Green Races Red. Maurice Hamilton. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Maurice Hamilton
Издательство: HarperCollins
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Жанр произведения: Биографии и Мемуары
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9780007564798
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session. As soon as I went out, I suddenly found the car had nothing like the amount of grip that we had enjoyed before. Suddenly I had loads of understeer, and as a consequence we were struggling.

      The most immediate answer was to increase the front wing angle and create more downforce. That would give the car more front-end grip and allow it to turn into the corners more easily. It was the correct decision and as a result I immediately went a lot quicker. But it wasn’t quite right. And time was running out.

      The only thing to do was put on even more front wing and hope for the best. But the trouble was, I only had time to leave the pits and then complete a single fast lap, and that would be it. The way things had been going, everyone had been quickest on their second or third flying laps because it would take until then to get the tyres working really well. I wouldn’t have that luxury.

      I really tried to work some heat into the rubber by working the tyres hard in the corners during the first lap out of the pits, and I succeeded – up to a point. The front end of the car didn’t feel as good as it could have done at the start of the quick lap. But it wasn’t bad.

      Michael had completed his best lap just as I was leaving the pits. His time was not that quick, to be honest. I thought I was in with a chance, and I knew what I had to do.

      From the point of view of timing, each lap is divided into three sections. The split times are thrown up on the computer read-out in the car. I could tell from my time on the first third of the lap that I was three-tenths of a second slower than Michael – which tended to confirm my suspicion that the tyres were not ‘in’ at that point, that is, not up to optimum working condition. But everything felt better for the final two-thirds of the lap.

      My overall lap was good, but not brilliant. It wasn’t on the ragged edge. It was a very neat lap, but then the best laps should be neat and tidy. Just as I crossed the line, Luca Baldisserri got on the radio and said, ‘Good lap!’ They sounded quite happy. I checked the read-out. I was ahead of Michael! But I couldn’t tell where I was on the overall list of times.

      During qualifying, the officials operate a weighbridge at the entrance to the pit lane. Cars are stopped at random and, as I came in, I was pulled over for a mandatory weight check. As I climbed out, everyone was saying, ‘Well done! Well done!’ It was only then that I discovered I was third on the grid! After all the troubles we had been through, it was hard to take in. To me, this felt as good as winning pole position. The Williams-Renaults were first and second and we knew they were much faster than anything else. I couldn’t help but wonder what I might have done on a second or third flying lap, but I knew there was no way our car was within half a second of the Williams in terms of performance. I was well pleased.

      I had to walk the length of the pit lane to get back to the Ferrari garage. On the way, I passed the Jordan pit where everyone came rushing out. There were all sorts of remarks as you might imagine and the one which really grabbed my attention concerned Eddie Jordan. It seemed he had bet Benetton boss Flavio Briatore and Formula 1 supremo Bernie Ecclestone that I would out-qualify Schumacher. Each time that happened, they would pay EJ $20,000. And each time Michael was ahead of me, Eddie had to find $5,000. So, EJ was in front already. I had left the team and he was still making money out of me. I guess it should not have come as a surprise.

      There were wide grins when I got back to the Ferrari garage. I couldn’t honestly tell how Michael felt; all he said was ‘good job’, or something like that. This had been the first time in a couple of seasons that his team-mate had been faster than him during a straight fight in qualifying. He had been having his own problems with his car – so he was a bit quiet. Anyway, we were soon into another debrief. With the Ferraris third and fourth on the grid, there was a lot to discuss.

      Our strategy for Melbourne was to run the quickest race that we could. That may sound an obvious thing to say but there were variables to consider, particularly concerning the number of pit stops. It was clear that Williams would be on a different level to us, whereas I thought that the Benettons (sixth and seventh on the grid) were probably not as quick. It would be a case, as I said, of choosing the right tactic to suit us. There was no point in trying to out-guess Williams; they could do whatever they liked – one, two or three stops – and still win the race. The computer worked out that a two-stop race was best for Ferrari, so we settled on that.

      In my opinion, there had been a lot of rubbish talked about pit stop strategy in 1995. It was said that Benetton were smarter than anyone else. I don’t think that had much to do with their success. Michael Schumacher, who was with Benetton then, was simply quicker than the rest of us. He could carry more fuel than the Williams drivers and still run with them. Then, because he already had more fuel on board, he needed to take on less at the first stop and he was able to get ahead by doing that. It was simply down to Michael being quicker than anyone else. The so-called experts talked about Benetton’s strategy being a lot better but the simple fact is, if you are not quick, then you are not going to win.

      Back to the present and sitting on the second row of the starting grid, I wasn’t under any illusions about winning this race. In any case, there was a minor distraction when something was dropped on the front wing of my car as we sat on the starting grid. It meant changing the whole front wing. During the reconnaissance lap on my way to the grid, I had found that the car was understeering too much and I had asked to have more wing angle added at the front. This had been done but I don’t think the replacement wing had the same setting.

      The 1996 season really got under way when the red lights went out – they had done away with the green lights in a new starting procedure – and I watched the Williams drivers, Hill and Villeneuve, make a race of it off the line. Damon Hill got himself into a bit of a mess at the first corner, the Williams going sideways. I remember thinking, ‘Damon is too easy’ because I saw a bit of a gap and went for it knowing that Damon wouldn’t close it. In fact, he had screwed up so much that he actually let Michael through as well. I thought this was pretty good. Jacques Villeneuve was leading, I was second and I knew there was no way Damon would get past Michael until the first pit stops at the very earliest. It was a great way to start.

      Then the red flags came out. The race had been stopped, which was a big disappointment considering I had made such a good start. I didn’t know the exact reason but I assumed there had been an accident somewhere during the first lap. We returned slowly to the starting grid and somewhere along the way I saw pictures of what had happened. Going into the third corner Martin Brundle, who had started from the back of the grid, had piled into a couple of cars which seemed to be involved in their own accident. A chain reaction had been caused by one car moving over on another, which in turn forced David Coulthard to take avoiding action. The McLaren, which may in turn have been touched from behind, swerved into Johnny Herbert’s Sauber just as Brundle arrived on the scene. Brundle hit Herbert and became airborne and rolled a couple of times. It was a big shunt. Martin was lucky because of the way the car had bounced. He was unhurt, but it was ironic that he was driving a Jordan.

      There had been a bit of controversy over the way Jordan and Williams had interpreted new rules concerning the introduction of raised cockpit sides in order to give more protection to the driver’s head. Jordan had been a bit cheeky by bending the rule in such a way that they did not need to raise the cockpit sides as much as everyone else. There was a performance advantage to be had by doing that. It may have been very small but that was not the point. This was all about safety and I felt that Jordan’s decision to do what they did was totally wrong.

      Formula 1 does not need people getting smart when it comes to safety. On this occasion, Jordan were extremely lucky. Martin’s head could have gone over the side of the cockpit. They were fortunate because of the way the car rolled and the fact that there were no G-forces and no heavy impacts with the concrete wall.

      The car had broken in half immediately, the engine coming away from the chassis, which meant there was not a huge amount of weight adding to the car’s momentum as it continued to roll. It was the ‘perfect’ sort of accident – if you can say such a thing – one which looked highly spectacular but, in fact, did not amount to a great deal.

      Had Martin suffered a serious impact to his head, then I would hate to think what the newspapers would have done with