The resolution offered by Mr. Keyes, on Saturday, and referred to this committee, proposing to abolish all pecuniary qualification in electors of officers under this government, was taken up by the committee.
MR. NICHOLS of South Reading moved that the committee should rise. Negatived.
MR. PARKER of Charlestown moved to pass over the resolution, on account of the absence of the mover. Negatived.
The question was then taken on the resolution, and decided in the affirmative, 185 to 157.
MR. ALVORD of Greenfield moved a reconsideration of the last vote.
MR. FOSTER of Littleton said he was not present when the vote was taken, but he should have voted in the affirmative. He would not question the right to require such a qualification, but he had been for several years convinced that it was inexpedient and mischievous. Either a greater amount of property should be required, or none at all. Great difficulties were occasioned by this requisition at every election, and continual questions asked of this sort—what property have you? have you the tools of any trade? Yes. What else? A pair of steers my father gave me. And if this was not enough, then, he said, a note, which is never intended to be paid, makes up the balance. Men in this Commonwealth become freemen when they arrive at twenty-one years of age; and why oblige them to buy their freedom? They perform militia duty—they pay a tax for all they possess, that is, their polls. Nothing, he said, of so little consequence in itself, was so ardently desired, as an alteration in this part of the constitution. Men who have no property are put in the situation of the slaves of Virginia; they ought to be saved from the degrading feelings.
MR. BOND of Boston said the reverend gentleman was mistaken on one point. The resolution did not confine the right of voting to those who paid a poll tax; but paupers also were embraced by it.
MR. FOSTER said he did not mean to allow them the privilege of voting.
MR. DUTTON said he was in favor of reconsideration. He had voted against the resolution, which, it is now understood by those who supported it, ought to be modified so as to exclude paupers. Although the resolution as it passed, was without limitation, still he was willing to consider it, as modified in the manner suggested. It introduced a new principle into the constitution. It was universal suffrage. There were two ways of considering it. 1st. As a matter of right. 2d. As a matter of expediency. As to the right, he inquired why paupers were excluded at all, if it was a common right; and if it was not, then there was the same right in the community to exclude every man, who was not worth two hundred dollars, as there was to exclude paupers, or persons under twenty-one years. In truth there was no question of right; it was wholly a question of expediency. He thought it expedient to retain the qualification in the constitution. It was in the nature of a privilege, and as such, it was connected with many virtues, which conduced to the good order of society. It was a distinction to be sought for; it was the reward of good conduct. It encouraged industry, economy and prudence; it elevated the standard of all our civil institutions, and gave dignity and importance to those who chose, and those who were chosen. It acted as a stimulus to exertion to acquire what it was a distinction to possess. He maintained that in this country, where the means of subsistence were so abundant, and the demand for labor so great, every man of sound body could acquire the necessary qualification. If he failed to do this, it must be, ordinarily, because he was indolent or vicious. In many of the states a qualification of freehold was required. He thought that a wise provision; and if any alteration was to be made, he should be in favor of placing it there, rather than upon personal property. As it was, he thought it valuable as a moral means, as part of that moral force so essential to the support of any free government. He would not diminish that, for in the same proportion it should be, from any cause diminished, would the foundations of the republic be weakened. He also considered it as unreasonable, that a man who had no property should act indirectly upon the property of others. If gentlemen would look to the statute book, to the business of the Legislature, or to the courts of law, how much of all that was done, would be found to relate to the rights of property. It lay at the foundation of the social state, it was the spring of all action and all employment. It was therefore, he apprehended, wholly inequitable in its nature, that men without a dollar should, in any way, determine the rights of property, or have any concern in its appropriation. He also contended, that the principle of the resolution was anti-republican. It greatly increased the number of voters, and those of a character most liable to be improperly influenced or corrupted. It enlarged the field of action to every popular favorite, and enabled him to combine greater numbers. The time might come, when he would be able to command, as truly as ever a general commanded an army, sufficient numbers to affect or control the government itself. In that case, the form of a republican constitution might remain, but its life and spirit would have fled. The government would be essentially a democracy, and between that and a despotism there would be but one step. Such would be the tendency of the principle, and so far as it operated, it would change the structure of the constitution. The qualification which is required, was intended as a security for property. He considered it as a barrier, which ought not to be removed, and could not be, without danger to the State… .
… MR. BLAKE was in favor of reconsideration, because he thought the subject had not been fairly examined. He was not satisfied that the right of universal suffrage ought to be exercised, but many weighty reasons could be urged in favor of it, some of which he would state. He did not consider it as changing a fundamental principle of the constitution, if he did, he should oppose it. He said that the constitutions of most of the states in the Union required no pecuniary qualification; those of South Carolina and Virginia, which require a freehold, were exceptions, and he did not mean to speak of the states newly admitted. The example of other states, however, was not of much weight, as we ought to be an example to ourselves. Life was as dear to a poor man as to a rich man; so was liberty. Every subject therefore, involving only life or liberty, could be acted upon, with as good authority, by the poor as by the rich. As to property, the case was different. But our constitution involves all three, and the question is, how the power in relation to them shall be parcelled out. Our constitution has made the senate the guardian of property. The senate is the rich man’s citadel. There, and there alone, the rich man should look for his security. Every man who pays his tax—and he did not know why not paupers, as they were liable to military duty, ought to possess the privilege of voting. To deprive a man of this privilege till he acquires property, was an encroachment on the fundamental principles of our constitution. The constitutions of most of the other states give the right of voting to every man who pays his taxes; not mentioning anything about paupers. He said the requisition of property was in this town, for a long time, a dead letter, until the Legislature, a few years since, made some wise provisions concerning elections… .
… MR. QUINCY said, that the proposition before the committee had been considered by those in favor, as well as those against it, as one for universal suffrage; but that it was not such a proposition. Universal suffrage is suffrage without qualification. Suppose the proposition adopted—still you have not universal suffrage. The qualification of age, and of sex, remains. Women are excluded—minors are excluded. The real nature of the proposition is the exclusion of pecuniary qualification. This remark is material, because the only principle alleged in favor of the exclusion of pecuniary qualification is just as strong in favor of the exclusion of every other qualification. Other gentlemen had alleged reasons in favor of the proposition from considerations of inconvenience and of expediency. But the only gentleman who had alleged in its favor a principle, as the foundation of a right, was his colleague (Mr. Blake). His principle was this. “Life is precious. Liberty is precious. Both more precious than property. Every man, whose life and liberty is made liable to the laws, ought therefore to have a voice, in the choice of his legislators.” Grant this argument to be just. Is it not equally applicable to women and to minors? Are they not liable to the laws? Ought they not then to have a voice in the