THE PLANS OF VON MOLTKE AND VON BENEDEK, AND THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES
The Prussian army was commanded by the King. His chief-of-staff was Baron Hellmuth Von Moltke, a soldier of reputation in Prussia, but as yet almost unknown beyond the boundaries of his own country.
The object of Von Moltke was to protect the Prussian rear by defeating the Hanoverian and Hessian troops; to prevent a junction of these troops with their South German allies; to “contain” the latter with as small a force as possible, and to hurl the crushing weight of the Prussian forces upon the Austro-Saxon army.
On the 14th of June the Prussian armies were stationed as follows:
The “Army of the Elbe,” consisting of three divisions, two cavalry brigades and 144 guns, in cantonments round Torgau, under command of General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld;
The “First Army,” consisting of three army corps, a cavalry corps of six brigades, and 300 guns, near Görlitz, under command of Prince Frederick Charles;
The “Second Army,” consisting of four army corps, a cavalry division of three brigades, and 336 guns, in the vicinity of Neisse, under command of the Crown Prince.
Besides the three main armies, there were other forces stationed as follows:
One division at Altona, in Holstein, under Von Manteuffel;
One division at Minden, under Vogel Von Falckenstein;
One division (made up principally of the Prussian garrisons withdrawn from the Federal fortresses of Mayence, Rastadt and Frankfort) at Wetzlar, under Von Beyer.
The Austrian “Army of the North” was posted as follows:
Ist Corps, at Prague, Teplitz, Theresienstadt and Josephstadt;
IInd Corps, near Bömisch Trübau;
IVth Corps, near Teschen;
VIth Corps, at Olmütz;
IIId Corps, at Brünn;
Xth Corps at Brünn;
VIIIth Corps, in the neighborhood of Austerlitz.
To these corps were attached five divisions of cavalry and more than 750 guns.
This army was under command of Field Marshal Von Benedek, an officer of great experience and high reputation.
The Saxon army, 25,000 strong, with fifty-eight guns, was at Dresden, under command of the Crown Prince of Saxony.
The Bavarian army was concentrating on the line of the Main between Amberg and Würzburg. It numbered 52,000 men, and was under command of Prince Charles of Bavaria.
The VIIIth Federal Corps was forming at Frankfort. It consisted of the contingents of Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau, and an Austrian division drawn from the Federal fortresses. It numbered about 42,000 men, and was under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse.
The Vth, VIIth and IXth Austrian corps, under the Archduke Albrecht, were in Venetia, opposed to an Italian army of four corps.
Von Benedek expected to assume the offensive and invade Prussia. He had announced this intention before the beginning of hostilities, even going so far as to prescribe rules for the behavior of his soldiers while in the enemy’s country. It is hard to understand (in the light of subsequent events) the slight esteem in which the Austrians held their opponents before the commencement of hostilities. In a general order issued to his army on June 17, 1866, the Austrian commander says: “We are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the line and partly of Landwehr. The first comprises young men not accustomed to privations and fatigue, and who have never yet made an important campaign; the latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which, rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their government. In consequence of a long course of years of peace, the enemy does not possess a single general who has had an opportunity of learning his duties on the field of battle.”
Von Benedek’s unfavorable opinion of his adversaries was probably shared by many other prominent European soldiers; for the excellence of the military system of Prussia was, as yet, not appreciated by other nations. Absurd as Von Benedek’s order now appears, it seems to have excited no unfavorable comment at the time of its appearance; and, in fact, the expectation of Austrian success was quite general in Europe.
On the 15th of June the Austrian outposts were notified of the intention of the Prussians to begin hostilities, and war was formally declared against Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Saxony. Within twenty-four hours after the declaration of war, the invasion of each of these minor states was begun.
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HESSIANS AND HANOVERIANS. 2
Von Falckenstein from Minden, and Von Manteuffel from Altona, moved upon Hanover, and Von Beyer invaded Hesse-Cassel from Wetzlar. On the night of the 15th the Hanoverian army, accompanied by the blind monarch, King George, retreated, chiefly by rail, to Göttingen; the retreat being conducted in such haste that even the reserve ammunition and hospital supplies were left behind. On the 17th Von Falckenstein entered the Hanoverian capital; on the 19th Von Manteuffel marched into the city; and by the 22d all Hanover, except Göttingen, was in the possession of the Prussians.
Von Beyer pushed into Hesse-Cassel, the Hessian army retiring before him, by way of Fulda, upon Hanau, where it formed a junction with the Federal forces. On the 19th the Prussians entered Cassel, and an army was thus placed across the path of the retreating Hanoverians.
The Hanoverian army, which had been compelled to wait several days at Göttingen to complete its organization, resumed its march on the 21st, intending to cross a portion of the Prussian territory via Heiligenstadt and Langensalza, and thence through Eisenach or Gotha, to form a junction with the Bavarians in the neighborhood of Fulda. Von Falckenstein pursued from Hanover, detachments were sent from Magdeburg and Erfurt to Bleicherode and Eisenach, and Von Beyer occupied the line of the Werra between Allendorf and Eisenach. Though the route through Eisenach was thus blocked, energetic measures on the part of the allies might easily have extricated the Hanoverian army from the constricting grasp of the Prussians. Gotha was occupied by a weak force of six battalions, two squadrons and three batteries, while the retreating army numbered 20,500 men. Had the Bavarian army been well prepared and ably led, a junction might have been formed with the Hanoverians, and the Prussian force at Gotha captured. But the Bavarian commander was inefficient, and the over-estimate placed by King George upon the number of his enemies at Gotha was strengthened by the receipt, from the commander of the petty force, of an audacious summons to surrender. Negotiations were entered upon by the Prussian and Hanoverian representatives; but the armistice (begun on the 24th and continued until the 26th) produced no other result than the reinforcement of the force at Gotha; General Von Flies, with five battalions, being detached from Von Falckenstein’s army, and sent by rail, via Magdeburg and Halle, to Gotha.
At Treffurt, Kreutzberg, Eisenach and Gotha, points on a semi-circle in front of the Hanoverians,