Before the various officials had had time to decide whether or not the Negro should be enlisted, many had numbered themselves among the first to spill their blood in behalf of American liberty. Peter Salem had distinguished himself at Bunker Hill by killing Major Pitcairn,112 a number of other Negroes under the command of Major Samuel Lawrence had heroically imperilled their lives and rescued him when he had advanced so far beyond his troops that he was about to be surrounded and taken prisoner,113 and Salem Poor of Colonel Frye's regiment had acquitted himself with such honor in the battle of Charlestown that fourteen American officers commended him to the Continental Congress for his valor.114 But great as were the services rendered by these patriots of color, the increase in the number of blacks in the Continental Army gave rise to vexatious questions. There were those who, influenced by the theories which had made the Revolution possible, hailed with joy the advent of the Negro in the role of the defender of his country, which they believed owed him freedom and opportunity. Some, having the idea that the Negro was a savage, too stupid to be employed in fighting the battles of freemen, seriously objected to his enlistment. Others were fearful of the result from setting the example of employing an uncivilized people to fight the British, who would then have an excuse not only for enlisting Negroes115 but also the Indians. A still larger number felt that the question of arming the slaves would simply reduce itself to one of deciding whether or not the colonies should permit the British to beat them playing their own game.116
In the beginning, however, those who believed the Negroes should be excluded from the army triumphed. Massachusetts officially took a stand against the enlistment of slaves. The Committee of Safety, of which John Hancock and Joseph Ward were members, reported in May, 1775, to the Provincial Congress the opinion that as the contest then between Great Britain and her colonies respected the liberties and privileges of the latter, that the admission of any persons but freemen as soldiers would be inconsistent with the principles supported and would reflect dishonor on the colony.117 They urged that no slaves be admitted into the army under any consideration whatever. No action was taken. This was not seemingly directed at the enlistment of free Negroes; but it must have had some effect, for in July of the same year, when Washington took command of the army at Cambridge, there were issued from his headquarters to recruiting officers instructions prohibiting the enlistment of any Negro, any person not native of this country, unless such person had a wife and a family and was a settled resident.118
This matter became one of such concern that the officials of the Continental Army had to give it more serious consideration. Communications relative thereto directed to the Continental Congress provoked a debate in that body in September, 1775. On the occasion of drafting a letter to Washington, reported by a committee consisting of Lynch, Lee and Adams, to whom several of his communications had been referred, Rutledge, of South Carolina, moved that the commander-in-chief be instructed to discharge from the army all Negroes, whether slave or free.119 It seems that Rutledge had the support of the Southern delegates, but failed to secure a majority vote in favor of this radical proposition.
The matter was not yet settled, however. On the eighth of the following month there was held a council of war consisting of Washington, Ward, Lee, Putnam, Thomas, Spencer, Heath, Sullivan, Greene and Gates, to consider the question whether or not it would be advisable to enlist Negroes in the new army or "whether there be any distinction between such as are slaves and those who are free." It was unanimously agreed to reject all slaves and by a large majority to refuse Negroes altogether.120 Upon considering ten days later the question of devising a method of renovating the army, however, the question of enlisting Negroes came up again before a Committee of Conference. The leaders in this council were Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Lynch, the Deputy Governors of Connecticut and Rhode Island, and the Committee of Council of Massachusetts Bay. They were asked the question whether Negroes should be excluded from the new enlistment, especially such as were slaves. This council also agreed that Negroes should be rejected altogether.121 Accordingly, the general orders from Washington, dated November 12, 1775, declared that neither Negroes, boys unable to bear arms, nor old men unfit to endure fatigues of the campaign should be enlisted.
The men who had taken this position had acted blindly. They had failed to consider the various complications which might arise as a result of the refusal to admit Negroes to the army. What would the Negroes think when they saw their offering thrown away from the altar of their country? Were the Revolutionary fathers so stupid as to think that the British would adopt the same policy? They could not have believed that the situation could be so easily cleared. Before the Revolution was well on its way the delegates from Georgia to the Continental Congress had already experienced certain fears as to the safety of Georgia and South Carolina. They believed that if one thousand regular troops should land in Georgia under a commander with adequate supplies and he should proclaim freedom to all loyal Negroes, twenty thousand of them would join the British in a fortnight. It was to them a matter of much concern that the Negroes of these provinces had such a wonderful art of communicating intelligence among themselves as to convey information several hundred miles in a week or in a fortnight.122 The colonists, too, could not ignore the bold attempt of Lord Dunmore, the dethroned governor of Virginia, who issued a proclamation of freedom to all slaves who would fight for the king, endeavored to raise a black regiment among them, and actually used a number of Negroes in the battle at Kemp's Landing, where they behaved like well-seasoned soldiers, pursuing and capturing one of the attacking companies.123 Referring thereafter to Lord Dunmore as an arch-traitor who should be instantly crushed, George Washington said: "But that which renders the measure indispensably necessary is the Negroes, if he gets formidable numbers of them, will be tempted to join" him.
Subsequent developments showed that these misgivings were justified. In July, 1776, General Greene learned on Long Island that the British were about to organize in that vicinity a regiment of Negroes aggregating 200.124 Taking as a pretext the enrollment of Negroes in the Continental Army, Sir Henry Clinton proclaimed from Philipsburgh in 1779 that all Negroes taken in arms or upon any military duty should be purchased from the captors for the public service, and that every Negro who would desert the "Rebel Standard" should have full security to follow within the British lines any occupation which he might think proper.125 In 1781 General Greene reported to Washington from North Carolina that the British there had undertaken to embody immediately two regiments of Negroes.126 They were operating just as aggressively farther South. "It has been computed by good judges," says Ramsey, "that between the years 1775 and 1783 the State of South Carolina lost 25,000 Negroes,127 that is, one fifth of all the slaves, and a little more than half as many as its entire white population. At the evacuation of Charleston 241 Negroes and their families were taken off to St. Lucia in one transport, the Scimitar."128 Yet in Georgia it is believed that the loss of Negroes was much greater, probably three fourths or seven eighths of all in the State. There the British were more successful in organizing and making use of Negroes. One third of the 600 men by whom Fort Cornwallis was garrisoned at the siege of Augusta were