XVI. Its an usuall question, Whether Compacts extorted from us, through fear, do oblige, or not: For example, If to redeeme my life, from the power of a Robber, I promise to pay him 100 l. next day; and that I will doe no act whereby to apprehend, and bring him to Justice, whether I am tyed to keep promise, or not? But though such a Promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not to be accounted so, because it proceeded from fear, for then it would follow that those promises which reduc'd men to a civill life, and by which Lawes were made, might likewise be of none effect, (for it proceeds from fear of mutuall slaughter, that one man submits himselfe to the Dominion of another:) And he should play the fool finely, who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of his redemption. It holds universally true, that promises doe oblige when there is some benefit received; and that to promisee and the thing promised, be lawfull: But it is lawfull, for the redemption of my life, both to promise, and to give what I will of mine owne to any man, even to a Thief. We are oblig'd therefore. by promises proceeding from fear, except the Civill Law forbid them, by vertue whereof, that which is promised becomes unlawfull.
XVII. Whosoever shall contract with one to doe, or omit somewhat, and shall after Covenant the contrary with another; he maketh not the former, but the latter Contract unlawfull: for, he hath no longer Right to doe, or to omit ought, who by former Contracts hath conveyed it to another; wherefore he can conveigh no Right by latter Contracts, and what is promised, is promis'd without Right: He is therefore tyed onely to his first Contract; to break which is unlawfull.
XVIII. No man is oblig'd by any Contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his Body; for there is in every man a certain high degree of feare through which he apprehends that evill which is done to him to be the greatest, and therefore by naturall necessity he shuns it all he can, and 'tis suppos'd he can doe no otherwise: When a man is arrived to this degree of fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself either by flight, or fight. Since therefore no man is tyed to impossibilities, they who are threatned either with deathe (which is the greatest evill to nature) or wounds, or some other bodily hurts, and are not stout enough to bear them, are not obliged to endure them. Farthermore, he that is tyed by Contract is trusted, (for Faith only is the Bond of Contracts) but they who are brought to punishment, either Capitall, or more gentle, are fettered, or strongly guarded, which is a most certain signe that they seem' d not sufficiently bound from non resistance by their Contracts. Its one thing if I promise thus: If I doe it not at the day appointed, kill me. Another thing if thus: If I doe it not, though you should offer to kill me, I will not resist: All men, if need be, contract the first way; but there is need sometimes. This second way, none, neither is it ever needfull; for in the meer state of nature, if you have a mind to kill, that state it selfe affords you a Right; insomuch as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will afterward kill him. But in a Civill State, where the Right of life, and death, and of all corporall punishment is with the Supreme; that same Right of killing cannot be granted to any private person. Neither need the Supreme himselfe contract with any man patiently to yeeld to his punishment, but onely this, that no man offer to defend others from him. If in the state of nature, as between two Cities, there should a Contract be made, on condition of killing, if it were not perform'd, we must presuppose another Contract of not killing before the appointed day. Wherefore on that day, if there be no performance, the right of Warre returnes; that is, an hostile state, in which all things are lawfull, and therefore resistance also. Lastly, by the contract of not resisting, we are oblig'd of two Evills to make choice of that which seemes the greater; for certaine Death is a greater evill then Fighting; but of two Evills it is impossible not to chuse the least: By such a Compact therefore we should be tyed to impossibilities, which is contrary to the very nature of compacts.
XIX. Likewise no man is tyed by any Compacts whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by whose dammage he is like to procure himselfe a bitter life; wherefore neither is a Father oblig'd to bear witnesse against his Sonne, nor a Husband against his Wife, nor a Sonne against his Father; nor any man against any one, by whose meanes he hath his subsistance; for in vain is that testimony which is presum'd to be corrupted from nature; but although no man be tyed to accuse himself by any compact, yet in a publique tryall he may, by torture, be forc'd to make answer; but such answers are no testimony of the fact, but helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch as whether the party tortur'd his answer be true, or false, or whether he answer not at all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by Right.
XX. Swearing is a speech joyned to a promise, whereby the promiser declares his renouncing of Gods mercy, unlesse he perform his word; which definition is contained in the words themselves, which have in them the very essence of an Oath, to wit, so God help me, or other equivalent, as with the Romans, Doe thou Jupiter so destroy the deceiver, as I slay this same Beast: neither is this any let, but that an Oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory, as promissory; for he that confirmes his affirmation with an Oath, promiseth that he speaks truth. But though in some places it was the fashion for Subjects to Swear by their Kings; that custome took its Originall hence, That those Kings took upon them Divine Honour; for Oathes were therefore introduc'd that by Religion, and consideration of the Divine Power men might have a greater dread of breaking their Faiths, then that wherewith they fear men, from whose eyes their actions may lie hid.
XXI. Whence it followes, that an Oath must be conceived in that forme which he useth, who takes it; for in vain is any man brought to Swear by a God whom he beleeves not, and therefore neither feares him. For though by the light of nature it may be known that there is a God, yet no man thinks he is to Swear by him in any other fashion, or by any other name then what is contain'd in the precepts of his own proper, that is, (as he who Swears imagines) the true Religion.
XXII. By the definition of an Oath we may understand, that a bare Contract obligeth no lesse, then that to which we are Sworn; for it is the contract which binds us, the Oath relates to the Divine punishment, which it could not provoke, if the breach of contract were not in its selfe unlawfull; but it could not be unlawfull if the Contract were not obligatory. Furthermore, he that renounceth the mercy of God obligeth himselfe not to any punishment, because it is ever lawfull to deprecate the punishment howsoever provok'd, and to enjoy Gods Pardon if it be granted. The onely effect therefore of an Oath is this, To cause men who are naturally inclin'd to break all manner of faith, through fear of punishment, to make the more Conscience of their words and actions.
XXIII. To exact an Oath, where the breach of contract, if any be made, cannot but be known, and where the party compacted, withall wants not power to punish, is to do somewhat more then is necessary unto self-defence, and shewes a mind desirous not so much to benefit it selfe, as to prejudice another. For an Oath, out of the very form of swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of Gods anger, that is to say, of him that is Omnipotent against those who think, that by their own therefore violate their Faith, because they strength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is Omniscient against those, who therefore usually break their trust, because they hope that no man shall see them.
Chapter III
Of the other Lawes of Nature
I. Another of the Lawes of Nature is, to performe Contracts, or to keep trust; for it hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter that the Law of Nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain Peace; to conveigh certain rights from each to other, and that this (as often as it shall happen to be done) is called a Contract: But this is so farre forth onely conducible to peace, as we shall performe Our selves, what we contract with others, shall be done, or omitted; and in vaine would Contracts be made, unlesse we stood to them. Because therefore, to stand to our Covenants, Or to keep faith, is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace, it will prove by the second Article of the second Chapter to be a precept of the naturall Law.
II. Neither is there in this