1756
Early in the following spring another irruption, spreading death and desolation around, was made into the inhabited country. The number of troops on the regular establishment was unequal to the protection of the frontier, and effective service from the militia was found to be unattainable. The people either abandoned the country, or attempted to secure themselves in small stockade forts, where they were in great distress for provisions, arms, and ammunition, were often surrounded, and sometimes cut off. The letters of Colonel Washington at the time show the deep impression made on his mind by this afflicting and irremediable state of things.
The incompetency of the military force to the defence of the country having become obvious, the assembly determined to augment the regiment to fifteen hundred men. Colonel Washington urged the necessity of increasing it still further, and demonstrated the total incompetency of the number proposed to the protection of the extensive frontier of Virginia. His representations did not succeed, and the distress of the country increased. As had been foreseen, Winchester became almost the only settlement west of the Blue Ridge on the northern frontier; and fears were entertained that the enemy would pass even that barrier, and ravage the country below it. Express after express was sent to hasten the militia, but sent in vain. At length, about the last of April, the French and their savage allies, laden with plunder, prisoners, and scalps, returned to fort Du Quêsne.
Some short time after their retreat, the militia appeared, and were employed in searching the country for small lingering parties of Indians, and in making dispositions to repel another invasion. A fort was commenced at Winchester, which, in honor of the General then commanding the British forces in America, was called fort Loudoun; and the perpetual remonstrances13 of Colonel Washington at length effected some improvement in the military code.
Successive incursions continued to be made by the French and Indians, who kept up a perpetual alarm, and murdered the defenceless wherever found. In Pennsylvania, the inhabitants were driven as far as Carlisle; and, in Maryland, Fredericktown, on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, became a frontier. With less than one thousand men, aided occasionally by militia, Colonel Washington was required to defend a frontier nearly four hundred miles in extent, and to complete a chain of forts.
This campaign furnishes no event which can interest the reader; yet the duties of the officer, though minute, were arduous; and the suffering of the people beyond measure afflicting. It adds to the many instances history records of the miseries always to be expected by those who defer preparing the means of defence, until the moment when they ought to be used, and then rely on a force neither adequate to the danger, nor of equal continuance with it.
Oct. 1756
As soon as the main body of the enemy had withdrawn from the settlements, a tour was made by Colonel Washington to the south-western frontier. There, as in the North, repeated incursions had been made; and there too, the principal defence of the country was entrusted to our ill-regulated militia.
March 1757
After returning to Winchester, he gave the Lieutenant-Governor, in curious14 detail, a statement of the situation in which he found the country, urging, but urging in vain, arguments which will always be suggested by experience, against relying chiefly on militia for defence.
Sensible of the impracticability of defending such an extensive frontier, Colonel Washington continued to press the policy of enabling him to act on the offensive. The people of Virginia, he thought, could be protected only by entering the country of the enemy; giving him employment at home, and removing the source of all their calamities by taking possession of fort Du Quêsne.
His inability to act offensively was not the only distressing and vexatious circumstance to which he was exposed. The Lieutenant-Governor, who seems to have been unequal to the difficulties of his station, frequently deranged his system by orders which could not be executed, and sometimes could not be well understood. He seems, too, to have occasionally manifested unreasonable dissatisfaction with the conduct of the commander-in-chief.
July 1756
In the midst of these embarrassments, Lord Loudoun,15 in whose person the offices of Governor and commander-in-chief were united, arrived in Virginia. A comprehensive statement of the situation of the Colony in a military point of view, and of the regiment in particular, was drawn up and submitted to him by Colonel Washington. In this, he enumerated the errors which had prevented the completion of his regiment, showed the insufficiency of militia for military purposes, and demonstrated the advantages of an offensive system.
Feb.–April 1757
This statement was probably presented by Colonel Washington in person, in the winter when permitted to visit Lord Loudoun in Philadelphia, when that nobleman met the Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina, and the Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, in order to consult with them on the measures to be taken in their respective provinces, for the ensuing campaign. He was, however, disappointed in his favorite hope of being able to act offensively against the French on the Ohio. Lord Loudoun had determined to make a grand effort against Canada, and to leave only twelve hundred men in the middle and southern colonies; yet his anxious wishes continued to be directed towards fort Du Quêsne. In a letter written in May to Colonel Stanwix, who commanded in the middle colonies, he observed, “You will excuse me, sir, for saying that I think there never was, and perhaps never again will be, so favorable an opportunity as the present for reducing fort Du Quêsne. Several prisoners have made their escape from the Ohio this spring, and agree in their accounts that there are but three hundred men left in the garrison. Surely then, this is too precious an opportunity to be lost.”
July 1757
But Mr. Pitt16 did not yet direct the councils of Britain, and a spirit of enterprise and heroism did not yet animate her generals. The campaign to the North was inglorious; and nothing was even attempted towards the West which might relieve the middle colonies.
Large bodies of savages in the service of France once more spread desolation and murder over the whole country west of the Blue Ridge. The regular troops were inadequate to the defence of the inhabitants, and the incompetence of the defensive system to their security became every day more apparent. He continued to urge on the Lieutenant-Governor, and on the Assembly, in his letters to the Speaker, the necessity of vigorous exertions. Without them he predicted that there would not be found an individual west of the Blue Ridge the ensuing autumn, except the troops in garrison, and a few in Winchester under the protection of the fort.
1757
It was impossible that Colonel Washington, zealous in the service of his country, and ambitious of military fame, could observe the errors committed in the conduct of the war without censuring them. These errors were extended to Indian affairs. The Cherokees and Catawbas had hitherto remained faithful to the English, and it was very desirable to engage the warriors of those tribes heartily in their service; but so badly was the intercourse with them conducted, that, though considerable expense was incurred, not much aid was obtained, and great disgust was excited among them. The freedom with which his censures were uttered gave offence to the Lieutenant-Governor, who considered them as manifesting a want of respect for himself. Sometimes he coarsely termed them impertinent; at others, charged him with looseness in his information, and inattention to his duty. On one of these occasions, Colonel Washington thus concluded a letterAug. 27 of detail:17 “I must beg leave before I conclude, to observe in justification of my own conduct, that it is with pleasure I receive reproof when reproof is due, because no person can be readier to accuse me than I am to acknowledge an error when I have committed it, nor more desirous of atoning for a crime when I am sensible of being guilty of one. But on the other hand, it is with concern I remark that my best endeavors lose their reward; and that my conduct, although I have uniformly studied to make it as unexceptionable as I could, does not appear to you in a favorable point of