PLATO. Hoshang Khambatta. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Hoshang Khambatta
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Жанр произведения: Языкознание
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isbn: 9783891990131
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but has unknown elements is therefore wrong. Socrates now wants to go back to the original question as to what the addition of an account to true judgment means? He suggests that there are three possibilities for what is meant by account. The first would be expressing someone’s thoughts. Here, a man expresses the image of his judgment. Theaetetus agrees, but then Socrates says that anyone who makes a correct judgment will turn out to have combined it together with its account. Hence, correct judgment without knowledge will not be found anywhere. The second possibility is that an account means that a man has knowledge of a thing when he believes that same thing to be part of one thing or part of something else, or when he judges that one thing or some thing different that belongs to the same object. Socrates gives the example, that when a student is learning to write and is asked to spell Theaetetus’ name, the student thinks and then begins to write THE. When asked to write Theodorus’ name, he thinks and then starts with TE. If this is the case, Socrates asks, can it be said that the student knows the first syllable of Theaetetus’ name? Theaetetus answers that anyone at that age does not have the knowledge of spelling the name correctly. So this young person is writing with correct judgment but without knowledge. Hence, the person is writing while possessing an account along with correct judgment. This dichotomy is an instance of correct judgment with an account that cannot be called knowledge. Such a conclusion brings Socrates to his third possibility. A person could be able to mark an object with the characteristic by which it differs from all other similar objects. Theaetetus asks for an example of this condition. Socrates offers the sun as such an example, and asks whether Theaetetus would be satisfied if he were to say it is the brightest body that moves about the earth and the heavens. The point is that, if someone can get at a difference that distinguishes a thing from everything else, then that contrast provides an account of that thing. Socrates gives another example of someone looking at a shadow painting. Anyone close up to the painting cannot take it all in with a single view, but if the observer stands back, the picture will appear to have some meaning. Putting it another way, Socrates proffers the theoretical situation in which he forms a correct judgment about Theaetetus if he can also grasp Theaetetus’ account, then he can say that he knows Theaetetus. If he cannot understand Theaetetus’ account, then he is merely judging a young man. An account is a matter of showing differences. So Socrates would have to know some features that belong to Theaetetus only, such as the shape of his nose. For someone to say that it is Theaetetus who is before him, he must know these definite features about him to make such judgment. Thus, correct judgment is also concerned with differences in what the judgment is about. This type of reasoning goes round in circles because the answer to the question of “what knowledge is” is “correct judgment accompanied by knowledge of differences.”

      Socrates says that, in the final analysis, knowledge is not perception, nor is it true judgment, nor an account added to judgment. What knowledge is remains an unresolved question. Socrates advises Theaetetus that he will be a better person as a result of this inquiry, but he must be modest and not think that he knows what he does not know. Socrates admits that he does not know any of the things that other men claim to know. In utter frustration Socrates concludes that all they have produced is “wind-eggs.” After this discussion he takes leave of Theaetetus to go to court to hear the indictment that Meletus has brought against him.

       Overview: The question raised in this Dialogue is: “What does the title of Sophist imply?” The word sophist is derived from Sophia, which means wise in Greek. Therefore, a sophist is one who teaches wisdom. This is one of the few Dialogues where Socrates does not play a major role. Socrates is present at the start when the dialogue is arranged between a man known as the Visitor from Elea, and Theaetetus. Elea is a Greek city in Southern Italy that is the stronghold of the sophist Parmenides and the logician Zeno. It would appear that by not giving Socrates a major role – Plato’s spokesman in other dialogues – Plato is down-playing the sophist Parmenides who claims to teach virtue. Plato consistently maintains that virtue cannot be taught; it is learned by experience. Though the sophists claim the high ground of teaching virtue, all they are doing is teaching how to debate. A sophist is a juggler of words and a very good imitator of someone who claims to be all-knowing. He may be an expert in one thing, but he claims to be an expert in everything. He projects cleverness but he is a cheat and knows how to flatter his rich young students with a play of words; his only goal is collecting fees.

      Theodorus, Socrates, and Theaetetus meet together as previously planned. Theodorus informs them that he has brought along a visitor from Elea, a Greek city in Southern Italy. This man is a member of a group of philosophers that gathers around the great sophist Parmenides and the logician Zeno. Socrates inquires what title the Visitor uses, for example Sophist, Statesman or Philosopher. Theodorus replies with a question as to what makes him ask this question. Socrates replies that he wonders whether the Visitor thought that all these titles were considered to be the same or different? Theodorus suggests that perhaps the Visitor can answer that question himself. The Visitor replies that he would be glad to explain. Socrates asks if he would like to explain with a long speech or use the question-and-answer format as Parmenides does. The Visitor selects the latter. Socrates suggests that Theaetetus will be able to answer the questions and thus it is settled with the two of them, namely the Visitor and Theaetetus, holding the discussion. They first plan to obtain a clear account of what a Sophist is. The Visitor adds that it is not easy to describe what a Sophist is. Instead, he would like to start with a simple example and then advance further. Both agree to this mode of examination. The Visitor suggests that they start with a simple subject, such as an angler. The Visitor divides every answer into two parts. He asks whether they should call the angler an expert or a non-expert. Theaetetus says that he is obviously not a non-expert. The Visitor replies that expertise also falls into two categories. One kind would be an expertise in producing things such as farming and construction, while the other type relates to learning while not creating anything, such as commerce or hunting. The former takes things that have come into being, which is known as acquisition. So possession is either through production or acquisition. Therefore, he asks, which mode the angler employs. Theaetetus replies acquisition. The Visitor replies there are two types of expertise in acquisition. One type is a willing exchange through gift or purchase, while the other will be acquired by actions or words. The Visitor further divides possession into two categories; one done openly as by combat, the other done secretly as by hunting. He further divides hunting into two parts, hunting living things or lifeless things. Thus, the Visitor divides all the answers into two, constructing and deconstructing.

      The Visitor suggests that they use this model to understand what makes a sophist. He asks whether the sophist is an expert. Theaetetus asserts that as the name sophist suggests being wise, it implies some type of expertise. So both the angler and the sophist have knowledge. The Visitor suggests that both the sophist and the angler appear to be hunters. After multiple such deductions, the Visitor claims that the sophist will be classified as a wage-earner. He is agreeable to people and earns wages by what could be called flattery. When this kind of wage earning teaches virtue to people, the teacher could be called a sophist: a person who deals with knowledge, its acquisition, and sale. A sophist has expertise in debating and appears in many different forms. Examples include a hunter hired by a group of rich young men, a wholesaler and a retailer of learning about the soul, a seller of his own learning, and an expert in verbal combat called debating. The sophist cleanses souls of beliefs that interfere with learning. No one can know everything, but sophists know about things that they dispute. To their students they appear to be wise about everything, without actually being wise. So the sophist has belief and knowledge about everything but does not possess truth. Thus, he must be regarded as a cheat and an imitator.

      The Visitor continues, saying that a sophist is deceptive about appearances and so is an expert at deception. He is an expert at cheating and telling falsehoods. The sophist can make young people believe that they are wiser than everyone else. The sophist says this because if they did not look wise, then no one would be willing to pay to listen to their wisdom. If a person is expert in only one thing, but promises to make everything clear, then he is trying to fool everyone. Thus, he is one of those people who play games. He is a cheat and an imitator. At this point the Visitor divides the sophist’s actions into two parts, likeness-making and appearance-making, a difficult distinction. Examples