The Free Sea. Hugo Grotius

enclosures or sluices, which the Greeks call ἐποχας, thinking doubtless it should not come to pass that any should envy another a little portion of the sea who should be admitted himself to fish in the whole sea.⁵⁹ Surely, howsoever any take away a great part of the sea from public utility, although he be able to do it, it is intolerable wickedness against which the holy man Ambrose inveigheth: “They challenge unto themselves the length of the sea by the law of a bondslave, and mention the right of fishes as of slaves subject to them in a servile condition. This gulf of the sea,” saith he, “is mine; that, another’s. Thus mighty men divide the elements unto themselves.”⁶⁰

      The sea therefore is in the number of those things which are not in merchandise and trading, that is to say, which cannot be made proper.⁶¹ Whence it followeth, if we speak properly, no part of the sea can be accompted in the territory of any people. Which thing Placenti[n]us seemeth to have meant when he said, “That the sea was so common, that it may be in the dominion of none but God alone,” and Johannes Faber, “When the sea shall depart, left in his ancient right and being, wherein all things were common,” otherwise those things which are common to all shall differ nothing from those things which are properly called public, as the sea from a river.⁶² The people of a country might possess a river as included within their bounds, but so could they not the sea.

      But territories are of the possession of a people as private dominions are of the possessions of particular men. Celsus saw this, who clearly enough distinguisheth between the shores which the people of Rome might occupy, yet so that the common use should not be hurt and the sea which retained her ancient nature.⁶³ Neither doth any law show the contrary. But those laws which are cited out of authors of contrary opinion either speak concerning islands (which is clear might be possessed) or else concerning a haven, which is not common but properly public.⁶⁴

      But they who say that some sea appertaineth to the empire of Rome interpret their saying so that they affirm that right over the sea proceedeth not beyond protection and jurisdiction,⁶⁵ which right they distinguish from propriety; nor peradventure do they sufficiently observe that, in that the people of Rome might appoint a convoy for the aid and succor of such as passed the seas and punish such pirates as were taken on the sea, it happened not by any proper right but of the common right which also other free nations have in the sea. In the mean space we yet confess this that some nations might agree among themselves that such as were taken in this or that part should be judged by this or that commonwealth, and so for the benefit of distinguishing jurisdictions the bounds in the sea to be described, which truly bindeth the making that law to themselves which could not bind other people in like manner. Neither doth it make the place proper to any but conferreth the right upon the persons of the contractors.⁶⁶

      Which distinction, as it is agreeable to nature, so it was approved by a certain answer of Ulpian who, being demanded whether the lord of two manors upon the sea could impose servitude upon one of them which he would sell, that it should not thereby be lawful to fish in a certain place of the sea, answered the thing itself, that the sea could not have any servitude imposed on it because by nature it should be open to all, but seeing the true meaning of a contract required the law of sale to be kept, the persons of the possessors and such as succeeded in their right were bound by this law.⁶⁷ It is true that the lawyer spoke of private manors and a private law but in a territory and law of the people here is the same reason, because the people in respect of all mankind have the place of private men.

      In like manner, the rents which are set down for fishing upon the sea-coast are reckoned in the number of royalties, and bind not the thing, that is, the sea or fishing, but the persons.⁶⁸ Wherefore subjects over whom the commonwealth or prince have power to make a law by consent may peradventure be compelled to these burdens and impositions, but the right of fishing everywhere ought to be free to foreigners, that servitude be not imposed on the sea, which cannot serve.

      For the reason of the sea and of a river is not the same, which seeing it is public, that is to say, the people’s, the right also of fishing in it may be granted or letten by the people or prince,⁶⁹