Joh used the Christmas/New Year period to keep the speculation going. He held a major rally in Wagga Wagga on 31 January and announced his strong support for a 25 per cent flat tax policy. He spoke of ‘starting a bushfire that will spread across Australia'.3 That meeting was addressed by Des Keegan of the Australian and the activist leader of Australia’s surgeons, Bruce Shepherd. He personified the type of person who caused me difficulties with Joh. A very conservative man, he professed support for me and had actually told me in advance what he proposed saying at the Wagga Wagga rally, but also told me what a great man Joh was. Shepherd railed against the so-called trendies in my party such as Ian Macphee and Peter Baume. I told him that the Liberal Party was a broad church and that it was the final policies which emerged that really mattered.
In January 1987 I went to Perth for some America’s Cup activities and had breakfast with Ian McLachlan, still president of the National Farmers Federation (NFF) but there for a meeting of the Elders board. He was an impressive figure who I liked and really wanted as a Liberal candidate at the next election. Then one of Australia’s largest woolgrowers, his leadership of the NFF had made him a real poster boy for industrial relations reform on issues such as the Mudginberri abattoir. Whilst being friendly, he was unwilling to commit. Shortly afterwards, John Carrick, who had been a NSW senator since 1971, told me that he would resign his Senate seat in favour of Ian McLachlan, if that would help. I rang and told McLachlan of this. He was non-committal. Carrick had made a huge gesture, but I don’t think that Ian was fully seized by this. A few weeks later I called to see McLachlan when in Adelaide. We had a long and friendly talk, but it was of little avail. He said that he did not wish to commit specifically to either the Liberal Party or the Nationals. He kept referring to the right-hand side of politics. McLachlan said that he had been in touch with Bjelke-Petersen. He said, ‘You know, he really thinks he can do it. I am going to take a detailed look at his proposals.’ He also said that the NFF was resolutely opposed to a consumption tax and would campaign hard against it if it became Liberal policy. The farmers wanted fuel excise abolished. I left that meeting feeling dispirited.
A huge complication throughout was the poor relations between Bjelke-Petersen and the Nationals’ federal leader, Ian Sinclair. The Queensland Premier had no interest in getting closer to his federal colleague, and Ian Sinclair struggled to find the right modus operandi for handling Joh. Relations between Joh and the federal Nationals had always been problematic. In the Fraser Government days, Peter Nixon had been the man to deal with Joh. Nixon was neither in awe of Joh nor insensitive to his raw populism. He was a straight shooter, and on many occasions both Malcolm Fraser and Doug Anthony would ask Peter Nixon to ‘deal with Joh'.
Tension built as parliament prepared to resume in February 1987. Tactically, Bjelke-Petersen’s first objective was to break the federal coalition. My aim was to preserve it. I knew that if the federal coalition held, there was no real prospect of a ‘Joh for PM’ campaign getting off the ground. Crucial to maintaining the federal coalition was the determination and leadership authority of Ian Sinclair.
We held a joint party meeting on 2 February, after which I called on Bjelke-Petersen to be either supportive or to keep out of the federal scene. On the same day, at a news conference, Ian Sinclair reiterated his commitment to the Coalition and said that no individual premier or leader of any state parliamentary party ‘will have a direct role in determining any other course'. That was the right attitude.
The agitation from the Queenslanders continued, and attention shifted to a separate meeting of the federal parliamentary National Party, set for 16 February. This shaped as a test of Ian Sinclair’s authority to hold the federal Nationals in the Coalition. Before the meeting, I spoke to him about the need to reaffirm the commitment of the Nationals to the Coalition.
The outcome of that National Party meeting could not have been worse. Instead of a clear statement of support for the Coalition, what was described to me by Peter McGauran, a National MP, as ‘an olive branch to Bjelke-Petersen’ emanated. It said nothing about the Coalition. Rather, it welcomed the thrust of what the Premier of Queensland had been seeking to achieve and expressed support for his general philosophy. This outcome told me that, when push came to shove, Bjelke-Petersen had enough influence to break the federal coalition. The Queenslanders were in mortal fear of their party endorsements. Not only could Bjelke-Petersen corral them but also at least two from other states.
This was anything but an endorsement of the federal coalition. The following day, I told Ian Sinclair that I would not preside at a joint party meeting, scheduled for later that day, unless he was willing to have his National Party colleagues join in an affirmation of the Coalition, to be publicly made after the meeting of the two parties. After consulting his colleagues, Ian said he would do as I wished. The joint party meeting was held, and the statement I wanted was issued.
The statement said that Ian Sinclair had informed the joint party meeting of the desire of the National Party to continue in coalition with the Liberals. It also reaffirmed that the maintenance of the Coalition was the most effective instrument to defeat the Hawke Government. Cracks were being papered over.
The shove came from the central council of the Queensland National Party meeting at Hervey Bay on 27 February. Effectively, that meeting called on the parliamentary members of the federal National Party to withdraw from the Coalition. The ‘Joh for PM’ campaign came out of the closet at that meeting. ‘Joh for PM’ T-shirts were distributed and ostentatiously donned by people such as the Deputy Premier of Queensland, Bill Gunn. I attached significance to him as my colleague Wal Fife, who had been a fellow Education Minister with Gunn some years earlier, had conveyed to me assurances from Gunn: ‘Don’t worry, Wal. It won’t happen.’ The bandwagon was well and truly gathering pace. Ian Sinclair had attended the meeting and rang me afterwards sounding deeply depressed about the outcome, but assured me he would continue to resist any breaking of the federal coalition.
Sinclair publicly ignored the Hervey Bay resolution. The Queensland members of the National Party decided to wait until a meeting of the federal council of the National Party, due at the end of March, before deciding whether or not to bail out. Meanwhile, the central executive of the NSW party reaffirmed its strong support for Ian Sinclair as leader, and the maintenance of the federal coalition.
Separately, the federal member for Groom in Queensland, Tom McVeigh, withdrew from the federal parliamentary National Party. There were rumours at the time that McVeigh had been offered a job by Bjelke-Petersen in return for vacating his very safe Darling Downs electorate in favour of the Premier.
In directing the parliamentary Nationals to leave the Coalition, and threatening their endorsements if they did not do so, the Queensland Nationals were doing something which for decades both the Liberal and National parties had publicly held against the Labor Party. Dictation from unelected party bosses had been a characteristic of the Australian Labor Party in the 1950s and ‘60s.
To people such as Doug Anthony, this thuggish behaviour by the unelected central council of the Queensland National Party was contrary to fundamental beliefs of the two coalition parties.
Speaking at the Sydney Rotary Club on 2 March, Doug Anthony said, ‘I cannot stomach the intimidatory (sic) action against sitting members of parliament. Threatening them with their preselection if they don’t obey the organisation is political blackmail … For 60 years, the party was proud of its parliamentary freedom and goodwill. For the Queensland organisation to direct and threaten elected members of parliament smacks of those features of the Labor Party we have always deplored.’ He went on to say that if the federal coalition were broken, ‘the mantle of blame would fall fairly and squarely on the Queensland National Party'.4 He said it was absurd of the Queensland National Party to imagine it could ever win seats in metropolitan Sydney or Melbourne and that all that would occur would be the re-election of the Hawke Government. Doug Anthony understood precisely what was at stake.
The federal council met in Canberra on 27 March 1987. It resolved that it be left to the parliamentary Nationals