To declare a patriot suspected is to deprive him of all that he most highly values—confidence and esteem.
In what class am I placed?
Since the commencement of the Revolution, have I not always been attached to its principles?
Have I not always been contending either with domestic enemies or foreign foes?
I sacrificed my home, abandoned my property, and lost everything for the Republic?
I have since served with some distinction at Toulon, and earned a part of the laurels of the army of Italy at the taking of Saorgio, Oneille, and Tanaro.
On the discovery of Robespierre's conspiracy, my conduct was that of a man accustomed to look only to principles.
My claim to the title of patriot, therefore cannot be disputed.
Why, then, am I declared suspected without being heard, and arrested eight days after I heard the news of the tyrant's death.
I am declared suspected, and my papers are placed under seal.
The reverse of this course ought to have been adopted. My papers should first have been sealed; then I should have been called on for my explanation; and, lastly, declared suspected, if there was reason for coming to, such a decision.
It is wished that I should go to Paris with an order which declares me suspected. It will naturally be presumed that the representatives did not draw up this decree without accurate information, and I shall be judged with the bias which a man of that class merits.
Though a patriot and an innocent and calumniated man, yet whatever measures may be adopted by the Committee I cannot complain.
If three men declare that I have committed a crime, I cannot complain of the jury who condemns me.
Salicetti, you know me; and I ask whether you have observed anything in my conduct for the last five years which can afford ground of suspicion?
Albitte, you do not know me; but you have received proof of no fact against me; you have not heard me, and you know how artfully the tongue of calumny sometimes works.
Must I then be confounded with the enemies of my country and ought the patriots inconsiderately to sacrifice a general who has not been useless to the Republic? Ought the representatives to reduce the Government to the necessity of being unjust and impolitic?
Hear me; destroy the oppression that overwhelms me, and restore me to the esteem of the patriots.
An hour after, if my enemies wish for my life, let them take it. I have often given proofs how little I value it. Nothing but the thought that I may yet be useful to my country makes me bear the burden of existence with courage.
It appears that this defence, which is remarkable for its energetic simplicity, produced an effect on Albitte and Salicetti. Inquiries more accurate, and probably more favourable to the General, were instituted; and on the 3d Fructidor (20th August 1794) the representatives of the people drew up a decree stating that, after a careful examination of General Bonaparte's papers, and of the orders he had received relative to his mission to Genoa, they saw nothing to justify any suspicion of his conduct; and that, moreover, taking into consideration the advantage that might accrue to the Republic from the military talents of the said General Bonaparte, it was resolved that he should be provisionally set at liberty.
—[With reference to the arrest of Bonaparte (which lasted thirteen
days) see 'Bourrienne et ses Erreurs', tome i. pp. 16–28, and Iung,
tome ii. pp. 443–457. Both, in opposition to Bourrienne, attribute
the arrest to his connection with the younger Robespierre.
Apparently Albitte and Salicetti wets not acquainted with the secret
plan of campaign prepared by the younger Robespierre and by
Bonaparte, or with the real instructions given for the mission to
Genoa. Jealousy between the representatives in the staff of the
army of the Alps and those with the army of Italy, with which
Napoleon was, also played a part in the affair. Iung looks on
Salicetti as acting as the protector of the Bonapartes; but Napoleon
does not seem to have regarded him in that light; see the letter
given in Tunot, vol. i. p. 106, where in 1795 he takes credit for
not returning the ill done to him; see also the same volume, p. 89.
Salicetti eventually became Minister of Police to Joseph, when King
of Naples, in 1806; but when he applied to return to France,
Napoleon said to Mathieu Dumas, "Let him know that I am not powerful
enough to protect the wretches who voted for the death of Louis XVI.
from the contempt and indignation of the public" (Dumas, tome iii.
p. 318). At the same time Napoleon described Salicetti as worse
than the lazzaroni.]—
Salicetti afterwards became the friend and confidant of young Bonaparte; but their intimacy did not continue after his elevation.
What is to be thought of the motives for Bonaparte's arrest and provisional liberation, when his innocence and the error that had been committed were acknowledged? The importance of the General's military talents, though no mention is made about the impossibility of dispensing with them, is a pretence for restoring him to that liberty of which he had been unjustly deprived.
It was not at Toulon, as has been stated, that Bonaparte took Duroc into the artillery, and made him his 'aide de camp'.
—[Michel Duroc (1773–1813) at first only aide de camp to Napoleon,
was several times entrusted with special diplomatic missions (for
example, to Berlin, etc.) On the formation of the Empire he became
Grand Marechal du Palais, and Duc de Frioul. He always remained in
close connection with Napoleon until he was killed in 1813. As he
is often mentioned in contemporary memoirs under his abbreviated
title of 'Marshal', he has sometimes been erroneously included in
the number of the Marshals of the Empire—a military rank he never
attained to.]—
The acquaintance was formed at a subsequent period, in Italy. Duroc's cold character and unexcursive mind suited Napoleon, whose confidence he enjoyed until his death, and who entrusted him with missions perhaps above his abilities. At St. Helena Bonaparte often declared that he was much attached to Duroc. I believe this to be true; but I know that the attachment was not returned. The ingratitude of princes is proverbial. May it not happen that courtiers are also sometimes ungrateful?—[It is only just to Duroc to add that this charge does not seem borne out by the impressions of those more capable than Bourrienne of judging in the matter.]
CHAPTER III.
1794–1795.
Proposal to send Bonaparte to La Vendée—He is struck off the list
of general officers—Salicetti—Joseph's marriage with Mademoiselle
Clary—Bonaparte's wish to go to Turkey—Note explaining the plan of
his proposed expedition—Madame Bourrienne's