“The preceeding Observations will explain the Meaning of the strong poetical Expressions of the Gods, or even of Jupiter himself, the supreme God, being subject to Fate; by which, agreeably to the Platonical and Stoical Philosophy, was understood, that all subordinate Beings, how divine soever, were subject to the immutable Laws of Providence, which were the Will and Command of the supreme God; and, according to which, God himself was determined invariably to act, and so was said to be bound by, and to obey, his own Laws, as being most wise and perfect.
“With respect to the Subjection of the inferior Deities to Fate, Chalcidius gives us Plato’s Opinion;
“‘The Command of God, which the subordinate Gods obey, is, I think, that Reason, call’d Fate, which contains the eternal Government of Things, and is deriv’d from Providence.’237
“To the same purpose Plato himself cites Pindar saying, ‘That the Law (of Providence) rules over all, both mortal Men, and the immortal Gods.’238
“And Simonides; ‘The Gods themselves do not resist Necessity,’ i.e. the uncontrouble Laws of divine Providence.
“And Seneca; ‘Whatsoever it is that commands us thus to live, or die, it binds the Gods also under the same Necessity: An irrevocable Course (of Providence) carries on, both human and divine Things; the very Maker and Governor of all Things wrote indeed the Fates, but also follows them; commanded once for all, and himself always observes what he commanded.’239
“Lucan expresses the same Notion in a lively and poetical Manner.240
“With respect to God’s being unalterably determined to act according to the fixed Laws of his Providence, and so to be, as it were, bound by them; Seneca styles God his own Necessity.241
“And Cicero interprets a Greek Poet, as saying; ‘That the supreme Jupiter cannot prevent that which is decreed to come to pass.’242
“And Herodotus; ‘It is impossible for God himself to avoid the destin’d Fate.’ And again; ‘God himself is a Servant of Necessity.’243
“Which Passages do not mean, as if there was thought to be any Fate, or Necessity, distinct from, and really superior to, the supreme God; but only, that the Laws of divine Providence, as being the Result of infinite and perfect Wisdom, were the immutable Rule, by which God was determined to order the Event of Things, and to act in the Government of the World. To proceed therefore:
“Fate (κατ’ ὀνέργειαν) in the abstract Sense, as implying Energy, Power, or Operation, ‘is the Laws’ (of Providence) ‘with which the Soul of the World is invested, for the good Government of the Universe.’244 Hence we see the Reason, why the Soul of the World is call’d Fate, viz. As containing in it those Laws of Providence, which are that which is call’d Fate.
“Again; ‘It is a Decree, existent Order, and an all-comprehending Law, which derives its precedent Causes from our Deserts, as the Grounds’ (of the Events) ‘of it; and the Events, which proceed necessarily from it, are the consequential Effects of our precedent Merits, and of the Necessity’ (or immutable Sanction) ‘of that Law.’245
“Chalcidius goes on; ‘The Foundation therefore of the divine Law, that is, of Fate, is Providence: But it is call’d Fate, because it contains, as in a Decree, the Duty of Obedience, and the Contumacy of our Disobedience to it. And Punishments and Rewards proceed from it, according to our precedent Deserts. But our precedent Deserts, whether good, or bad, are the Motion of our own Minds; and the Judgment, Consent, Desire, and Aversion of them, which are in our own Power; because the Choice of these and their contraries is in our own Power.—Therefore the Soul of the World is Fate, as it signifies a substantial Being; and that Law also, with which it is instructed for the well Governing of all Things, is that Fate, which consists in Operation and Act, and the Order and Consequence of it is; if we do this, that will follow: Therefore, the precedent Action is in our Power; the Event that follows it, is the Decree of Fate; which is otherwise call’d Fatal, and differs very much from Fate. So that there are three Things, viz. that which is in our own Power; and Fate,’ (or the Law of Providence,) ‘and the Recompence of our Deserts according to the Law of Fate.’246
“Chalcidius concludes the Platonick Notion of Fate, from many foregoing Arguments in these Words, viz.
“‘That some Things are effected by Fate, is true; and that some Things are in our own Power, has been prov’d to be true also. Wherefore, they who ascribe all Things to Fate, are justly found fault with by those, who prove, that some Things are in our own Power. Again; they who place every Thing in our Power, and attribute nothing to Fate, are plainly mistaken. For who knows not, that something is effected by Fate, and is not in our Power? Therefore, that Reasoning alone is true, and that Opinion firm and solid, which teacheth, that some Things happen by Fate, and other Things proceed from the Choice and Will of Men.’247
“Thus, I think, it is clearly and indisputably prov’d, that the Freedom of human Actions was the general and prevailing, and almost unanimous Doctrine, of the most eminent and numerous Sects of Philosophers, particularly, the Five great Sects amongst the Heathens, which comprehended all the Philosophy of Greece and Rome, namely, the Epicureans, Stoicks, Platonicks, Aristotelians, and Academicks; and that the Opposers of this Doctrine were chiefly Leucippus, Empedocles, and Democritus, the first Founders of the Epicurean Sect, but oppos’d herein by Epicurus and his Followers; Heraclitus, Diodorus, and some Astrologers and Fortune-tellers amongst the Stoicks, which were greatly despised and condemned by the most learned of that Sect also. And I have also shewn distinctly, and at large, that the antient Platonick and Stoical Notion of Fate and Necessity agreed with each other, and was declar’d to be consistent with the Liberty of Mens Actions; and was not understood to be a necessary efficient Cause of human Actions at all, but only to be the determinate Will and Decrees of God, or the Laws of his Providence, by which the Universe was govern’d, and Good and Evil was dispensed unto Men, according to the free and voluntary Actions, and Conduct, of their Life.
“And, from the preceeding Proofs of the Freedom of human Actions, as being the Sense and Opinion of the most Wise and Learned, as well as greatest Part of Mankind in all Ages, I beg leave to make one Observation, namely, that upon the Supposition of the Necessity of Mens Actions, it must appear very extraordinary and directly absurd, that the Light of natural Reason should necessarily lead Mankind at all Times to conclude their Actions to be in their own Power and Choice, and to be voluntary and free, if they are indeed necessary: That Necessity should form Mens Minds and Notions so opposite to its own Operations, and make them necessarily think their Actions are not necessary but voluntary. To which Purpose, the learned Ammonius Hermias argues; ‘Does this Reason, which’ (as they teach) ‘necessarily effects all Things, make it necessary for Men to affirm, either that all Things are necessary, or that some Things are in our Power? If the latter is true, then all Things are not necessary; but, if the former, how come many to think the contrary, viz. that many Things are in our Power? For it is altogether absurd to suppose, that Nature, which’ (they say) ‘necessarily effects all Things, should move us against Nature, to contradict the Truth of its own Operations.’”248
So much for the Sentiments of the Antients concerning Fate, Necessity, Liberty,