Lazarus Rising. John Howard

while I was still at the helm.

      A difficult and sensitive policy then emerged — deregulation of the domestic wheat market. At that time a single desk operated, both in relation to wheat sales abroad and also sales on the domestic market. The Government indicated that it wished to deregulate the domestic wheat market, and the Coalition was required to form a view. Unless the Coalition adopted the same position as the Government, it would reflect poorly on our economic credentials. Once again it would look as if the Labor Party were more market oriented than, in particular, the Liberals. I made it very clear to both Ian Sinclair and Bruce Lloyd, the two National Party leaders, that I wanted a change in policy, knowing full well that the overwhelming bulk of the joint party room, who were Liberals, would support my position. I suspected that privately several Nationals were also on side. Ian Sinclair knew the pressure this would put on the National Party, and Bruce Lloyd was explosive in his response. To him it represented a fundamental repudiation of something the National Party had always stood for. It was a challenge to the McEwenite orderly marketing tradition still very much in the ascendancy amongst Nationals.

      The Coalition decided to support deregulation of the domestic market while reaffirming the maintenance of the single desk for export sales. The Coalition held together, but only just. Despite his deep personal feelings, Bruce Lloyd pulled back from the brink of resigning as deputy leader of his party. At heart he was a good Coalition man.

      On both the issue of the joint Senate ticket and wheat marketing policy I had achieved results. There was no dramatic change in the polls, although the Coalition remained reasonably competitive. There was, however, growing confidence in opposition ranks. We had tackled and resolved difficult issues. Parties paralysed by leadership doubts don’t normally do that.

      It was through Michael Kroger that I first met Peter Costello. They had been friends since university days and were close allies within the Victorian division. Early in 1989 Michael led a push to strengthen the federal representation from Victoria in the parliament by encouraging challenges against sitting MPs who were not perceived as performing well. One of those readily within his sights was Roger Shipton, MP for Higgins, who had followed John Gorton in the seat after the latter’s departure from the Liberal Party in 1975. Shipton was a hardworking member, but not likely to make it to senior office in government or opposition. When John Elliott had been hankering after a seat, Higgins was always the one mentioned.

      Elliott had never publicly declared an intention of standing for Higgins, so when his parliamentary ambitions went on ice in late 1988, nothing was said. It remained the case, however, that Shipton was still highly vulnerable to a challenge. This created a perfect opening for Costello. He was young, very articulate, and with a well-developed reputation for political toughness. His career at the Bar had been successful, with his appearance on behalf of Fred Stauder in the Dollar Sweets case an industrial relations landmark, winning much praise. Costello had Kroger’s strong support. He lived very close to Higgins. Not surprisingly, he nominated against Shipton for the seat.

      Interest in Higgins was as nothing compared with the stoush which was developing in the nearby seat of Goldstein, held by Ian Macphee. He had been challenged by David Kemp, former close advisor to Malcolm Fraser when he was PM and also until very recently director of the Victorian division of the Liberal Party. Kemp was close to Kroger, but it was an oversimplification to describe his nomination as a Kroger-inspired head office push to throw out Macphee.

      The Canberra press gallery virtually demanded that I intervene in Goldstein to save Macphee. Being a ‘small l’ Liberal, he was one of their favourites. This was all about stopping the dark reactionary forces of Michael Kroger taking over the Liberal Party in Victoria, although nothing of the kind was occurring. As it happened, one of the key Liberals of local influence in Goldstein, who had encouraged Kemp to stand, was Sir John ‘Bill’ Anderson, a veteran of World War II and former president of the Victorian division. A party grandee, Anderson was also a man who Malcolm Fraser greatly respected, although they disagreed about the Goldstein preselection. The former PM strongly backed Macphee.

      Given the pressure I was under over Goldstein, not only from the press but also from a growing number of MPs, who always feel nervous and experience an extra charge of collegiality when one of their number is under challenge — after all, I could be next — I decided to do some research of my own. I rang Anderson and was politely but bluntly told to stay out of Goldstein. According to him there was a lot of unhappiness with Macphee within Goldstein branches and influential locals had invited Kemp’s nomination; there would be deep grassroots resentment if I poked my nose into the preselection. He confirmed what Kroger had told me all along.

      Kroger and I had built a solid relationship. He had been a huge help in my drive for a joint Senate ticket, kept me informed of what was going on in Victoria and strongly supported my leadership. He had lifted the morale of the party in his state. It is a lasting loss for the party that he has never entered parliament. He would have gone a very long way.

      Events were moving to a weekend of preselections, commencing with the Higgins ballot on 5 May, which Costello won easily. Kroger rang me that evening, simply saying, ‘Peter Howard Costello', which was the future Treasurer’s full name. The next day saw the drama of Goldstein, with media coverage at absurd levels. Kemp won comfortably, it clearly being the case that local Liberals wanted someone else. Then on Sunday, Julian Beale, who held the seat of Deakin, defeated Ken Aldred for the safer electorate of Bruce. There had been a redistribution which had touched both seats. Aldred later defeated Macphee for the nomination in Deakin, despite the latter’s endorsement by Andrew Peacock, by then the freshly reminted Opposition leader.

      These preselections, especially the one in Goldstein, were an important backdrop to the sudden leadership change which occurred the following Tuesday, 9 May. Although each was a good outcome in its own right, the combined impact played into the hands of my critics. When an MP loses his or her preselection, it is so easy for remarks such as ‘the boss could have done more to help you', to gain currency. Peacock knew what buttons to push, and he pushed them. In the ABC Four Corners program which I mention shortly, John Moore cited my handling of the Victorian preselections (meaning Goldstein) as delivering the final impetus to the push to get rid of me as leader.

      * * *

      The coup against me had been well planned to take place at a routine party meeting. I did not know about it until confronted by Andrew Peacock, Fred Chaney and Austin Lewis (leader and deputy Senate leader respectively) in my office the night before, and was therefore denied any chance to organise in my own defence. Peacock won convincingly by a vote of 44 to 27. I was devastated, as I felt that I had really begun to turn the corner with strong leadership on hard issues. I was angry with Chaney for not having warned me of what was coming. He was entitled to switch support to Peacock but, given our past friendship, should not have been part of the ambush. I felt that it was the end of my dream to be PM. At a subsequent news conference I replied, ‘Like Lazarus with a triple bypass', to a question about my returning to the leadership. The best lines are never scripted.