Whatever term one chose to apply to them, these Brethren of the Coast and outlaws of the oceans became almost a recognized institution of the century when rival European powers were fighting for supremacy in the New World and were unanimously arrayed against Spain. There were among them recruits from almost all nations, classes and professions. There were bankrupt shopkeepers, discharged soldiers, runaway convicts, thieves and murderers, vagabonds and adventurers and many a black sheep of good family under an assumed name. A large proportion was attracted by the possibility of getting hold of some of the unlimited treasures of gold and silver which the New World was said to hold. For the reports that had been spread by the participants in the early expeditions, not always limited to natives of Spain and Portugal, were so fairy-like that the classic tale of the Argonauts paled into insignificance beside them. It is reported that a noted French freebooter who had joined the pirates as a runaway debtor, hoped in this way to secure enough to pay off his debts. An equally large number consisted of men who in that period of adventure were seized with an insatiable desire for roving about the world, free from all fetters of conventional life.
The attitude of England, France and Holland against Spain was so hostile, that whenever one of these powers was at war with Spain, these outlaws were granted the rights of belligerents. Mariner-warriors, prepared to defend themselves and to attack by force, they became a mercenary navy at the service of any power that happened to be at war with Spain. At bottom of this united effort, which at the end resulted in ruining the overseas commerce of Spain, was the opposition against its restrictions of the navigation and commerce of other countries. Bancroft who is referred to by Pedro J. Guiteras in his "Historia de la isla de Cuba" says in the first volume of his "History of the United States" (p. 163)
"The moral sense of mariners revolted at the extravagance; since forfeiture, imprisonment, and the threat of eternal woe were to follow the attempt at the fair exchanges of trade; since the freebooter and the pirate could not suffer more than menaced against the merchant who should disregard the maritime monopoly, the seas became infested by reckless buccaneers, the natural offspring of colonial restrictions. Rich Spanish settlements in America were pillaged; fleets attacked and captured; predatory invasions were even made on land to intercept the loads of gold, as they came from the mines, by men who might have acquired honor and wealth in commerce, if commerce had been permitted."
John Fiske, too, in the second volume of his "Historical Essays," dwells upon the causes of the enormous development of piracy in the seventeenth century. Speaking of the struggle of the Netherlands and England against the greatest military power of the world, he said that the former had to rely largely and the latter almost exclusively, upon naval operations, and continued:
"Dutch ships on the Indian Ocean and English ships off the American coasts effectually cut the Spaniard's sinews of war. Now in that age ocean navigation was still in its infancy, and the work of creating great and permanent navies was only beginning. Government was glad to have individuals join in the work of building and equipping ships of war, and it was accordingly natural that individuals should expect to reimburse themselves for the heavy risk and expense by taking a share in the spoils of victory. In this way privateering came into existence and it played a much more extensive part in maritime warfare than it now does. The navy was but incompletely nationalized. Into expeditions that were strictly military in purpose there entered some of the elements of a commercial speculation, and as we read them with our modern ideas we detect the smack of buccaneering."
England in dealing leniently with these buccaneers sailing under her flag, argued that since the gold and silver carried from America to Spain in Spanish ships was used to defray the expenses of a war which threatened her, English mariners were justified in capturing these vessels and seizing such treasures. But there is little doubt that by this interpretation the doors were opened wide to all sorts of trickery and outrage, carried on regardless whether the countries under whose flags both captors and captured sailed were at the time at war or at peace. Thus the naval and commercial restrictions, which Spain imposed upon other countries, proved at the end a boomerang, which did irreparable loss to Spain itself.
For the long war with England had greatly weakened Spanish power and when the peace of 1604 was concluded, the once so powerful country was visibly entering upon its downward path. Philip II, called the Great, had left a son, Philip III, who had neither the personality nor the ability to continue his famous father's policy of imperialism. Before long it was found that the naval power had sunk from the proud Armada which had challenged England in the time of Queen Elizabeth to no more than thirteen galleys. Ship-building practically ceased. To bring the tobacco crop from Havana to Spain, French and British vessels had to be hired. Nothing was done to keep up the military strength of the kingdom which had once ranked as Europe's greatest military power and had as such been feared by other nations. The army was composed either of inexperienced youths or of nerveless old men. The magazines and arsenals stood empty. With no ships patrolling the seas and protecting the coasts, the predatory outlaws of the ocean, sailing under various flags, soon recognized in the Spanish overseas possessions a territory which upon slight effort promised to yield rich booty. Cuba, Santo Domingo, Jamaica and other West Indian Islands were repeatedly ravaged by them. They established settlements on St. Christopher's Island, called St. Kitts, and on one of the Bahamas, and from these bases carried on their destructive operations.
Notwithstanding the great progress which navigation had made during the previous century, news between the Eastern and the Western continent traveled slowly. This proved a serious drawback to an efficient management of the colonies which European powers had established in America. It was responsible for a great deal of confusion and for the dilatory policy which characterized the government of the Spanish West Indies. Communication between the mother country and Cuba was so irregular and unreliable that Philip III, the new king, was not proclaimed in Cuba until the spring of the year 1599. Yet at no time was the fate of the island more closely linked with that of Spain, whose decline profoundly affected Cuba's political and economic conditions during the seventeenth century.
In that most critical period for Spain, when the fate of the Kingdom passed from the hands of Philip the Great into those of his incapable successor, Cuba had the good fortune of being under the administration of strong and able governors. D. Juan Maldonado Barrienuevo, who entered upon his office in the year 1596, did a great deal towards the improvement of the capital, starting the erection of a government house and a public prison. He recognized the great value of sugar as one of the staple products of the island and by every measure possible encouraged the cultivation of sugar cane. He obtained from the King special exemptions and privileges for the builders and owners of sugar mills. He was the first to construct that of Vicente Santa Maria in Fuente de Chaves. Sugar was at that time sold at fabulous prices. A cargo of sugar of inferior quality brought in Seville as much as twelve pesos per arroba (twenty-five pounds). The importation of and traffic in African negroes who were set to work on the sugar plantations was inseparable from this industry which henceforth became the chief source of Cuba's wealth. But Maldonado, too, had troubles with the pirates. As the two galleys in the port were known to be absolutely useless, the pirates approached almost within cannon-shot of the place.
The administration of D. Pedro de Valdes, Ensign (alfevez major) of the Order of Santiago and nephew of the famous admiral of that name, began most auspiciously. He was appointed successor of Maldonado in 1602. A worthy heir of his uncle's glory, he started for his post from San Lucas with a galleon and a galizabra (vessel used in the Levantine trade) on the seventeenth of April. On his voyage he captured an enemy vessel, sailed bravely through a Dutch squadron and sank three of their ships in the port of Santo Domingo. After putting to flight a horde of smugglers that swarmed about the coasts of Cuba, he cast anchor in Havana on the nineteenth of July, 1602.
Valdes immediately set out to improve the artillery of the fortifications, and even to superintend the casting of the cannon. Within the short space of two years he succeeded in providing the port of Havana with eighty pieces of good quality and various calibre, most of which had been cast in the capital itself. Frequent changes of administration had not only hampered the initiative of minor functionaries and opened the door to official malpractice of miscellaneous nature,