"In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four powers.
"The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir E. Grey has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his démarche for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Serbia opens a new phase of the question."
M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported an interview of Herr von Jagow with M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires, in which the German Secretary of State was hopeful that Austria-Hungary's willingness to converse with Russia after the expiration of the ultimatum to Serbia might discover an issue from present difficulties. M. Cambon adds that perhaps Austria is seeking time to make her preparations.
Von Jagow told Cambon that he could not accept the kind of conference proposed by Grey, and that success depended on mediation taking another form.
"I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favorable result."
Von Jagow had made the same suggestion to the British and Italian Ambassadors.
"My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic démarche at Vienna and St. Petersburg.
"In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any démarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the powers to avoid war could be brought about.
"We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favor of peace compatible with our engagements toward our ally; but to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes."
M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported that M. Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had said "Austria is unwilling to converse."
M. Dumaine, Ambassador to Vienna, reported the declaration of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British Ambassador Bunsen that discussion of the Serbian reply was useless, war having been declared. M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, said that his position from the beginning had been that the question was not of localizing the war, but preventing it. The declaration of war made pourparlers by the four powers extremely difficult. The German formula, "Mediation between Austria and Russia," is unsuitable, since it assumes a dispute between the two empires which does not exist.
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1914
Austria-Hungary. On the following day, July 29, 1914, Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, telegraphed the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and Rome, copies of a memorandum which he had handed Herr von Tschirscky that day in answer to the démarche made by the German Ambassador, namely that the Austro-Hungarian Government should accept the Serbian reply either as satisfactory or as a basis for discussion. The memorandum declared that, contrary to the assumption of Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, at whose instance the proceeding was taken, the parts of the Serbian reply which were not accepted by Austria-Hungary are the most vital in it, since they contain the guarantees for Serbia's observance of the demands made on her. So, too, it is an assumption that the action taken against Serbia was directed against Russia and her influence in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary does not charge Russia with instigating the Serbian propaganda against the Dual Monarchy. Our feelings toward her are entirely friendly.
Austria-Hungary cannot adopt the desired attitude toward the Serbian reply since this has already been outstripped by events. Our declaration of war was made after vainly waiting three days for Serbia to abandon her point of view.
"If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between the great powers, and with a view to the localization of the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Serbian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this."
Ambassador Szécsen telegraphed from Paris that France was unmistakably making military preparations.
"The German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen is commissioned to discuss these preparations with M. Viviani [French Prime Minister] to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way the two countries, although they are only striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilization, which would be dangerous.
"Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict between us and Serbia should remain localized, and that in this Germany relies on the support of France."
Ambassador Szögyény telegraphed from Berlin that as early as the 26th inst. the German Government had warned Russia that mobilization by her would cause German mobilization.
"Another telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures of mobilization Germany might be brought to mobilize."
Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was greatly excited over the alleged disinclination of Austria-Hungary to continue exchange of ideas with Russia, and over her mobilization, which is supposed to be more extensive than necessary, and therefore directed against Russia.
I visited the minister to explain matters. I agreed that you (Count Berchtold) had declined to discuss the wording of the Serbian reply, but made it clear that we had no intention, if the conflict remained localized, to annex Serbian territory or touch her sovereignty, and would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.
M. Sazonof accepted the assurance in regard to territory, but on the point of sovereignty said he must continue to believe that our coercion of Serbia would result in her becoming our vassal, and that this would upset equilibrium in the Balkans, and so involve Russian interests. Russia recognized our legitimate interest there, but its assertion must be acceptable to Serbia.
"I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Serbian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests, so that I was obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.
"I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilized eight corps for action against Serbia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavored to convince the minister that any unprejudiced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia.
"I indicated to the minister that it would be well if his Imperial Master