28 The Teians, as these ravages passed under their eyes, sent deputies to the Roman commander, carrying fillets, and other badges of suppliants. And when they were exculpating their state from every hostile act or word against the Romans, he strongly charged them with “having assisted the enemy’s fleet with provisions, and with having promised a quantity of wine to Polyxenidas.” He further told them, that “if they would furnish the same supplies to the Roman fleet, he would recall his troops from plundering; otherwise, he would treat them as enemies.” When the deputies carried back this distressing answer, the people were summoned to an assembly by the magistrates, to consult on what they should do. It happened that Polyxenidas, who had sailed with the king’s fleet from Colophon, after he heard that the Romans had left Samos and pursued the pirates to Myonnesus, and that they were laying waste the lands of the Teians, and that their fleet lay in the harbour of Geræsticus, cast anchor, in a retired harbour of an island called by the sailors Macris, opposite to Myonnesus. Then from his neighbouring position, exploring what his enemies were doing, at first he was in great hopes of vanquishing the Roman fleet here, in like manner as he had vanquished the Rhodian at Samos, by besetting the narrow entrance at the mouth of the port. Nor is the nature of the place unlike: by the promontories advancing towards each other, the harbour is enclosed in such a manner, that two ships can scarcely go out together. Polyxenidas intended to seize this narrow pass in the night; and, while ten ships stood at each of the promontories, to attack, from the right and left, both sides of the enemy’s fleet sailing out, having landed his armed men from the fleet, as he had done at Panormus, to overpower the Romans on land and sea at once. And this design would not have been formed by him in vain, had it not appeared to the Romans better for receiving the provisions, when the Teians had promised to execute their commands, that the fleet should pass into that harbour, which is before the city. It is said, also, that Eudamus, the Rhodian, had pointed out the fault of the outer harbour, when two ships broke their oars locked together in the narrow entrance. Among other motives, this too induced the prætor to remove his fleet, because there was danger from the land, as Antiochus kept his camp not far from it.
29 When the fleet was brought round to the city, all being ignorant of the approach of the enemy, both soldiers and sailors went on shore to divide the provisions, and the wine particularly, among the ships; when, about mid-day, a peasant happened to be brought before the prætor, who told him, that the enemy’s fleet was lying at the island of Macris these two days; and that, a little while ago, some of them were observed to be in motion, as if preparing to sail. Greatly alarmed at this unexpected event, the prætor ordered the trumpets to sound, to call in such as might have straggled into the country, and sent the tribunes into the city, to hasten the soldiers and sailors on board. The confusion was not less than if the place were on fire, or taken by an enemy; some running to call out the men; others hurrying to the ships, while the orders of the officers were confounded by irregular shouts, amid which the trumpets raised their din, until at length the crowd collected at the ships. Here scarcely could each know his own ship, or make his way through the tumult; and the disorder would probably have been productive of much mischief, on land and sea had not Æmilius, in the commander’s ship, sailed out first into the main; where, receiving those following, he put each into its own place, so as to form a line abreast: and Eudamus, with the Rhodian fleet, waited at the shore, that the men might be embarked without confusion, and that every ship might leave the harbour as soon as it was ready. By these means, the foremost division formed under the eye of the prætor, while the rear was brought up by the Rhodians; and then the whole line, in as regular order as if within sight of the foe, advanced into the open sea. They were between Myonnesus and the promontory of Corycus, when they first got sight of the enemy. The king’s fleet, which was coming in a long line, with only two vessels abreast, then formed themselves in order of battle, stretching out their left division so far, as that it might enclose the right of the Romans. When Eudamus, who commanded in the rear, perceived that the Romans could not form an equal front, but were just on the point of being surrounded, he pushed up his ships. They were Rhodians, by far the fastest sailers of any of the fleet; and having filled up the deficiency in the extent of the line, he opposed his own ship to the commander’s, on board of which was Polyxenidas.
30 Now the entire fleets in every part were engaged in action. On the side of the Romans eighty ships were fighting, of which twenty-two were Rhodian. The enemy’s fleet consisted of eighty-nine ships, and they had of the largest rates, three of six, and two of seven banks. In the strength of the vessels, and valour of the soldiers, the Romans had greatly the advantage of the king’s party, as had the Rhodians in the activity of their vessels, the skill of the pilots, and the dexterity of the rowers. However, those which carried fire before them were the greatest terror to the enemy: and what was the sole cause of their preservation when they were surrounded at Panormus, proved here the principal means of victory. For when the king’s ships, through fear of the fire, had turned aside, in order to avoid at the same time encountering the enemy’s prow with their own, they could not strike their antagonist with the beaks, but exposed the side of their ships to his strokes; and if any did venture an encounter, it was immediately overspread with the fire that was poured in; while the men were more alarmed at the fire than the battle. However, the bravery of the soldiers, as is generally the case, chiefly availed in deciding the battle. For the Romans, having broke through the centre of the enemy’s line, tacked about and fell upon the rear of the division which was engaged with the Rhodians; and, in an instant of time, both Antiochus’s centre division, and the ships on the left, were surrounded and sunk. The squadron on the right, which was still entire, was terrified rather by the disaster of their friends, than by any immediate danger threatening themselves; but, when they saw the others surrounded, and Polyxenidas’s ship deserting its associates, and sailing away, having quickly hoisted their topsails, they betook themselves to flight, (and they steering for Ephesus had a favourable wind,) having lost forty-two ships in that battle; of which thirteen struck, and fell into the hands of the Romans; the rest were burned or sunk. Two Roman ships were shattered, and several were much damaged. One Rhodian vessel was taken by an extraordinary casualty; for, on its striking a Sidonian ship with its beak, its anchor, thrown out by the force of the shock, caught fast hold of the other’s prow with its fluke, as if it were a grappling-iron thrown in. Great confusion ensuing thereon, when the Rhodians, who wished to disengage themselves from the enemy, pulled back, its cable being dragged forcibly, and at the same time entangled with the oars, swept off one side of them. The very ship, which, when struck, had grappled with it, took the Rhodian galley in its weakened state. The naval battle at Myonnesus was fought principally in this manner.
31 By which Antiochus being terrified, because, as he was driven from the possession of the sea, he despaired of being able to defend his distant possessions, ordered the garrison to be withdrawn from Lysimachia, which plan was ill devised, as the event subsequently proved, lest it should be there cut off by the Romans. As it was easy for him, not only to defend Lysimachia from the first attack of the Romans, but to protract the siege through the whole winter; and by thus prolonging the time, to reduce the besiegers to the extremity of want; and in the mean time try the hope of peace, as opportunities should present themselves. But, after the defeat at sea, he not only gave up Lysimachia, but even raised the siege of Colophon, and retired to Sardis. Here, bending all his thoughts to one single object, that of meeting the enemy in the field, he sent into Cappadocia, to Ariarathes, to request assistance, and to every other place within his power, to collect forces. Æmilius Regillus, after his victory at sea, proceeded to Ephesus, having drawn up his ships before the harbour, when he had extorted from the enemy a final acknowledgment of their having surrendered the dominion of the sea, sailed to Chios, to which he had directed his course from Samos, before the sea-fight. As soon as he had refitted the ships that had been damaged