The Principles of Natural and Politic Law. Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui

state, only because it insensibly increases in strength and power. Such was likewise the error so common formerly among the Greeks and Romans, that it was allowable for parents to expose their children.^* On the contrary, the idea Abimelech had of Sarah the wife of Abraham, by taking her for an unmarried person, was an error of the fact.

      The ignorance a person lies under through his own fault, or an error contracted by neglect, and which might have been avoided by using all possible care and attention, is a voluntary ignorance, or a vincible and surmountable error. Thus the polytheism of the Pagans was a vincible error; for they had only to make a right use of their reason, in order to be convinced that there was no necessity for supposing a plurality of gods.⁷ The same may be said of an opinion established among most of the ancients, that piracy was lawful against those with whom there was no treaty subsisting, and that it was allowable to consider them as enemies. Ignorance is involuntary, and error invincible, when they are such as could neither have been prevented nor removed, even by all the care and endeavours that are morally possible; that is, judging of them according to the constitution of human things, and of common life. Thus the ignorance of the christian religion, under which the people of America laboured, before they had any communication with the Europeans, was an involuntary and invincible ignorance.<12>

      In fine, we understand by an essential error,⁸ that whose object is some necessary circumstance in the affair, and which for this very reason has a direct influence on the action done in consequence thereof; insomuch, that were it not for this error, the action would never have been done. Hence this is denominated likewise an efficacious error. By necessary circumstances, we are to understand those which are necessarily required, either by the very nature of the thing, or by the intention of the agent, formed at the proper time, and made known by suitable indications. It was thus, for instance, an essential error in the Trojans, at the taking of their town, to shoot their darts against their own people, mistaking them for enemies, because of their being armed after the Greek manner. Again; a person marries another man’s wife, supposing her to be a maid, or not knowing that her husband is still living: this regards the very nature of the thing, and is of course an essential error.

      On the contrary, accidental error is that which has no necessary connexion of itself with the affair, and consequently cannot be considered as the real cause of the action. A person abuses or insults another, taking him for somebody else, or because he supposes the prince is dead, as it had been groundlessly reported, &c. These are errors merely accidental, which subsist indeed in the mind of the agent, and have accompanied him in the action, but cannot be considered as its real cause.

      It is likewise observable, that these different qualities of ignorance or error may concur, and be found united in the same case. It is thus an error of the fact may <13> be either essential or accidental; and both the one and the other may be either voluntary or involuntary, vincible or invincible.

      So much may suffice for what regards the understanding. Let us proceed now to examine into the other faculties of the soul, which concur also to the production of human actions.

       CHAPTER II

       Continuation of the Principles relative to the nature of man. Of will and liberty.

      The Will. What happiness and good consist in.

      I. It was not sufficient, pursuant to the views of the Creator, that the human mind should be possessed of the faculty of knowing things, and of forming thereof ideas; it was likewise requisite it should be endowed with an active principle to set it in motion, and with a power whereby man, after knowing the objects that occur to him, should be capable of determining to act or not to act, according as he judges proper. This faculty is what we call the will.

      The will is therefore nothing else but that power of the soul, by which it is determined of itself, and by virtue of an active principle inherent in its nature, to seek for what is agreeable to it, to act after a certain manner, and to do or to omit an action, with a view of happiness.

      By Happiness we are to understand the internal satisfaction of the mind, arising from the possession <14> of good; and by good whatever is suitable or agreeable to man for his preservation, perfection, conveniency, or pleasure. The idea of good determines that of evil, which, in its most general signification, implies whatever is opposite to the preservation, perfection, conveniency, or pleasure of man.

      Instincts, inclinations, passions.

       II. Instincts, inclinations, and passions, are reducible to the will.¹ Instincts are sentiments excited in the soul by the wants of the body, which determine it to provide immediately against them. Such are hunger, thirst, the aversion for whatever is hurtful, &c. The inclinations are a propensity of the will, which leads it rather towards some sorts of objects than others, but in an even tranquil manner, a manner so proportioned to all its operations, that instead of obstructing or interrupting, it generally facilitates them. As for the passions, they are, indeed, in the same manner as the inclinations, motions of the will towards certain objects, but motions of a more impetuous and turbulent kind, motions that dispossess the soul of its natural tranquillity, and hinder it from directing properly its operations. Then it is that the passions become most dangerous distempers. The cause of the passions is, generally, the allurement of some sensible good, which solicits the soul, and impels it with too violent an impression.

      It is easy to conceive, by what has been here said, that the inclinations, passions, and instincts, have a very great affinity with one another. They are all alike propensities or motions, which have frequently the same objects; but there is this difference between <15> these three species of motions, that instincts are necessarily the same in all men, by a natural consequence of their constitution, and of the union between the body and the soul; whereas the inclinations and passions, particularly considered, have nothing necessary in their nature, and are surprisingly different in different men.

      Let us make an observation here, which falls in very naturally: it is that we often give the name of Heart to the will, considered as susceptible of the forementioned motions; and the reason of this in all probability is, because these motions were supposed to have their seat in the heart.

      Liberty: in what it consists.

      III. Such is the nature of the soul, that the will not only acts always spontaneously, that is, of its own proper motion, of its own accord, and by an internal principle; but likewise, that its determinations are generally accompanied with liberty.

      We give the name of liberty to that force or power of the soul, whereby it modifies and regulates its operations as it pleases, so as to be able to suspend, continue, or alter its deliberations and actions; in a word, so as to be capable to determine and act with choice, according as it thinks proper. It is by this excellent faculty, that man has a kind of command over himself and his actions: and as he is hereby rendered also capable of conforming to rule, and answerable for his conduct, it is therefore necessary to give a further explication of the nature of this faculty.

      Will and liberty being faculties of the soul, they cannot be blind or destitute of knowledge; but <16> necessarily suppose the operation of the understanding. How is it possible in fact to determine, suspend, or alter our resolutions, unless we know what is proper for us to chuse? It is contrary to the nature of an intelligent and rational being to act without intellection and reason. This reason may be either superficial or bad; yet it has some appearance at least, some glimmering, that makes us give it a momentary approbation. Wherever there is election or choice, there must be a comparison; and a comparison implies at least a confused reflection, a kind of deliberation, though of a quick and almost imperceptible nature, on the subject before us.

      The end of ² our deliberations is to procure us some advantage. For the will tends generally towards good, that is, to whatsoever is really or apparently proper for rendering us happy; insomuch, that all actions depending on man, and that are any way relative to his end, are for this very reason subject to the will. And as truth, or the knowledge of things, is agreeable to man; and in this signification truth is also a