shall we therefore affirm that he is chargeable with a crime who has murdered a tyrant, tho’ he were his familiar? The people of Rome, I am sure, will not say so, by whom this is counted among the greatest and most glorious actions in the world. You will say then, Does not interest carry it against honesty? No, but rather honesty voluntarily follows interest. If therefore, we would upon all emergencies be sure to determine ourselves aright, when that which we call our advantage or interest seems to be repugnant to that which is honest, we must lay down some general rule or measure, which, if we will make use of in judging about things, we shall never be mistaken as to point of duty. Now this measure I would have to be conformable to the doctrine and principles of the Stoics, which I principally follow throughout this work. For tho’ I confess, that the ancient Academics and your Peripatetics, which were formerly the same, make honesty far preferable to that which seems one’s interest: yet those who assert, that whatever is honest must be also profitable, and nothing is profitable but what is honest, talk much more bravely and heroically upon this subject than those who allow, that there are some things honest which are not profitable, and some things profitable which are not honest. The principle of the Stoics he explains more fully a little after, where he asserts with them, “Certainly greatness and elevation of soul, as also the virtues of justice and liberality, are much more agreeable to nature and right reason than pleasure, than riches, than even life itself: to despise all which, and regard them as just nothing, when they come to be compared with the public interest, is the duty of a brave and exalted spirit: whereas to rob another for one’s own advantage, is more contrary to nature than death, than pain, or any other evil whatever of that kind.” This question concerning the interferings which may happen between duty and private interest, or self-preservation, will clear up, as we go on with our Author in the enquiry into our duties to others, and into the rights and bounds of self-defence; I shall only add to what our author asserts, in opposition to Pufendorff, about executioners, that if we consult the apology of Socrates by Plato, and that by Xenophon, we will find several fine passages, which shew that we ought never to obey our superiors to the prejudice of our duty; but very far from it; and unless we are in an entire incapacity to resist them, we ought to exert ourselves to the utmost of our power, and endeavour to hinder those who would oppress the innocent from doing them any mischief. See Grotius, l. 2. c. 26. §4. 9. as also Sidney’s discourse upon government, ch. 3. §20,
3 and Mr. Barbeyrac’s notes on Pufendorff, of the law of nature and nations, b. 8. c. 1. §6. I beg leave to subjoin, that I know nothing that can better serve to prepare one for wading through all the subtleties, with which morality in general, and this particular question about the contrariety or competition that may happen between self-love and benevolence in cer-<122>tain cases, are perplexed, than a careful attention to two discourses upon the love of our neighbour, by Dr. Butler (Bishop of Bristol) in his excellent sermons,
4 to copy which would take up too much room in these notes, and to abridge them without injuring them is hardly possible, with such conciseness and equal perspicuity are they wrote. These sermons make the best introduction to the doctrine of morals I have seen; and the principles laid down in them being well understood, no question in morals will afterwards be found very difficult. It is owing to not defining terms, or not using terms in a determinate fixed sense, (the terms self-love, private interest, interested and disinterested, and other such like, more particularly) that there hath been so much jangling about the foundations of morality. They who say, that no creature can possibly act but merely from self-love; and that every affection and action is to be resolved up into this one principle, say true in a certain sense of the term self-love. But in another sense, (in the proper and strict sense of self-love,) how much soever is to be allowed to it, it cannot be allowed to be the whole of our inward constitution; but there are many other parts and principles which come into it. Now, if we ought to reason with regard to a moral constitution, as we do with respect to a bodily frame, we must not reason concerning it from the consideration of one part singly or separately from the rest with which it is united; but from all the parts taken together, as they are united, and by that union constitute a particular frame or constitution. The final cause of a constitution can only be inferred from such a complex view of it. And the final cause of a constitution is but another way of expressing what may properly be called the end for which it was so framed, or the intention of its Author in so constituting it. The end of our frame therefore, and by consequence the will of our Maker with regard to our conduct, can only be inferred from the nature of our frame, or the end to which it is adapted: But if we are to infer our end from our frame, no part of this frame ought to be left out in the consideration. Wherefore, tho’ self-love ought to be taken into the account, yet several particular affections must also be taken into the account; benevolence must likewise be taken into the account, if it really belongs to our nature; a sense of right and wrong, and reason must also be taken into the account; and whatever is taken into the account must be taken into it as it really is, i.e. affections must be considered as subjects of government, and reason must be considered as a governing principle, for such they are in their natures. But of this more afterwards, in the remark upon the duties reducible to benevolence. <123>
CHAPTER VII
Concerning our absolute and perfect duties towards (others in general), and of not hurting or injuring others (in particular).
SECTION CLXXII
The foundation of our duties towards others.
Let us now proceed to consider our duties towards others, the foundation of which lies, as was observed above, in this, that man is by nature equal to man, and therefore every man is obliged to love every other with a love of friendship (§85 & 88). And because equality of nature requires equality of offices, hence we concluded, that every man is obliged to love every man no less than himself (§93).
SECTION CLXXIII
They are either perfect or imperfect.
We have also shewn that there are two degrees of this love, one of which we called love of justice, and the other love of humanity and beneficence (§82 & seq.) But because the former consists in doing nothing that may render one more unhappy, and therefore in not hurting any person, and in giving to every one his own, or what is due to him; and the latter consists in endeavouring, to the utmost of our ability, to increase and promote another’s perfection and happiness, and in rendering to him even what we do not owe to him by strict and perfect obligation; the consequence of this is, that of the duties we owe to others, some are duties of justice, which are of perfect obligation, and others are duties of humanity and beneficence, which are of imperfect obligation. <124>
SECTION CLXXIV
These duties defined.
Therefore those are perfect duties, to which one is bound by such perfect obligation, that he may be forced to perform them; such as to injure no person, and to render to every one what is due to him: those are imperfect, to which we cannot be forced, but are only bound by the intrinsic goodness of the actions themselves; such as, to study to promote the perfection and happiness of others to the utmost of our power (§84).*
SECTION CLXXV
They are divided into absolute and hypothetical.
Since perfect duties may be reduced to not injuring any one, and rendering to every one his due (§174); but to injure, is to render one more unhappy than he is by nature, or would otherwise be (§82); and one may call that his due, or his own, which he hath justly acquired (§82); it follows, that obligation not to injure any one is natural; and obligation to render to every one his due is acquired; whence the former is called absolute, and the latter we call hypothetical.† <125>
SECTION CLXXVI
In what order these duties ought to be treated.
