§ 35. Of a nation’s duty to perfect itself and its condition
§ 5, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 4, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 29.
Every nation ought to perfect itself and its condition. For since a nation is a number of men united into a state, and since men go into a state in order to accomplish a definite purpose by their combined powers; in order that this purpose may be accomplished it is undoubtedly necessary that the nation should be fitted to accomplish this purpose, nor should it lack those things which it needs to accomplish it. Therefore since the perfection of a nation consists in its fitness for accomplishing
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the purpose of the state, and since its condition is perfect, if there is nothing lacking in it which it needs for attaining its end, every nation ought to perfect itself and its condition.
§ 440, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
How it may perform this duty is plain from those things which we have shown at length concerning the establishment of the state in the entire third chapter of the eighth part of “The Law of Nature.” Hence it is plain that a nation errs, if in those things which have been mentioned in the same place, it is in any way remiss in diligence.
§ 36. Of the duty of being on one’s guard and avoiding anything opposed to perfection
§ 35.
§ 722, part 1, Jus Nat.
Since every nation ought to perfect itself and its condition, and the one bound to do this is at the same time bound not to do the opposite, every nation ought to be on its guard against and avoid those things which in any way interfere with its perfection and that of its condition, or which render it or its condition less perfect.
Lucilius properly desired to make a distinction between guarding against and avoiding. To avoid is more than to guard against. He of course guards against, who takes care that a thing may not happen to him which he foresees can happen, although it is uncertain whether it will happen or not; while he avoids, who turns aside that for the producing of which some cause already actually exists. So he guards against a conflagration, who does not allow servants with lighted candles to go into a stable or granary filled with straw; he avoids a conflagration, who snatches himself betimes from a burning building. Therefore in the present proposition it is urged that we should not only look out for those things which can happen and take measures lest perchance they may happen, but also that in an emergency we should look out for ourselves and ward off evil from ourselves. Moreover it is quite plain that, in order to avoid, we must be on our guard, since no man can unerringly foreknow the future. We guard against what is uncertain, we avoid the certain. But since, as I have said, we cannot unerringly foreknow the future, we rightly fear in proportion to the degree of the probability of its occurrence that which is acknowledged as not impossible to occur. Nature herself leads us hither, who instills fear in
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the senses, and reason commands, in so far as the intellect reduces the confused notions which affect the senses, to distinct concepts, through which the will and the non-will are determined. But these points will become more manifest, if we are allowed to teach moral philosophy by the method which we use in metaphysics.
§ 37. Of the right belonging to a nation to perfect itself and its condition
§ 35.
§ 36.
§ 159, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
Likewise since every nation is bound to perfect itself and its condition and must guard against and avoid those things which interfere in any way with its own perfection and that of its condition or render itself or its condition less perfect, and since moreover the law of nature gives a right to those things without which we cannot perform our obligation, every nation has the right to those things without which it cannot perfect itself and its form of government, nor guard against and avoid those things which interfere with its own perfection and its form of government, or render itself or its form of government less perfect.
Note, § 35.
Since from those things which we have shown concerning the establishment of the state, it is plain how a nation can perfect itself and its condition, and consequently also what things are to be guarded against and avoided to that end; from those also it is known in what respects a certain right belongs to it, so that it may be capable of perfecting itself and its condition, and capable of guarding against and avoiding those things which hinder its perfection or produce imperfection.
§ 38. Of the duty of the ruler of a state in the preservation and perfection of the nation and its condition
§ 42, part 8, Jus Nat.
§§ 4, 9, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 60, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 29.
The ruler of a state has the care of perfecting and preserving his nation or people and likewise its condition, and also of guarding against and avoiding, so far as possible, all imperfection and destruction. For it belongs to the ruler of a state to exercise the civil authority, consequently to determine those things which are required to advance the public good, and therefore to accomplish the purpose of the state. Therefore it is necessary
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that he should see to it that the nation be fitted to attain the purpose of the state and that nothing be lacking which is needed for attaining that. Therefore since the perfection of the nation and its condition consists in this, moreover, since there is no perfection, unless the nation be preserved, as is evident of itself, the ruler of a state has the care of perfecting and preserving his nation and its condition, and also of guarding against and avoiding, so far as possible, imperfection and destruction.
§ 34, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 31, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 30, part 8, Jus Nat.
The care, of course, of saving and perfecting the nation and its condition belongs originally to the nation as a whole, to which originally belongs the civil sovereignty, or the right of the whole over the individuals, to be determined by the purpose of the state. When therefore this is transferred to another or others, on this same one or ones is imposed the care of saving and perfecting the nation and its condition. This same thing has already been made perfectly plain from those things which we have proved concerning the establishment of the state in the eighth part of our work on natural law.
§ 39. Of the character as representative of a nation belonging to the ruler of a state
§ 38.
§§ 32, 37.
§ 70, part 1, Jus Nat.
Since the care of preserving the nation and perfecting it and its condition belongs to the ruler of a state, whatever right belongs to the nation of preserving itself and of perfecting itself and its condition, the same resides with the ruler of a state, consequently the ruler of a state has the right which belongs to each nation, and therefore he represents his nation when it has dealings with others.
§ 70, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 131, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 160, part 8, Jus Nat.
The character as representative of the nation, belonging to the ruler of a state, presents no difficulty, if only you consider what a moral person is. The nation, in so far as there belong to it definite rights for the purpose of saving itself and perfecting itself and its condition, is a moral person, and so far as the nation rules itself, a thing which occurs in a democratic state, it is itself the ruler also of the state into which it has united. If, therefore, it has given over to another or others the care of preserving itself and perfecting itself and its condition, and consequently, if it has transferred to him or them the rights also belonging