rulers were eventually ‘compelled’ to concede the first ‘limitation’ of their power, but the second has proved harder to achieve (p. 6).
However, a time came when it ceased to seem inevitable that the interests of ruler and ruled should be opposed; the best protection against abuse of power would be to have elected governments (p. 6). This became the objective of ‘popular’ parties, and, as the ‘struggle proceeded’, the view gained ground, particularly within ‘European liberalism’, that there would be no need to limit the powers of such governments (p. 7). As they exercised ‘the nation’s own power’, they could be trusted not to abuse it (p. 7).
However, success reveals problems that failure might have concealed. The establishment of ‘elective and responsible’ governments showed that ‘such phrases as “self-government”, and “the power of the people over themselves”, do not express the true state of the case’ (p. 8). Rulers and ruled are not ‘always the same people’, while the ‘will of the people’ is that of its ‘most numerous’ or ‘most active part’ (p. 8). It became clear that it is important to limit the powers of ‘accountable’ governments over individuals, and to establish safeguards against the ‘“tyranny of the majority”’ (p. 8).
Such tyranny is still generally held to operate through governments, but, when ‘society is itself the tyrant’, it often takes the form of ‘social tyranny’ (p. 8). This can be worse than ‘political oppression’, because ‘prevailing opinion’ penetrates so ‘deeply into the details of life’ (pp. 8–9). Protection is needed against society’s tendency to impose ‘its own ideas and practices’ on those who do not share them (p. 9). It is as important to set (and maintain) limits to ‘the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence’ as it is to resist ‘political despotism’ (p. 9).
But, although the enforcement of ‘restraints’ on others’ actions is what makes existence ‘valuable’, there is still (apart from a few obvious cases) a lot of work to be done on the question of where to set these restraints (p. 9). No two periods of history have ‘decided it alike’, but ‘the magical influence of custom’ has prevented doubt about the rules of conduct which have been adopted (p. 9). As people have been encouraged to regard their feelings as the best guide on this issue, they believe that others should be required to act as they ‘would like them to’ (p. 10). And, for the ‘ordinary man’, there is no better justification for his ‘notions of morality, taste or propriety’ than that they are his own preferences (p. 10). Indeed, this is his ‘chief guide’ in most matters, including interpretation of his ‘religious creed’ (p. 10). Of course, if there is an ‘ascendant class’, a large part of a country’s morality comes from its ‘class interests’ (pp. 10–11). Other factors determining acceptance of rules of conduct are the ‘supposed preferences or aversions’ of rulers or gods, or the interests of society (p. 11).
However, the rules of conduct a society adopts often have more to do with its ‘likings and dislikings’ than anything else. And those with new ideas are usually more concerned with ensuring their general acceptance than with defending freedom, or addressing the issue of whether or not what society prefers ‘should be a law to individuals’ (p. 11). The only exception has been in religion. Although most of the opponents of the Roman Catholic Church were also intolerant of religious differences, in situations where it was clear that no one religious group was going to be dominant, it was recognized that there would have to be agreement to differ. So, it is in relation to religion that the ‘rights of the individual’ have been asserted on ‘grounds of principle’; and it is claimed that no one is accountable to others for his religious beliefs (p. 12). However, in practice, full religious freedom is only found where there is ‘religious indifference’; even in countries where there is toleration, most genuinely religious people have reservations about it (p. 12).
England differs from most continental countries: while the ‘yoke of opinion’ may be heavier, ‘that of law is lighter’ (p. 12). This is not so much due to respect for individual independence as to the view that the government and public have ‘opposite’ interests (p. 13). However, attitudes in England could change if people come to regard the government as representing their opinions and interests. Further, opposition to government ‘interference’ is indiscriminate, because there is no ‘recognized principle’ for testing its ‘propriety or impropriety’ (p. 13).
The ‘object of this Essay’ is to propose ‘one very simple principle’, by which to regulate society’s ‘dealings’ with individuals, whether through the law or ‘the moral coercion of public opinion’ (pp. 13–14). It is that, ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (p. 14). His own good, whether physical or moral, is not a ‘sufficient warrant’ (p. 14). While there may be good reasons for trying to persuade people into, or out of, actions that may cause good or harm to themselves, there is no justification for coercion or punishment. In conduct which affects only himself,