Nehru was pessimistic about the Chinese reaction if the US kept the scope of the talks limited. He believed that Washington had not gone far enough and in fact wanted the Taiwan “question to remain unsettled and the tension to continue.”209 Acting on Nehru’s concerns and British foreign secretary Harold Macmillan’s advice, Dulles agreed to use less restrictive phrasing in the US proposal for talks.210 Nehru wrote to Zhou recommending that China accept the US proposal to hold ambassadorial talks, noting his belief that American opinion had changed and “a realistic approach” to the Strait crisis was possible. Nonetheless, he was somewhat taken aback when he heard that Zhou’s response was “quite friendly.”211
Dulles believed that Nehru’s pessimism had stemmed from his desire to keep Krishna Menon involved as an intermediary.212 But, by June 1955, Nehru believed that direct, preferably informal, Sino-US negotiations were the only effective option. He disagreed with the Sino-Soviet call for a six-power conference to discuss Far Eastern issues because he had come to believe that large conferences involved too much back and forth on issues like participants. Furthermore, issues like Taiwan were best dealt with bilaterally.213 He did not expect a Taiwan solution, but told the Indonesian prime minister that direct talks could alleviate tensions related to the offshore islands, which could create a better atmosphere more broadly.214 Finally, Nehru believed there was a limit to how much India could achieve as an intermediary; he was frustrated with the Chinese attitude on American prisoners, believing that their continued detention gave the Eisenhower administration an excuse to rile up anti-China opinion.215
There was another reason for Indian reticence to becoming involved again between China and the US: the impact on US-India relations. Nehru worried about the effect of the US seeing Indian policymakers as “stronger advocates of [the] Chinese position than [the] Chinese themselves.216 In his talks with Dulles, Krishna Menon repeatedly asserted that Indian policy toward China was not anti-American; instead, India actually wanted to “help increase and promote the prestige of the United States throughout Asia.” He stressed that he did not want India’s mediation and differences over China to affect the US-India relationship negatively or result in the US questioning India’s motives.217
Some members of Congress were, at the very least, questioning India’s wisdom. In hearings, they expressed frustration about India’s naïveté about China. They invoked the Munich analogy, as well as the metaphor of lambs lying down with lions. Others asked if Delhi did not realize that growing Chinese strength would decrease India’s prestige in Asia.218 Moreover, there was frustration that India had helped increase China’s global respectability.219
India’s improving relations with China and then, in 1955, the Soviet Union, also gave Delhi’s critics on Capitol Hill more ammunition. That summer, while advocating for aid to India, Allen acknowledged, “There are important differences in views between ourselves and India on the best means of preserving the peace of Asia and the free world.” He admitted that these differences resulted in India being “considered one of the most controversial countries insofar as [the administration’s FY1956] aid program is concerned.” Representative Vorys (R-OH) bluntly asked, “What do we get out of” aiding India? Representative E. Ross Adair (R-IN) asserted that the US should not be as generous with India as with those who were “avowedly our friends.” Mutual Security Agency director Harold E. Stassen had to point out that the administration was asking for only a “modest amount.” But congressional leaders like Senators Knowland (majority leader) and Bridges (ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee) argued that even a modest amount was too much, asserting that aid should be reserved for those who substantially cooperated with the US.220 Eventually, Congress approved only $50 million of the $70 million requested for India.
Concern about such consequences gave India another reason to limit its mediation. Once Eisenhower told Nehru of US agreement to ambassadorial talks in Geneva, the prime minister instructed Krishna Menon to keep his distance from the discussions—something the Indian ambassador in China recommended as well. Nehru did not want either Chinese or US officials to think that India was interfering. Furthermore, he told Krishna Menon that Delhi would handle things from that point.221 Nehru believed the talks, even if their scope was limited, and the four-power conference in Geneva could lessen tension even if nothing substantive was achieved.222 He was pleased that the US publicly gave India and Burma credit for the developments, which was in contrast with Washington’s having played down India’s role a month earlier when Delhi had helped secure the release of the American airmen.223
That fall, India did get involved again, but only when Beijing and Washington requested its help with Chinese citizens in the US who wanted to return to China.224 When the Sino-American talks seemed to stall in October, the Indian ambassador in Washington suggested to Dulles that China and the US consider higher-level talks to discuss larger issues. But Dulles stated that raising the level was not feasible, and Beijing had not taken up the US offer of discussing additional issues. He also questioned the reliability of Chinese promises since nineteen American prisoners remained in China. Saying that India had and could play a “very useful” role, Dulles urged Krishna Menon to help with their return.225 Nehru tried once again to clear roadblocks, suggesting to Chinese officials via his ambassador that the release of more American prisoners would result in progress with the US on various matters.226 He believed that neither side wanted to terminate the talks, but, as 1955 turned to 1956, he was concerned that they were in danger of failing.227
Other Problematic Partnerships (1955)
India’s receding intermediary role reduced one source of tension between the US and India, but other irritants had emerged, especially related to their partnerships with others. Negotiations over the UK-driven Baghdad Pact in 1955 exacerbated Indian concerns about associated military aid to Pakistan from nonmember US.228 Nehru believed that, like SEATO, the group might end up having “more bark … than bite,” but the potential consequences made it problematic for India.229 Wanting to focus on development, he did not wish to get into an arms race with Pakistan. But, he told Indian diplomats, it was his reminder to Dulles of the implications for India’s ability to guard its 2,000-mile frontier with China that “of course impressed him much more.”230
That fall, the US relationship with another ally—NATO member Portugal—also strained the US-India relationship. Britain and France had left India, but, despite Indian demands, Lisbon had refused to give up Goa on the western coast of the subcontinent. Dulles, in a joint statement with the Portuguese foreign minister in December 1955, referred to Goa as a Portuguese province instead of a colony as India had labeled the territory. The statement had followed Chinese and Soviet declarations supporting India’s stance on the issue. Cooper later clarified to Nehru that Dulles’s statement indicated neither a final US position on Goa nor that Goa fell within NATO’s purview. But the damage to the US image in India was already done.231
The deteriorating US-India relationship stood in stark contrast to the developing India-Soviet one. Delhi had been trying to improve relations with Moscow since independence. The Soviet Union, though, had given India short shrift. After Stalin’s death, however, as the US had before it, Moscow assigned India a part in its drive to counter its adversaries. To encourage and enable India to play that role, it offered assistance and acceptance. The new bonhomie was evident during visits by Nehru to the Soviet Union in June 1955, and by Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin to India in November–December 1955. In India, the Soviet leaders made a number of offers: more economic assistance at better terms; certain kinds of aid (especially scientific and technical) that Moscow seemed less inhibited about giving than Washington; large infrastructure projects, including in the state-owned sector; trade; military equipment; and support for India’s position on Kashmir and its claim to Goa.232