XIII. But it is easily judg'd how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either of Man-kind, or of each single Man, a perpetuall War is: But it is perpetuall in its own nature, because in regard of the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by Victory; for in this state the Conquerour is subject to so much danger, as it were to be accounted a Miracle, if any, even the most strong should close up his life with many years, and old age. They of America are Examples hereof, even in this present Age: Other Nations have been in former Ages, which now indeed are become Civill, and Flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and destroy'd of all that Pleasure, and Beauty of life, which Peace and Society are wont to bring with them. Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawfull for all men, he contradicts himself; for every man, by naturall necessity desires that which is good for him: nor is there any that esteemes a war of all against all, which necessarily adheres to such a State, to be good for him. And so it happens that through feare of each other we think it fit to rid our selves of this condition, and to get some fellowes; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet be against all men, nor without some helps.
XIV. Fellowes are gotten either by constraint, or by consent; By Constraint, when after fight the Conqueror makes the conquered serve him either through feare of death, or by laying fetters on him: By consent, when men enter into society to helpe each other, both parties consenting without any constraint. But the Conqueror may by right compell the Conquered, or the strongest the weaker, (as a man in health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper yeares a childe) unlesse he will choose to die, to give caution of his future obedience. For since the right of protecting our selves according to our owne wills proceeded from our danger, and our danger from our equality, its more consonant to reason, and more certaine for our conservation, using the present advantage to secure our selves by taking caution; then, when they shall be full growne and strong, and got out of our power, to endeavour to recover that power againe by doubtfull fight. And on the other side, nothing can be thought more absurd, then by discharging whom you already have weak in your power, to make him at once both an enemy, and a strong one. From whence we may understand likewise as a Corollarie in the naturall state of men, That a sure and irresistible Power confers the right of Dominion, and ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuch, as the right of all things, that can be done, adheres essentially, and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.
XV. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature (i.e.) of War, by reason of that equality of power, and other humane faculties they are endued withall. Wherefore to seek Peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it, and where there is none, to enquire out for Auxiliaries of War, is the dictate of right Reason; that is, the Law of Nature, as shall be shewed in the next Chapter.
Chapter II
Of the Law of Nature concerning Contracts
I. All Authors agree not concerning the definition of the Naturall Law, who notwithstanding doe very often make use of this terme in their Writings. The Method therefore, wherein we begin from definitions, and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary Disputes; for the rest, if any man say, that somwhat is done against the Law of Nature, one proves it hence, because it was done against the generall Agreement of all the most wise, and learned Nations: But this declares not who shall be the judg of the wisdome and learning of all Nations: Another hence, That it was done against the Generall consent of all Man-kind; which definition is by no means to be admitted; for then it were impossible for any but Children, and Fools, to offend against such a Law; for sure, under the notion of Man-kind, they comprehend all men actually endued with Reason. These therefore either doe Naught against it, or if they doe Ought, it is without their joint accord, and therefore ought to be excus'd; but to receive the Lawes of Nature from the Consents of them, who oftner Break, then Observe them, is in truth unreasonable: besides, Men condemne the same things in others, which they approve in themselves; on the other side, they publickly commend what they privately condemne; and they deliver their Opinions more by Hear-say, then any Speculation of their own; and they accord more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or some other perturbation of mind, then true Reason. And therefore it comes to passe, that whole Bodyes of people often doe those things by Generall accord, or Contention, which those Writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the Law of Nature. But since all doe grant that is done by RIGHT, which is not done against Reason, we ought to judg those Actions onely wrong, which are repugnant to right Reason, (i.e.) which contradict some certaine Truth collected by right reasoning from true Principles; but that Wrong which is done, we say it is done against some Law: therefore True Reason is a certaine Law, which (since it is no lesse a part of Humane nature, then any other faculty, or affection of the mind) is also termed naturall. Therefore the Law of Nature, that I may define it, is the Dictate of right Reason*, conversant about those things which are either to be done, or omitted for the constant preservation of Life, and Members, as much as in us lyes.
[Right Reason.] By Right Reason in the naturall state of men, I understand not, as many doe, an infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the dammage, or benefit of his neighbours. I call it Peculiar, because although in a Civill Government the reason of the Supreme (i.e. the Civill Law) is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this Civill Government, (in which state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it with His owne) every mans owne reason is to be accounted not onely the rule of His owne actions which are done at His owne perill, but also for the measure of another mans reason, in such things as doe concerne him. I call it True; that is, concluding from true principles rightly fram'd, because that the wHole breach of the Lawes of Nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of those men who see not those duties they are necessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation; but the Principles of Right reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in the 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. articles of the first Chapter.
II. But the first and fundamentall Law of Nature is, That Peace is to be sought after where it may be found; and where not, there to provide our selves for helps of War: For we shewed in the last Article of the foregoing Chapter, that this precept is the dictate of right reason; but that the Dictates of right reason are naturall Lawes, that hath been newly prov'd above; But this is the first, because the rest are deriv'd from this, and they direct the wayes either to Peace, or self-defence.
III. But one of the Naturall Lawes deriv'd from this fundamentall one is this, That the right of all men, to all things, ought not to be retain'd, but that some certain rights ought to be transferr'd, or relinquisht: for if every one should retain his right to all things, it must necessarily follow, that some by right might invade; and others, by the same right, might defend themselves against them, (for every man, by naturall necessity, endeavours to defend his Body, and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his Body) therefore War would follow. He therefore acts against the reason of Peace, (i.e.) against the Law of Nature, whosoever he be, that doth not part with his Right to all things.
IV. But he is said to part with his right, who either absolutely renounceth it, or conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth it, who by some sufficient Signe, or meet Tokens, declares that he is willing that it shall never be lawfull for him to doe that again, which before, by Right, he might have done; but he conveys it to another, who by some sufficient Signe, or meet Tokens, declares to that other, that he is willing it should be unlawfull for him to resist him, in going about to do somewhat in the performance where he might before, with Right, have resisted him; but that the conveyance of Right consists meerly in not resisting, is understood by this, that before it was convey'd, he, to whom he convey'd it, had even then also a right to