§ 239, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
§ 859, part 1, Jus Nat.
Therefore, since if he is restrained, his right is taken from him, as demonstrated, consequently that happens contrary to his right, and since he who does what is contrary to his right, does him a wrong; if any one in a corporation is restrained from using the property of a corporation in a proper manner, that is a wrong to him. Which was the second point.
So one cannot without wrong be restrained from cutting in a forest ready to cut the quantity of wood which the law allows to the individuals who are in the corporation, nor from cutting in accordance with his need, if it shall have been allowed generally to every one to cut that quantity of wood which he needs.
§ 97. Whether a right in the property of a corporation can be transferred to another
§ 12, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 11, part 3, Jus Nat.
By nature nothing prevents any one from transferring, as he likes, the right which he has in the property of a corporation, to any other person whomsoever and in any way he pleases: it is still possible to reach a different agreement. For since any one can transfer any right whatsoever to any other person as he likes and in the way that shall seem best to him, nothing by nature prevents any one from transferring, as he likes, the right which he has in the property of a corporation, to any other person whomsoever, and in any way he pleases. Which was the first point.
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§ 170, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
§ 118, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
But since what is allowed, we are not compelled to do, consequently it is not necessary that we should do it; it is left to our free will to do or not to do as shall have seemed best. Therefore, although nothing by nature prevents any one from transferring, as he likes, the right which he has in the property of a corporation, to any other person whomsoever and in any way he pleases, as shown above, nevertheless it can be agreed otherwise. Which was the second point.
So it is plain that by the law of nature a right in the property of a corporation can none the less be transferred to a stranger than to an associate, or another who is in the same corporation, as well by lucrative title, when given for nothing, as by onerous title, when granted on such terms that something should be given in exchange, both for a fixed time, and at will, either as a whole or in part. So if any one can pasture a hundred sheep in the common pasture, he can transfer to another the right to feed thirty, while he himself feeds seventy. Likewise he can sell or give to another hay due to him from the common meadow, or he can exchange it for something else. But if indeed it shall have been determined that he cannot feed more than a hundred sheep in the common pasture and none except his own; even if he have only fifty sheep, nevertheless he cannot grant to another permission to pasture fifty others in the same place, nor can he rent out his right of pasturing one hundred sheep. Moreover it is readily apparent in this case that the right of pasturing fifty sheep, which he does not use, by no means accrues to the others, who themselves in fact are not able to pasture more than a definite number.
§ 98. Of the ownership and use of public property
§88.
§ 129, part 2, Jus Nat.
Public goods are in the ownership of the whole people, but the use of them belongs to the individuals without distinction, according of course as there shall have been need to any one of them. For the public goods have been brought under the mixed community holding of the whole nation or people and have remained there. Therefore, since goods in a mixed community holding are in the ownership of the corporation, but the use of them belongs to the individuals without distinction, as of course there shall have been the need of the same to each, public goods
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are in the ownership of the whole people, but the use of them belongs to the individuals without distinction, as of course each one shall have need of them.
§ 88.
§§ 88, 94.
§ 112, part 2, Jus Nat.
So, for example, a river is in the ownership of the whole people, or is the property of the people, nevertheless any one of the people as he likes can sail or fish in it, unless the right of fishing shall have been appropriated and shall have come into the ownership of a certain private person, or corporation. But it is to be noted that the river is not to be confused with the water flowing in it. For although the river consists of the bed and the water, the water nevertheless is not looked at as flowing, but in so far as it fills the bed. Whence that is properly called running water which at any given time is in a certain part of the bed, while for instance it is being drawn, but it is not running water in so far as new water continually fills the same part of the bed. For in this regard it belongs to the river. And therefore this does not imply that running water is common, which is in the ownership of no one; while the river, which cannot be thought of without the water, belongs to the whole people, or is in the ownership of the same, by virtue of the present proposition, and because the use of the running water is open to all men, of whatsoever nation they are, while the use of the river is restricted to a definite nation. Obviously this is the difference between things common and things public, that the former are in the ownership of nobody, but the latter are in the ownership of some definite nation, the use of the former is common to all men, but the use of the latter is common only to some people. Likewise the difference is plain which exists between public goods and goods of a corporation. The public goods of course are in the ownership of the whole people and their use belongs in general to all, by virtue of the present proposition; but the goods of a corporation are in the ownership of some definite group or community, and their use is common to the individuals in that group or community. So public goods differ from the goods of a corporation, just as the more general from the special. But if you look at a certain group of men as a people, since each is a kind of corporation; by force of a principle of reasoning the things which we have proved of the goods of a corporation are easily applicable in their way to public goods.
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§ 99. Of the transfer of ownership of public property to the ruler of a state
§ 98.
§ 12, part 3, Jus Nat.
Since public property is in the ownership of the whole people; the people can transfer the ownership of public property to the ruler of the state, while all the use or at least some remains with the people.
So the ownership of a river can be transferred to the ruler of a state, while the use for sailing and fishing, for driving cattle to the river, and watering or washing them there remains with the people, or the right of fishing can be assigned to the ruler of the state, so that he can dispose of it, as seems best. In like manner the ownership of public roads can be transferred to the ruler of a state, their use for travelling and carrying remaining with the people.
§ 100. Of the method of using public property
§ 88.
§ 239, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
§ 910, part 1, Jus Nat.
Every one ought so to use public property that he may not in any manner impair the public use or that common to all. For the use of public property belongs to all without distinction, as of course each shall have need. If, therefore, any one so uses the public property that he in any way injures the public use common to all; this is contrary to the common right of all. Therefore, since no one ought to do anything contrary to the right of another, no one indeed ought so to use public property as to injure in any way the public use, or that common to all.
So no one may build out a pier into the river, or build a mill on it, or draw the water into his own farm, because navigation is impaired, whether the river itself is navigable or makes another river navigable. To build in a public river is not allowed to a private individual for this reason also, that the bottom of the