(a). “Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to bring a very large force into action on the day of the battle, an army of 130,000 or 140,000 men may easily resist a much larger force.
(b). “If driven from the field, there will be at least 100,000 men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one of the other armies.
(c). “The central army … requires such a quantity of provisions, munitions, horses and materiel of every kind, that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to support such numbers.
(d). “The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in check two armies of 135,000 men each must be very strong (from 80,000 to 90,000 each); and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement, they will probably suffer reverses, the effect of which might outweigh the advantages gained by the principal army.”
Finally, the increased defensive power given to infantry by the introduction of breech-loading rifles might be counted upon to increase greatly the probability of either of the Prussian armies being able to fight successfully a purely defensive battle against the entire army of Von Benedek, armed, as it was, with muzzle-loaders.
In view of these reasons, Von Moltke’s strategy was not only justifiable, but perfect. The Prussian objective was the Austrian army, wherever it might be.
Before the commencement of hostilities Von Benedek had, as we have seen, announced his intention of invading Prussia. Two routes offered themselves to his choice: one by way of Görlitz and Bautzen to Berlin; the other by way of the valley of the Oder into Silesia. The latter route was obstructed by the fortresses of Glatz, Neisse and Kosel; the former would have led to the unobstructed occupation of Saxony, and would have enabled the Bavarian army to concentrate, via the passes of the Saale and Wittenberg, with the Austrians and Saxons. But, at a time when minutes were worth millions, Von Benedek was slow; and the preparation and energy of the Prussians enabled them to take the initiative and throw the Austrians upon the defensive in Bohemia. Von Benedek then decided to concentrate his army in the vicinity of Josephstadt and Königinhof; to hold the strong defiles of the Iser or the Elbe with comparatively weak detachments, and throw his main army upon the Crown Prince or Frederick Charles, as circumstances might decide.
Von Benedek’s concentration began on the 18th of June; and on the 25th his army stood as follows:
The Ist Corps, with one brigade of the IIIrd Corps and a cavalry division, on the left bank of the Iser, from Turnau, through Müchengrätz to Jung Buntzlau, where the retreating Saxons formed on the left.
The Xth Corps, with one cavalry division, at Jaromir.
The IVth Corps at Opocno.
The VIth Corps at Solnitz.
The IIIrd Corps on the left of the VIth, at Tynist.
The VIIIth Corps at Wamberg.
The IId Corps at Geyersberg.
Four cavalry divisions were at Gabel, Leitomischel, Abtsdorf and Policzka, respectively.
The force on the Iser, under Count Clam-Gallas, was thus opposed to the entire army of Frederick Charles; while Von Benedek confronted the Crown Prince with six corps. The Austrian line extended beyond Gitschin, the point at which the Prussian armies were to concentrate.
THE INVASION OF BOHEMIA
It was now certain that Bohemia was to be the theater of war. This province of the Austrian Empire may be described as a huge basin, whose rim is composed of mountains. It is separated from Silesia by the Riesengebirge (Giant Mountains), from Saxony by the Erzgebirge (Iron Mountains), from Moravia by the Moravian Hills, and from Bavaria by the Fichtelgebirge and the Böhmerwald; the Moravian Hills and the Böhmerwald separating it from the valley of the Danube. This great basin is drained by the Elbe river, which, rising in the Riesengebirge, makes a huge loop, flowing first south, then west, and finally north, and receives the waters of the Iser, Adler, Moldau and Eger rivers before it issues forth from the Bohemian frontier into Saxony. This theater is well suited to defensive operations, as the mountain frontiers are penetrated by few passes, and the forests and rivers constitute additional obstacles. On the Silesian frontier the only issues by which an invader can enter Bohemia are the passes of Trautenau, Eypel, Kosteletz, Nachod and Neustadt. These passes could all be easily defended, while on the Saxon frontier the passes of Reichenberg, Gabel and Königstein-Tetschen could be used by retarding forces, which could afterwards find a strong defensive line on the Iser.
No. 2.
1st. ARMY ON 22ND., 23RD. & 24TH. JUNE.
Two railway lines lay in the theater of war, and were of great importance to the contending armies. One line ran from Vienna, via Kosel, Breslau and Görlitz, to Dresden. The other connected the Austrian capital with Prague, via Olmütz (or Brünn) and Bömisch Trübau. The two lines were joined by a railway from Dresden to Prague, and by one which, running from Löbau to Turnau, branched from the latter point to Prague and Pardubitz. These railways connected with others leading to all the important cities of Prussia. The two Prussian armies could cover their railway communications while advancing; but the Prague-Olmütz line, which was of vital importance to the Austrian army, ran parallel to, and dangerously near, the Silesian frontier, and was not covered by the Austrian front during the operations in Bohemia.
The Prussian advance began on the 20th of June. The Army of the Elbe marched from the vicinity of Dresden, via Stolpen, Neustadt, Schluckenau and Rumburg, to Gabel. As the greater part of this march had to be made by one road, it required six days, though the distance was only 65 miles. The First Army had concentrated at Zittau, Herrnhut, Hirschfelde, Seidenberg and Marklissa. From these points it began its march on the 22d of June, each division marching by a separate road; and on the 25th it was closely concentrated around Reichenberg. The entire Prussian front was now reduced to about 100 miles, and Herwarth Von Bittenfeld was only twelve miles from Frederick Charles.
It would have been dangerous in the extreme for the Crown Prince to begin his march while Von Benedek held six corps in hand to hurl upon him. The passage of the Second Army through the defiles depended on surprise; and in the face of a superior and concentrated army, it would have been a desperate undertaking. It was necessary, therefore, to distract the plans of the enemy by false maneuvers, and to wait for Frederick Charles to menace the Austrian left, on the Iser, before beginning the forward movement with the Second Army. With these objects in view, the VIth Corps was ordered to push forward towards Olmütz, and Frederick Charles received the following instructions from Von Moltke: “Since the difficult task of debouching from the mountains falls upon the Second, weaker, Army, so, as soon as the junction with Herwarth’s corps is effected, the First Army must, by its rapid advance, shorten the crisis.” The VIth Corps moved from Neisse into the Austrian dominions as far as Freiwaldau, where its advanced-guard had a successful skirmish with a party of Austrian cavalry. This corps was supposed by the Austrians to be the advanced-guard of the Crown Prince’s army marching upon Olmütz; and the demonstration had the effect of holding a large force of Austrians between Hohenmauth and Bömisch Trübau, where it could not be used to oppose the real advance of the Second Army.
The Crown Prince’s army was to move as follows:
The Ist Corps3 via Liebau and Trautenau, to Arnau;
The Guards, via Neurode, Braunau, Eypel, to Königinhof;
The Vth Corps, via Glatz, Reinerz, Nachod, to Gradlitz;
The cavalry, from Waldenburg, via Trautenau, to Königinhof.
No. 1.
PROPOSED ADVANCE OF 2ND. ARMY FROM 25TH. TO 28TH. JUNE.