"German Ambassador is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow at 1 p. m. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to their attitude."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris that French Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin had reported to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, that uncertainty of Great Britain's intervention was encouraging Germany in her warlike attitude, and that a definite declaration by Great Britain on the side of Russia and France would decide the German attitude in favor of peace.
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg the following proposition (sent also to France), made by M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:
"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Serbian territory; if, recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the great powers to look into the matter and determine whether Serbia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state of her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."
M. Sazonof adduced the latest telegram of Nicholas II to William II as proof of sincerity of Russia's attitude. He proposed that the conference of the powers be held in London. He was grateful to Great Britain; if peace were secured, it would be due largely to her efforts; Russia would never forget her firm attitude.
Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin that he had spent an hour with Secretary of State von Jagow, urging him to accept Grey's proposal to make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe of a European war.
"He appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day [the ultimatum].
"I asked his excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization was directed only against Austria.
"His excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favorable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the emperor and chancellor.
"He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and the telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything."
Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that he had presented to M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grey's inquiry concerning France respecting Belgian neutrality.
"He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances [which may arise from Germany's ultimatum to Russia.]"
The German Embassy is packing up.
In a supplementary telegram Bertie informed Grey:
"French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day."
France. Raymond Poincaré, President of France, informed George V that Germany was pushing forward military preparations, especially on the French frontier, while France had till now confined herself to indispensable precautionary measures.
"We are, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events.
"From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged; if on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the entente cordiale would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.
"It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to your majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable.
"But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the entente between Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of the impressions of all France.
"It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend.
"We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our ally [Russia] an attitude of moderation from which they have not swerved. In concert with your majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.
"But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace.
"I beg that your majesty will excuse a step which is inspired only by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely reaffirmed."
Ambassador Paul Cambon telegraphed from London of Grey's reply to Germany on attitude of Great Britain in event of European war.
"The Cabinet Council took place this morning. After having examined the situation, the Cabinet thought that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their intervention; that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality; but that before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to develop.
"I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied.
"Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet on the situation had been formed only at the moment; that the situation might be modified; and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be called at once in order to consider it.
"I am informed that the Cabinet will meet again to-morrow, and that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be certain to renew the discussion.
"The letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to the King of England should be given to the king this evening. This step will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet."
M. Viviani notified the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of France's agreement to the proposal of Great Britain to Austria-Hungary not to proceed further against Serbia after occupying Belgrade,