Thought consists of two processes that may also be termed steps, and that are more or less observable in all good teaching; they are (1) the association of newly apperceived facts with one another and with older and more firmly established ideas in order that rational connection may be established in what one knows, and especially in order that what is general and essential in given facts may be grasped by the mind; and (2) the condensation of knowledge into a system, such for instance as we see in the classifications of botany and zoölogy, or in the interdependence of principles as in arithmetic. Thought, in brief, involves the association of ideas and the derivation of generalizations such as are appropriate to the matter in hand and to the thought power of the pupils.
The third stage, that of application, is not subdivided. Most other followers of Herbart, both German and American, though varying in methods of approach, conform essentially to the results of this analysis, distinguishing five steps, as follows:—
| 1. Preparation—AnalysisApperception of percepts.2. Presentation—Synthesis |
| 3. AssociationThought. The derivation and arrangement of rule, principle, or class.4. Systemization |
| 5. Application. From knowing to doing: use of motor powers. |
The reader is referred to the following-named works for extended discussion of this topic: McMurray, “General Method”; DeGarmo, “Essentials of Method”; Lange, “Apperception,” pp. 200–245; Rein (Van Liew’s translation), “Outlines of Pedagogy”; Herbart (Felkins’ translation), “Science of Education”; McMurray, C. A. & F. M., “The Method of the Recitation.” A comparative view of the treatment of the Steps of Instruction by various authors is found in Van Liew’s translation of Rein’s “Outlines of Pedagogy,” p. 145.
CHAPTER IV
The Conditions Determining Interest
71. Interest means self-activity. The demand for a many-sided interest is, therefore, a demand for many-sided self-activity. But not all self-activity, only the right degree of the right kind, is desirable; else lively children might very well be left to themselves. There would be no need of educating or even of governing them. It is the purpose of instruction to give the right direction to their thoughts and impulses, to incline these toward the morally good and true. Children are thus in a measure passive. But this passivity should by no means involve suppression of self-activity. It should, on the contrary, imply a stimulation of all that is best in the child.
At this point a psychological distinction becomes necessary, namely, that between designedly reproduced, or “given,” and spontaneous representations. In recitations of what has been learned we have an example of the former; the latter appear in the games and fancies of children. A method of study that issues in mere reproduction leaves children largely in a passive state, for it crowds out for the time being the thoughts they would otherwise have had. In games, however, and in the free play of fancy, and accordingly also in that kind of instruction which finds an echo here, free activity predominates.
This distinction is not intended to affirm the existence of two compartments in which the ideas, separated once for all, would, of necessity, have to remain. Ideas that must by effort be raised into consciousness because they do not rise spontaneously, may become spontaneous by gradual strengthening. But this development we cannot count on unless instruction, advancing step by step, bring it about.
Interest must be conceived as self-propulsive activity toward an end. It is a part of the teacher’s function to assist the pupil in making the appropriate ideas strong and spontaneous. Occasionally a mere suggestion will change the whole mental attitude toward an end and the means for reaching it. A student one day approached his instructor with this query: “How can I get through this study with the least expenditure of time and effort?” The desired answer was first given. The instructor then remarked that there was another way of viewing the matter, viz., that one might consider how to get the most rather than the least out of the study. He then briefly unfolded its nature and possibilities, whereupon the student became one of the most interested members of the class. He had come with only an indirect interest in the subject as an end; he regarded the study as a required task and the means of passing upon it as so much drudgery; but he so changed his attitude toward it, that the study became an end personally desired, and the daily effort a pleasurable exercise of his self-directed power of thought. The interest that the instructor had aroused in the end was transferred to the means.
72. It is the teacher’s business, while giving instruction, to observe whether the ideas of his pupils rise spontaneously or not. If they do, the pupils are said to be attentive; the lesson has won their interest. If not, attention is, indeed, not always wholly gone. It may, moreover, be enforced for a time before actual fatigue sets in. But doubt arises whether instruction can effect a future interest in the same subjects.
Attention is a factor of such importance to education as to call for a more detailed treatment.
73. Attention may be broadly defined as an attitude of mind in which there is readiness to form new ideas. Such readiness is either voluntary or involuntary. If voluntary, it depends on a resolution; the teacher frequently secures this through admonitions or threats. Far more desirable and fruitful is involuntary attention. It is this attention that the art of teaching must seek to induce. Herein lies the kind of interest to be sought by the teacher.
Forced and spontaneous are more truly expressive terms than voluntary and involuntary in this connection. It is not meant that interested activity is against the will, or even indifferent to it. On the contrary, it is a form of activity that calls every resource of the mind into full play. The will is never so promptly active as when it is doing the things in which it is most interested; it is, however, a spontaneous, not a forced activity.
There is, as Dr. John Dewey points out,[6] a contradiction between Herbart’s Pedagogy and his Psychology, as follows: the Pedagogy regards interest as the lever of education, the means for securing spontaneous activity of mind; the Psychology regards interest as a feeling arising from the relation of ideas. Ideas must therefore be given, in right relations, to arouse interest, while interest is in turn conceived as the means of arousing them. This is reasoning in a circle. The difficulty arises from asserting the primacy of ideas in mental life, and then speaking of self-activity, which presupposes the primacy of motor, or impulsive activities. The reader will avoid all contradictions in educational theory by accepting the modern view of the primacy, not of ideas, but of what may broadly be termed will. The latter view is in accord with biological and historical science. Ideas are a later production of mind; they serve to define more clearly the ends for which we work, at the same time giving us insight into the best means of attaining them. For an interesting discussion of the primacy of the will, the reader is referred to Professor Paulsen’s “Introduction to Philosophy,” pp. 111–122.[7]
[6] “Interest as Related to Will,” pp. 237–241, Second Supplement to First Herbart Year Book.
[7] Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1895.
74. Involuntary [spontaneous] attention is subdivided into primitive and apperceiving. The latter especially is of the greatest importance in teaching, but it rests on the former, the conditions of which must constantly be taken into account.
Apperception,