Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence. Samuel Pufendorf

contracts between men, since it is not easy for any one whatsoever to possess things of that kind for which another is willing to give his own in exchange, or which have the exact value of the other’s property; and in states where citizens are distinguished by different statuses, it is necessary that there be several classes of men which cannot at all maintain life with that kind of exchange, or else are able to do so with extreme difficulty. Hence civil life was rude and simple as long as that was the sole method which obtained of exchanging goods; and those who use it to-day are far removed from the customs of the more civilized nations. Having considered, therefore, the inconveniences of exchange, most nations agreed with one another to set a certain eminent worth, as it were, upon a definite thing, according to which as a standard the worth of other things should be exacted, and in which that same worth should be, as it were, eminently contained; and all that to such a degree that this thing could be used in exchange for any thing at all, and could be conveniently employed for conducting business and fulfilling all kinds of contracts. For this end the nobler metals, gold, silver, and bronze, were judged to be the most suitable, forasmuch as their substance is not too common, is durable, and is not clumsy because of its bulk; although a state might destine other substances also for this use, which would have to be employed by citizens in the place of money. These metals, in quantities of a definite weight, and marked with definite figures, are called coins, upon which the administrators of states, or the mutual agreement of the users, set a fixed value. Nevertheless, that increase or decrease of worth which other things undergo because of scarcity or abundance, money also itself does not entirely escape, as a coin made of the same material and with the same weight is worth now more and now less; although that variation is not as sudden or as frequent as the variations of value among other things. From what has been said in passing can be explained also the controversy among the ancient Roman jurisconsults regarding worth.³ Sabinus and Cassius, of their number, affirmed that other things besides money had worth, and therefore they included exchange under purchase and sale. Both of <67> these positions were denied by Proculus and Nerva, because otherwise it could not be made clear, when things had been exchanged, just which would appear to have been sold and which to have been given under the name of price. For it seemed to them to be absurd that both things had been sold and both given under the name of price. Now, in truth, both views can stand in a certain way. The first can stand, indeed, if we say that the purchase was made at common or eminent worth; and that the price in exchange appears to be the thing which is given by the one who started the business transaction. For he appears to be the purchaser who asks that something be given him in exchange for some property of his own. And the latter opinion can stand if only that in which eminent worth appears is called purchase. <68>

DEFINITION XI

Principles of human action are those things from which it springs and upon which it depends, and by which a human action is brought to completion.

1. Division of principles.

2. What is the end?

3. What is the occasion?

4. What is an order, and what counsel?

5. The means?

6. What the habit?

1. The principles of an action are either disposing principles, by which it is merely begun, or efficient and deciding principles, by which a human action is brought to act.

      Disposing principles are: (1) Moving principles, in part indirectly and that either naturally, as the end, or morally, as the occasion; in part directly, and that likewise either naturally, as inclination, or morally, and that extrinsically, as persuasion, bidding, incitation, or intrinsically, as obligation. (2) Directing principles, either in a moral way, as law, or in a natural way, as discernment. (3) Assisting principles, as means which are natural, like natural power, and that which chiefly manifests itself here, the faculty of locomotion; or else moral things, as authority. Efficient or deciding principles are immediate causes from which a human action has its being, and are such either simply, as will, whose respect to the directing moral principle is called obedience; or else they are combined with inclination, as habit.

2. The end is a certain good which is sought for its own sake, or because it has something in itself for the sake of obtaining which the action is undertaken; and it is either an ultimate end or an intermediate one. The greatest variety is found in this latter class. The former is called the summum bonum, which is either imaginary or what seems the summum bonum to the corrupted judgement of men, as pleasure of the body, wealth, honour, power, fame, &c., or true and agreeable to reason, as the pleasure and repose of the mind resulting from the practice of the virtues and the contemplation of things. To this is opposed the summum malum, which again is either imaginary, as poverty, diseases, servitude, contempt, &c., or true, as disquiet and anxiety of the mind arising from the practice of the vices and ignorance of things. The leading place, moreover, among principles is assigned to the end, because it must be known and valued before the rational agent bestirs himself to perform an action, and it is abhorrent to the nature of the rational agent to move, as it were, toward a vacuum, that is, to undertake anything without a predetermined end.

3. Occasion is that by which is offered to any one equipped with a natural faculty, in a convenient place and time, an object of some <69> action. For, in order that a person be said to have an occasion for acting, it is essentially required: (1) That the object of the action be present, or that it can be secured with only a little trouble. (2) That there be ready at hand a convenient place where we can be unhindered by others in our action, or, after the action, may not be affected by some inconvenience. (3) That a convenient time present itself, in which more necessary matters do not have to be performed, and in which we and others who concur in the action are conveniently situated. (4) That there be a natural faculty or power to act. It must be noted, nevertheless, here, that in common speech sometimes he also is said to have an occasion, who has merely the first three requisites, although he be deprived of the power of action. But, since the rest are of no avail when this last is wanting, you will call that an imperfect occasion. Moreover, occasion is like a very effective spur to undertake good as well as bad actions, and thus the common expression, that “occasion makes the thief,” is all too true.

4. An order is that whereby there is pointed out to some one, by virtue of the force of command [imperii], an action which he ought to perform. An action of that kind upon orders, undertaken as by that person who is subject to the orders of another, satisfies the obligation toward the giver of the order; thus, if neither the giver of the order has exceeded the limits of his authority, nor the other exceeded the limits of the thing commanded, it reflects, as it were, its effects properly and directly not back upon the executor, but upon the commander, and therefore it is imputed primarily not to the former but to the latter. But, truly, he who