36 The ambassador, after he came to the conclusion that he could obtain no reasonable terms in the council, tried to influence the mind of Publius Scipio in private (for such were his orders). First of all he told him that the king would restore him his son without a ransom; and then, as ignorant of the disposition of Scipio as he was of the Roman manners, he promised an immense weight of gold, and, excepting the title of king, an absolute partnership in the sovereignty, if through his means he should obtain a peace. To which Scipio answered, “I am the less surprised that you are ignorant of the Romans in general, and of me, to whom you have been sent, when I see that you are unacquainted with the situation even of the person from whom you come. You ought to have kept Lysimachia to prevent our entering the Chersonese, or to have opposed us at the Hellespont to hinder our passing into Asia, if you meant to ask peace from us as from people solicitous about the issue of war. But after leaving the passage into Asia open, and receiving not only a bridle, but also a yoke, what negotiation on an equality has been left you, when you must submit to orders? I shall consider my son as a very great gift from the munificence of the king; I pray to the gods that my circumstances may never require others, my mind certainly never will require any. For such an act of generosity to me he shall find me grateful, if for a personal favour he will accept a personal return of gratitude. In my public capacity, I will neither accept from him nor give him any thing. All that I can give at present is sincere advice. Go then, and desire him in my name, to cease hostilities, and to refuse no terms of peace.” These words had no effect on the king, who thought that the chance of war would be comparatively safe, since terms were dictated to him already as if he were totally vanquished. Laying aside, therefore, for the present, all farther mention of peace, he turned his whole attention to the preparations for war.
37 The consul having made every preparation for the execution of his designs, when he had quitted the post where he lay, marched first to Dardanus, and then to Rhœteum; from both states the people came out in crowds to meet him. He then advanced to Troy, and having pitched his camp in the plain which is under the walls, when he had gone up to the city and into the citadel, he offered sacrifices to Minerva, the guardian of the citadel; the Trojans, by every act and expression of respect, showing themselves proud of the Romans being descended from them, and the Romans expressing their delight in their origin. The army marching thence, arrived, on the sixth encampment, at the source of the Caicus. To this place also king Eumenes came. He at first endeavoured to bring back his fleet from the Hellespont to Elæa, for the winter; subsequently, when by adverse winds he could not, for several days, pass the promontory of Lectos, that he might not be absent at the commencement of operations, he landed and came, with a small body of men, by the shortest road to the Roman camp. From the camp he was sent home to Pergamus, to hasten supplies of provisions; and when the corn was delivered to the persons whom the consul had ordered to receive it, he returned to the same camp. The plan was, provisions for several days being prepared, to march hence against the enemy, before the winter should prevent them. The king’s camp was near Thyatira; and Antiochus, hearing there that Publius Scipio had fallen sick and was conveyed to Elæa, sent ambassadors to conduct his son to him. As this present was highly grateful to the mind of the father, so was the satisfaction which it gave no less salutary to his body. At length, being sated with the embraces of his son, he said to the ambassadors, “Tell the king that I return him thanks; that at present I can make him no other requital than my advice; which is, not to come to an engagement, until he shall have heard that I have rejoined the army.” Although sixty-two thousand foot, and more than twelve thousand horse, inspired the king at times with hopes in the result of a battle; yet, moved by the advice of so great a man as Scipio, in whom, when he considered the uncertainty of the events of war, he placed safety in any reverse of fortune, he retired, and having crossed the Phrygian river, pitched his camp near Magnesia, which is at Sipylus. And lest, if he wished to prolong the time, the Romans might attack his works, he drew round it a fosse six cubits deep and twelve broad, and on the outside surrounded the fosse with a double rampart: on the inside bank, he raised a wall flanked with towers at small distances, by which the enemy could easily be prevented from crossing the fosse.
38 The consul, thinking that the king was still in the neighbourhood of Thyatira, came down by continued marches on the fifth day into the Hyrcanian plains. Then when he heard that the other had departed, he followed his track, and pitched his camp on the hither side of the Phrygian river, at the distance of four miles from the enemy. Here, a body of about one thousand horse, (the greatest part of whom were Gallogræcians, the rest Dahans, and archers on horseback, of other nations intermixed,) passing the river with great tumult, made an attack on the advanced Roman guards. First of all they threw into confusion those unprepared; then, when the contest continued longer, and the number of the Romans increased, as succours were easily sent from the neighbouring camp, the king’s troops, becoming weary and unable to withstand superior numbers, endeavoured to retreat; but, before they could reach the river, very many were killed on the bank, by the enemy pressing on their rear. For two days after there was quiet, neither party passing the river. On the third, the Romans passed it with their whole force, and encamped at the distance of about two miles and a half from the enemy. While they were employed in measuring and fortifying the camp, a body of the king’s troops, consisting of three thousand chosen horse and foot, approached with great rapidity and violence. The party on guard, though much inferior in number, (being only two thousand,) without calling off any of the soldiers from the fortifying of the camp, sustained the combat with equal success at first, and, in the progress of the contest, repulsed the enemy, killing a hundred, and taking about the same number. During the four ensuing days, both armies stood in order of battle, before their respective camps. On the fifth, the Romans advanced into the middle of the plain, but Antiochus did not stir; so that his rear was not so far as a thousand feet from his rampart.
39 The consul, after perceiving that he declined the contest, called a council next day, and asked their opinion, “how he ought to act if Antiochus would not give him an opportunity of engaging. For the winter was at hand, and he must either keep the soldiers in camp; or, if they chose to retire to winter quarters, defer the business of the war until summer.” The Romans never despised any enemy so much. The assembly on every side called on him to lead on immediately, and make use of the present ardour of the troops; who, as if the business were not to fight against so many thousands, but to slaughter an equal number of cattle, were ready to force their way, through trenches and ramparts, into the camp, if the enemy would not come out to battle. Cneius Domitius was sent to discover the nature of the ground, and on what side the enemies’ rampart could be approached; after he returned with a full account of every particular, it was resolved that the camp should next day be moved nearer to the enemy. On the third day, the standards were carried forward into the middle of the plain, and the soldiers began to form line. Antiochus, thinking that he could hesitate no longer, lest, by declining a battle, he should damp the courage of his men, and add to the confidence of the enemy, drew out his forces in person, advancing only so far from the enemy’s camp as to make it apparent that he was willing to come to an engagement. The Roman line was nearly uniform throughout with respect to both men and armour. There were two Roman legions, and two brigades of allies and Latins, each containing five thousand four hundred men. The Romans formed the centre, the Latins the wings. The spearmen composed the first line, the first-rank men the second, and the veterans closed the rear. Beyond this, which formed as it were the regular line of battle, the consul formed on the right of it, and in one continued line, the auxiliary troops of Eumenes, intermixed with Achæan targeteers, making about three thousand foot; beyond these he posted somewhat less than three thousand horse, of which, eight hundred belonged to Eumenes; all the rest of the cavalry were Roman: and in the extremity of the line he placed bodies of Trallians and Cretans, equal in number, who were composed of five hundred men each. His left wing did not appear to require such supports, because a river and steep banks flanked it. However, four troops of horse were posted there. This was the whole amount of the Roman force, besides two thousand Macedonians and Thracians, who had, as volunteers, accompanied the army. These were left to guard the camp. They placed sixteen elephants behind the veterans, in reserve. For besides that they were not supposed capable of withstanding the great