Several of the garrison were killed, and among them Captain Treat, a gallant officer who commanded the artillery. Colonel Smith received a contusion on his hip and arm, which compelled him to give up the command, and retire to Red Bank. Major Fleury, a French officer of distinguished merit, who served as engineer, reported that the place was still defensible, but the garrison was so worn down with fatigue, and so unequal to the extent of the lines, that he dreaded the event of an attempt to carry them by storm. The command was taken first by Colonel Russell, and afterwards by Major Thayer; and the artillery, commanded by Captain Lee, continued to be well served. The besiegers were several times thrown into confusion, and a floating battery which opened on the morning of the 14th was silenced in the course of the day.
Nov. 15
The defence being unexpectedly obstinate, the besiegers brought up their ships as far as the obstructions in the river permitted, and added their fire to that of the batteries. The brave garrison, however, still maintained their ground with unshaken firmness. In the midst of this stubborn conflict, the Vigilant, and a sloop-of-war,13 were brought up the middle channel, between Mud and Province islands, which had, unperceived by the besieged, been deepened by the current, in consequence of the obstructions in the main channel; and taking a station within one hundred yards of the works, not only kept up a destructive cannonade, but threw hand-grenades into them; while the musketeers from the round-top14 of the Vigilant, killed every man that appeared on the platform.
Major Thayer applied to the Commodore15 to remove these vessels; and six galleys were ordered on the service; but they returned without attempting any thing. Their report was that these ships were so covered by the batteries on Province Island, as to be unassailable.
It was apparent that the fort could be no longer defended; and on the night of the 16th, the garrison was withdrawn; soon afterwards a detachment from Province Island occupied the ground that had been abandoned.
The day after receiving intelligence of the evacuation of fort Mifflin, the commander-in-chief deputed Generals De Kalb and Knox, to confer with General Varnum, and the officers at fort Mercer, on the practicability of continuing to defend the obstructions in the channel. Their report was favorable; but a council of naval officers had already been called by the commodore, in pursuance of a request made by the commander-in-chief, previous to the evacuation, who were unanimously of opinion that it would be impracticable for the fleet, after the loss of the island, to maintain its station, or to assist in preventing the chevaux-de-frise from being weighed by the ships of the enemy.
General Howe had now completed a line of defence from the Schuylkill to the Delaware, and a reinforcement from New York had arrived in the river at Chester. These two circumstances enabled him to form an army in Jersey for the reduction of fort Mercer, without weakening himself so much in Philadelphia as to put his lines in hazard. He detached Lord Cornwallis in the morning of the 17th, with a strong body of troops, who formed a junction with the reinforcement from New York, at Billingsport.
General Washington communicated the movement of Lord Cornwallis to General Varnum, with orders to defend fort Mercer to the last extremity; and, with a view to military operations in that quarter, ordered one division of the army to cross the river at Burlington, and despatched expresses to the troops who were marching from the north by brigades, directing them to move down the Delaware, on the northern side. Major-General Greene was selected for this service. But before Greene could cross the Delaware, Lord Cornwallis approached fort Mercer, and the place was evacuated.
Washington still hoped to recover much of what had been lost. A victory would restore the Jersey shore, and his instructions to General Greene indicated the expectation that he would be in a condition to fight Lord Cornwallis.
That judicious officer feared the reproach of avoiding an action less than the just censure of sacrificing the real interests of his country by fighting on disadvantageous terms. The numbers of the British, unexpectedly augmented by the reinforcement from New York, exceeded his, even counting his militia as regulars; and he determined to wait for Glover’s brigade, which was marching from the north. Before its arrival Lord Cornwallis took post on Gloucester Point, entirely under cover of the guns of the ships, from which place he was embarking his baggage and the provisions he had collected, for Philadelphia.
Believing that Lord Cornwallis would immediately follow his magazines, and that the purpose of Sir William Howe was to attack the American army while divided, General Washington ordered General Greene to re-cross the Delaware and to join him.
Thus, after one continued and arduous struggle of more than six weeks, the British army secured itself in the possession of Philadelphia, by opening a free communication with the fleet.
The opinion that Sir William Howe meditated an attack on the American camp, was confirmed by unquestionable intelligence from Philadelphia. On the 4th of December, Captain M’Lane, a vigilant officer on the lines, discovered that this design was to be immediately carried into execution, and communicated his discovery to the commander-in-chief. On the evening of the same day, General Howe marched out of Philadelphia with his whole force; and, about eleven at night, M’Lane, who had been detached with one hundred chosen men, attacked his van with some success at Three-Mile run, on the Germantown road. He hovered on the front and flank of the advancing army until three next morning, when the British encamped on Chesnut Hill, in front of the American right, and distant from it about three miles. The Pennsylvania militia, under General Irvine, had also engaged the advanced light parties of the enemy. The general was wounded, and the militia dispersed.
The range of hills on which the British were encamped, approached nearer to those occupied by the Americans as they stretched northward.
Having passed the day in reconnoitring the right, Sir William Howe changed his ground in the course of the night, and moving along the hills to his right, took an advantageous position in front of the American left. The next day he inclined still farther to his right, and approached still nearer to the left wing of the American army. Supposing a general engagement to be approaching, Washington detached Gist, with some Maryland militia, and Morgan, with his rifle corps, to attack the flanking and advanced parties. A sharp action ensued, in which Major Morris, of Jersey, a brave officer in Morgan’s regiment, was mortally wounded, and twenty-seven of his men were killed and wounded. A small loss was also sustained in the militia. The parties attacked were driven in; but the enemy reinforcing in numbers, and Washington, unwilling to move from the heights and engage on the ground which was the scene of this skirmish, declining to reinforce Gist and Morgan, they, in turn, were compelled to retreat.
Sir William Howe continued to manoeuvre towards the flank and in front of the left wing of the American army. Expecting to be attacked in that quarter, Washington made such change in the disposition of his troops as the occasion required; and the day was consumed in these movements. In the course of it, the American chief rode through every brigade of his army, delivering his orders in person, exhorting his troops to rely principally on the bayonet, in the use of which weapon their higher ground would give them the advantage, and encouraging them by the steady firmness of his countenance, as well as by his words. The dispositions of the evening indicated an intention to attack him next morning; but, in the afternoon, the British suddenly filed off from their right, and retreated to Philadelphia.
The loss of the British in this expedition rather exceeded one hundred men. It was sustained chiefly in the skirmish of the 7th, in which Major Morris fell.
On no former occasion had the two armies met uncovered by works, with equal numbers. The effective force of Sir William Howe has been since stated by Mr. Stedman,16 who then belonged to his army, to have amounted to fourteen thousand. The American army consisted of precisely twelve thousand one hundred and sixty-one regular troops, and three thousand two hundred and forty-one militia. This equality in point of numbers rendered it a prudent precaution to maintain a superiority of position. As the two armies occupied heights fronting each other, neither could attack without giving its adversary