Apathy.
§VII. Not less extravagant is their Doctrine of Apathy, or being free from animal Affections and Passions, which at once discards all things external, whether Good or Evil, both of this and another World, substituting certain mental Operations, instead of the Passions of the lower or animal Soul; “Will, instead of the Passion of Desire; mental Joy, instead of the Passion of Joy; Caution, instead of the Passion of Fear; but, instead of Grief, or Sorrow, they substitute nothing, because they deny any such Thing in a Wise-Man.” If Ulysses (said Epictetus) in truth lamented for his Wife, was he not unhappy? “But what good Man is unfortunate, or unhappy? Therefore, if he cri’d and lamented, he was not a good Man.” Sorrow for the Death of Friends, they account a very bad Thing, their Philosophy being a contrivance to live in perfect Indolence: Nor alloweth it Sorrow for our Sins and Vices, as Plutarch charges them. But, if this be Philosophy, the old Man had great Reason to tell his Son, “Hear me, my Son! you must Philosophize, but you must have Brains too: These are egregious Fooleries.” As likewise are these their Maxims. “The Wise-Man is never mov’d by Grace, or Favour; never pardoneth the Crimes of any. None commiserate, but the Vain and Foolish. It is not the Property of a Man, to be exorable, or placable.”
But, doubtless, it would be better for Mankind to be left to the Sentiments of Nature, than to be instituted to such a harden’d Virtue, that is neither possible, nor tolerable, being absolutely Destructive, both of Good-Nature, and of the Exercise of divine and gracious Affections and Passions. For Fear and Desire are truly said to be divine Virtues, if their Objects be Things divine; and to sympathize with others in their Joys and Sorrows, is inseparable from true Benevolence. But the Stoicks admit of no sympathizing Sorrow, but in political Appearance. “If you see a Man” (saith Epictetus) “lamenting his Misfortunes, you may in Words accommodate your-self to him, and, if you be so dispos’d, lament with him: But take care, that you do not internally lament.”
Arrogance, with respect to the Gods, as well as Men.
§VIII. The Pagans charg’d the Stoicks with Arrogance, and not without great Reason; for it was but a natural Consequence of their extravagant Liberty, Security, Tranquillity, Self-Sufficiency, Wisdom, Royalty, and Apathy; insomuch that their Wise-Man is no less than one of Jove’s Peers, that liveth as well as the Gods live. “And, as it is agreeable to Jove” (saith Chrysippus) “to elate himself upon account of his Life, to think great, and (if I may so speak) to lift up his Head, to glory, and magnify himself, living worthy of a magnifying Elation: So these Things agree to all good Men, that in nothing come behind Jove. As to the Body,” (saith Epictetus,) “thou art a small part of the Universe. But in respect of the Mind, or Reason, not worse, nor less, than the Gods; for the greatness of the Mind is not to be judg’d of by Longitude, nor Altitude, but by decretory Sentiments.” In this Philosophy, one of the fundamental Maxims is, “That all the Wise and Good are Equal,” being all of them happy to the height of Bliss. For Virtue, the true and the sole cause of Happiness, is equal in them all; it is not capable of increase, nor diminution, and as for Externals, which are of no consideration, they make no disparity. Time also maketh no disparity. Whence it follows, “That Jupiter and Dio, being both Wise, are equals. In Virtue Jupiter doth not transcend Dio. In Felicity God doth not transcend the Wise-Man, although he surmounteth him in Age,” which maketh no disparity. But is not Jupiter the more Powerful and Opulent? “Sextius was wont to equalize Jupiter and the good Man; Jupiter indeed hath more, and can do more for Mankind: But between two that are Good, the Richer is not the Better. Do you inquire of the difference between a Wise-Man and the Gods? The Gods will exist a longer Time. But it is a great Artifice, to inclose the whole in a little Room,”6 i.e. for a Wise-Man to have the whole in his Age, which God hath in a long Succession of Ages. In this and some other respects, the Wise-Man transcendeth Jupiter, and he admireth himself above him. “There is something wherein the Wise-Man may have the Precedence of God: He is one of the Wise, by the Benefit of Nature, not by his own Efficiency, as the Wise-Man is. The Wise-Man seeeth and contemneth all Things which others possess, with as equal a Mind as Jupiter: And upon this Account more admireth himself; Jupiter cannot make use of them, the Wise-Man will not.”7 Very modest and pious Doctrines! If this be not rampant Luciferian Pride, I know not what is.
“The Wise-Man” (say they) “is always alike, and of the same Countenance, as Socrates was, in all Circumstances. He doth not assent to any Opinion, is ignorant of nothing, never deceiv’d, never unsuccessful, never repenteth of any Undertaking, wondereth at nothing, nothing befalleth him contrary to Opinion. The good Man is perfect, sinneth in nothing, is impeccable, suffereth no Injury, is not mad, altho’ maniacal, is inebriated, yet not drunk. All Things are the Stoical Wise-Man’s, he is the only King and Freeman; he alone is rich, beauteous, noble, the only Citizen, Magistrate, Judge, Orator, Poet, Priest, Prophet.” Fine Prerogatives! The Popular Pagans fell so far short of Stoical Wisdom, as to acknowledge their good Endowments the Gift of God: But the Stoicks say of their Wisdom, “Every one that hath it, oweth it to himself.” Sometimes they huff at praying for the divine Aid. “What need is there of Prayers? make thy-self Happy.”8 In a better Humour they assert the Concurrence of divine Assistance with human Endeavours; they exhort us to pray for Virtue, a good Mind, and the divine Aid. “But so, that the Effect is properly to be ascrib’d to our own Power, because it is a Thing which properly belongeth to our own Power.” For this Philosophy distinguishes Things that properly belong to our own Power, from the Things that do not properly belong to our own Power: The Works of Providence are not the Things that properly belong to our own Power; they are properly to be ascrib’d to the Gods: But the Stoicks Virtue, and its consequent Felicity, are Things that properly belong to our own Power; according to that of Cotta in Cicero, “All Mankind ascribe the Commodity and Prosperity of Life to the Gods, but none ever ascrib’d his Virtue to the Diety.”9 So the Poet, speaking the Sense of the Stoical Philosopher, ascribeth Life and Riches to Jove, but not a virtuous Mind; for that is an Effect, which properly belongeth to his own Power. “Let him give Life and Riches, I will get to my-self a good Mind.”10 But as Riches are the Gift of Providence, yet not exclusively to human Endeavours, so the Virtue of our Mind belongeth to our own Power, yet not exclusively to divine Assistance; “for who hath told thee” (saith M. Antoninus,) “that the Gods do not help us even to those Things, that they have put in our own Power?” Whence an appearing inconsistency in another Poet, who also speaketh the Sense of the Stoical Philosopher, is easily reconcileable.
Orandum