§39. Then follows the state of fallen man. Here many things were altered. The organs of the body required some time before they were able to exercise their powers of locomotion and to be guided by the soul. Death enters the world; various diseases precede and further it; digestion is often poor; man must beware of poison; food must be prepared with various artifices so that it does not inflict harm; the sense organs of humans frequently deceive; the intellect has become much less acute. In infants it is like a clean slate, suitable to receiving any impressions whatsoever. The will of man has lost much of its liberty and is inclined almost wholly to evil, because the passions very frequently rise up and make man lose control of himself and in any case are perpetually straining at the leash.
§40. We believe that these changes in man have been so great that it is absolutely impossible for man to correct these imperfections in the present life by natural means.
§41. If he could do so, it would be in his power to rid himself of original sin or to evade divine punishment. Either of these, however, is absurd.
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§42. Insofar as the intellect is concerned, however, perfection did remain to the extent that man could recognize the common rules and precepts, above all those of the law of nature that are relevant to the will, which was inclined toward evil, but in such a way that it retained at least the liberty of constraining external actions effectively.
§43. Moreover, if we look at the changes with respect to societies, in divine society today there is no longer the face-to-face conversation with God, nor is God only loved as a benign father; he is also feared as a just judge. Conjugal society has been turned from an equal into a mixed society, as a punishment for original sin. The power to command was introduced into paternal society for the sake of education. The curse on the soil and the resulting division of property produced the society of masters and servants, and the fear of external violence led to the foundation of cities and commonwealths.
§44. The state of innocence is also called the state of right nature [natura recta], and the state after the fall from grace that of corrupt nature. Yet we must note that here by corruption we do not mean moral corruption with respect to external actions, since that description pertains either to the physical corruption of man or, at least, to the moral corruption of the internal actions that strongly incline to sin against the laws.
§45. Thus the postlapsarian state is still right to some extent, and the sinful external actions in that state do not reflect the defects of the state but of the humans living in it.
§46. Hence, you should also note the following ambiguity: corruption is opposed either to the state of innocence or to the postlapsarian state, to the extent that this latter state is still uncorrupt; in that case it refers for example to the condition of thieves, etc.
§47. There are many more different meanings concealed in the term natural state. We know of the distinction between the natural and the legal states of man, which is explained in different ways by different authors
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but is usually interpreted to mean that the natural state was that of man flourishing in the state of innocence; the legal state, however, that of corrupt nature. And this distinction is commonly applied not only to individual humans, but also to human societies, above all to civil society. And apart from that its use in solving several political controversies is often emphasized.
§48. We have done so, too, in another place.23 But now we have changed our opinion, in part because the natural state [in this sense] presupposes the existence of a civil society in the state of innocence, and we have just demonstrated the opposite; in part because those [political] controversies can be solved, if not better, then equally well, if we direct our attention exclusively to the legal state.
§49. Almost any beginner will know how much political theorists have criticized the natural state of Hobbes, which he insisted to be a war of all against all, and how much he opposed the social state to this. Pufendorf’s comments in various places against this state of war deserve to be read here.
§50. The state of man after the fall from grace can be described as natural in many respects. This will be clear from the following distinctions. The natural state initially describes a condition common to all humans that distinguishes them from the beasts also after the fall from grace, namely, that they are able to reason and to acknowledge a supreme legislator and direct their external actions according to his precepts. This state is opposed to the life and condition of beasts or to the life of humans abusing this state and following the dictates of their corrupt reason in every way.
§51. This natural state can, second, be subdivided conveniently into a natural state and a social state, the former understood as the condition of humans that would obtain if man, after the fall, from birth had been
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left to his own devices and not enjoyed the help of other humans; and the latter, the social state, understood as the condition of humans living a life that is improved by the efforts of others.
§52. And this natural state and social state are not to be confused with the natural state and the social state of Hobbes. Even though we may be using the same terms, the substance is very different. For in his theory of the natural state Hobbes considers man to be in opposition to other humans, and he wants this to be a state of war of all against all, none of which fits with our natural state.
§53. The social state is, third, either natural, that is, the condition of humans living in an equal society who do not have a common lord and in which no one is subject to another, or civil, which is the state of those who live in a civil society and in the other minor societies comprehended within a civil society.
§54. The natural state in this sense must not be confused with that of Hobbes. Hobbes’s state is one of war and opposed to the social; ours is peaceful and social.
§55. And, fourth and finally, the civil state is either natural, that is, a condition which man has by nature and without any human action (for example, being a man, being an infant, etc.) or it is adventitious, that is, a condition which man has as a result of human imposition (for example, being a consul, a nobleman, a peasant, etc.).
§56. Yet we believe that it is justified to apply the term natural state to all these meanings. In the first meaning the term is based on the essence of man, in the second on the misery accompanying the nature of postlapsarian man, insofar as he is left to himself; in the third it rests on the natural liberty and equality of humans, and in the fourth on the properties, mainly the physical properties, which man has by nature.
§57. Yet if someone wanted to call the first type of a state of nature the state of humanity, that of the second the condition of solitary life, and that
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of the third the state of equality, we will accept that, since we do not want to argue over words.
§58. These four natural states can be compared with each other with respect to their actual existence. The first exists or at least should exist in all humans. The second is not common, but it can exist, for example, if a single man is cast ashore on an uninhabited island after surviving a shipwreck; and it exists, for example, in the case of infants exposed by parents. The third is very common, for example, among nations in their mutual relations. About the existence of the fourth, however, there can be no doubt.
§59. Thus, those people err who believe that the state of nature of the second kind is a fictitious state or that the misery which we said accompanies that state is fictitious.
§60. But we had a reason for presenting this fourfold meaning of the natural state.