A just action is one which of free moral choice is rightly directed to that person to whom it is owed
DEFINITION XVIII
The quantity of moral actions is the estimative measure by which they are said to be of a certain degree
Appendix to Definition XVIII in which the Moral Sphere is explained
DEFINITION XIX
By the effect of a moral action is meant that which is produced by it
DEFINITION XX
Merit is an estimative moral quality resulting to a man from an action which he is not bound to perform, in accordance with which there is owed him an equivalent good on the part of the one in whose favour that action was undertaken
DEFINITION XXI
Demerit is an estimative moral quality resulting to a man from a bad action, through which he is under obligation to make amends for the injury done to a second person thereby
Book II
AXIOM I
Any action whatsoever that may be directed according to a moral norm, which is within a man’s power to do or not to do, may be imputed to him. And, on the contrary: That which neither in itself nor in its cause was within a man’s power, may not be imputed to him (that is, as a matter of desert, yet it is well if that be done as an act of grace on the part of the one who makes the imputation, in case some good has come to pass)
AXIOM II
Any person whatsoever can effectively, or with the obligation to perform them, enjoin on someone subject to himself those things to which his authority over the other extends itself
OBSERVATION I
A man can judge properly of things apprehended by the power of his intellect
OBSERVATION II
From an internal principle a man can move himself to undertake or to leave undone a certain action
OBSERVATION III
A man is destined by nature to lead a social life with men
OBSERVATION IV
Right reason dictates that a man should care for himself in such a way that human society be not thrown into disorder
OBSERVATION V
The law of nature alone is not directly sufficient to preserve the social life of man, but it is necessary that sovereignties be established in particular societies
THE ELEMENTS OF
UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE
BY
SAMUEL PUFENDORF
1. Of a voluntary action which is also moral.
2. The material element.
3. The fundamental element.
4. The formal element.
5. That which is a positive entity.
6. The division of actions.
7. The natural action.
8. Plan of the first book.
1. We call voluntary actions those actions placed within the power of man, which depend upon the will, as upon a free cause, in such wise that, without its decision setting forth from the same man’s actions as elicited by previous cognition of the intellect, they would not come to pass; and, indeed, according as they are regarded not in their natural condition, but in so far as they come to pass from a decision of the will. Now a voluntary action involves two things: One is, as it were, the material element, which is the exercise regarded in itself; the other is, as it were, the formal element, which is the dependence of the exercise upon the decision of the will, and the reason, operating with a kind of freedom of choice, by which the action as decided by the will is conceived.1 The exercise itself, considered apart and in itself for the sake of distinction, is better called an act of the will, or one coming from the will, than voluntary. Now, in truth, an action of the will is further regarded either in itself and absolutely, according as it is a certain physical movement undertaken by a previous decision of the will; or reflexively, in so far as its effect is imputed to a man. Voluntary actions which include this reflexive aspect are, by a special use of the term, designated human. And since imputation regards first and foremost the inclinations of the mind and the habits of life, which are listed properly under the designation morals, it comes about that human actions themselves, by the figure of synecdoche, are called moral.
2. The essence, therefore, of a human or moral action consists in these three elements, one of which is, as it were, material, the second, fundamental, and the third formal.2 The material element is a certain physical motion of physical force, for example locomotor force, that of the sensitive appetite, of exterior and interior senses, and of the intellect as far as the exercise of apprehension (for judgement so necessarily depends upon the quality of the object that concerning it there is no room for the direction of the will),3 nay even of an act of the will itself, when the act is considered in its natural being, that is, according as <4> it is regarded absolutely as a certain effect produced by a force as such imparted by nature. Also the deprivation of a certain physical motion which a man was able to produce either in itself or in its cause may be regarded as the material element; likewise the inclinations of natural powers toward definite objects, produced by preceding voluntary actions; as also a man’s acts or habitual performances consisting in certain usages introduced by the human will, by which, due to the mere opinion of men, a certain moral effect is indicated. Not only can actions of my own which are of such a kind be the material element of my moral actions, but also actions of this sort on the part of other men, and instances of depriving them of actions, when these can be directed by my will; nay even the actions of brutes, of plants, and of inanimate objects, which are capable of a direction that proceeds from my will. So, in the divine law itself, injury done by a goring ox is imputed to the master, if he knows the ox to be of that kind.4 So the vinedresser is himself held responsible, when, as a result of his neglect, the vine pours