By the way, I have taken for granted that others have the same idea of motive that I have, (i. e.) any perception exciting to action; or determining the judgments we make of things. It may be considered of two kinds, natural and moral; the former immediately from our various senses; the latter the offspring of our understandings, in reasoning; on which account I take the liberty of distinguishing them by the terms primary and secondary.
At the first view, man appears constituted of two natures, the animal and the intellectual. Motive necessitates all mere animals without a remedy; and it does the same by every human creature; as far as he is governed by his animal affections, so far he is necessitated. But experience shows he can controul these. Socrates and others in all ages have done so, by considering things, and their circumstances; and further by disciplines and use, facilitating the capacity, and improving the habit of reflection. We can consider the bodily claims, and submit to, or reject them.
In considering the power of Motive, I readily grant the Necessitarians all the facts they build upon; but not the assumed principles, [14] and hypothesis. I own we are in all things determined by Motive; that we never act without and never contrary to the present one. These concessions no ways interfere with our Liberties. What this consists in, is a particular prior to secondary Motives. Our Liberty consists in the procuring this sort of Motive. By consideration we determine concerning the propriety of our Motives, and confirm or reject them, in lieu of such as we approve: (i. e.) We reject the primary ones occasionally, and adopt others, which I call secondary, as more eligible: In the same manner as a servant who has leave for it, upon consideration of two persons, chuses which shall be his master.
In fact, we find our Motives do often change, and why? but by seeing things in different lights. It is true that they frequently change, as it were, by chance; but this is far from being always the case. New Ideas, and of consequence, new Motives arise in a way of reasoning and reflection; and this difference of origination alters the quality of the Motives, with respect to Liberty; in the latter case, we are active in their production: It is in this way we controul our inferior affections, according to the natural order, that the nobler powers should rule the ignobler. The thing is, that upon examination, finding the reasons intended action, conduct, judgment or opinion faulty, a [15] change of Motive naturally ensues, for other, or contrary ones. Any one may recollect that he has often done so, and satisfy himself that he can on like occasions, do the same again; viz. as reasons occur in reflection.
Here the Necessitarians may probably ask, Where shall we find the Motives for consideration? since they hold it not at our command.
The question indeed is proper to the occasion; but in putting it, they virtually own a fault they have always been reprehensible for, viz. a negligence in their enquiries into the frame of the human mind, and the operations of it; or they might have answer’d this question by themselves.
We freely grant that we have no immediate power of commanding consideration: But we have an equivalent, for all human purposes, implanted in the mind; a naturally strong disposition to it, which nothing but culpable self neglects, and rejections of its use, destroy: So that we have only to submit to our native promptings, to its use, on all occasions; and we shall sufficiently consider. Where there is reason, consideration and reflection constantly and readily offer. A much wiser provision for us, than any absolute power of commanding it; we can let the disposition take place; or we can shut the eyes of the mind against it; we can use or refute it as free creatures.
[16] We may with an agreeable propriety, call consideration the eye of the mind; since we make discoveries by it. And in comparing it with the bodily organ of sight, we may find we have a like power over both. The bodily eye is automatically, and naturally kept open by a proper muscle for that purpose; while yet we have a voluntary power of shutting it by another prepar’d for that office. The power of consideration is as really and as much under our command, in its design’d use, as the bodily eye is to view, or not, any external object. And we are in the general as much promted to the use of it, with this advantage, besides others, that the new motives obtain’d by the use of it, are our own property; redound to our praise and benefit; as the neglect of it does to our guilt and injury.
But the Necessitarians object, that desires and aversions are not in our power, and therefore we have no Liberty.
The reader will easily perceive the sameness of these and Motive, in so many respects, that the same answer might have served for both: But as particular expressions and sounds have very great influence on some minds; and considering that a separate discussion may give occasion to the mentioning some things which more or less affect the argument, I was determined to give it a place by itself.
[17] It is then readily own’d, that desires and aversions are not immediately at our command, as has been observ’d of Motive; but we have a remote power of obtaining new ones; or altering them, which is sufficient for our purpose. Experience teaches that we can procure very different, and even contrary ones, by industry and application of mind.
The body and the mind are both improveable, and by improving their faculties, likings and dislikings, are generated: Custom and use have great influence in altering our likings and dislikings; so applications of mind in the use of the understandings, as in arts and sciences, we become delighted with them in proportion as we increase in understanding them: The mind is like the palate, to which many things by use become agreeable which before were irksome, as oyl, olives, tobacco, &c.
Observation and attention make some things agreeable, by giving us right notions of them; thus we see the rustic, who at first despis’d the gentle manner and obliging behavior of the well-bred and polite, esteeming them incompatible with a manly fortitude and resolution, upon further acquaintance, becoming delighted with them.
Would we rectify our tastes concerning buildings, sculpture, paintings, &c. we may do it by frequent observations on them; and thus alter our erroneous likings and aversions. And [18] it is the same with our moral likings and aversions which we rectify, or change, by obtaining better notions of the things themselves, with their tendencies and benefits.
By consideration we become reconciled to various disagreeable self-denials; as with respect to the means for recovery from sickness; for the preservation of life and health: For these we deny ourselves many, otherwise desireable gratifications; the contrary becoming desirable by reflection.
Here I cannot pass some notice of what happened in the hot weather, while I was revising these pages for the press; particularly the death of divers by drinking freely cold water, or other cold small liquors, to quench thirst, when they were overheated by the sun, or exercise; now although accounts of such accidents are well known to every one, yet they are not attended to for want of consideration, and a resolution to consider and to take their drink leisurely, and by mouthfuls, at intervals, swallowing it slowly, ’till cool enough to make free with it. One would think the past and striking instances of mortality, by indulging in such circumstances, should render every one attentive and considerate; whereas we see them soon forgot; and why? but because no astonishing sound like thunder attends them. Altho’ for