Nor does the distinction of Caballus make any difference, where he holds that auxiliaries may indeed assist with impunity a husband or a father killing a wife or daughter respectively, in order that these may kill the more safely; but that they cannot lend a hand and actually kill; for in the latter case they are to be held accountable for the murder. Because, for foundation in making such a distinction, he plants his feet upon Paolo de Castro. [Citation.] But this is so far from proving his purpose that it rather turns back on him remarkably to his own injury. For after the latter sets before himself this kind of a difficulty, under No. 2, he adds: "But I hold entirely the contrary: that neither the one who did the killing nor he who made the assembly (as it may be called) are to be held for the murder for the purpose of inflicting the capital penalty."
This is also true in the council of Rollandus a Valle. [Citations.] May that learned authority pardon me; for even if he does attempt to confute Paolo de Castro in the said 154th council, which is in our favour, under the pretext that he speaks contrary to the common opinion, this claim does not suffice in view of the above-cited authorities. And if there were time, I would demonstrate this more clearly.
Furthermore, Rollandus alleges Parisius, cons. 154, lib. 4. But he could well omit that, because No. 22 proves expressly contrary to him on its very face, where it says: "Under our very conditions was given that excellent decision of Paolo de Castro in the before-cited council. In stronger circumstances (which also include the present case) he concludes that those who knew of, or were present, or were associated with a husband in the act of the said murder, and who furnished him aid, ought not to be punished with a greater penalty than the principal, according to the rule concerning auxiliaries, beside the accurate authority of Marsilius." And he concludes that at the very worst, when the utmost rigour of it is considered, they should not be punished with more than a temporary banishment.
Furthermore, Rollandus in the said council is expressly confuted by Facchinus. [Citation.] Nor is this without vital reason. For just as a qualification that modifies a crime in the principal delinquent increases it also for the auxiliaries, whenever they are aware of it, so all sense of equity demands that a qualification that diminishes the penalty for the principal, even though it be unknown to the auxiliaries, shall act in favour of them also. [Citations.] Hence Caballus remains without a stable foundation, and is opposed to the opinion of the many doctors here alleged, who make no distinction between those who simply assist and those taking a hand in the murder; and indeed all of them speak of auxiliaries. Furthermore, it is found that this has often been the judgment, even in the more extreme circumstances of one commanded to a murder, as was said above. And so strong is the plea of injured honour that not only does it extend its protection to mere mandatories, but even to mandatories whose case is modified by the circumstance of assassination. And it causes them to be absolved, as we find that it was so decided. [Citations.]
Hence if both mandatories and assassins are redeemed from the ordinary death penalty, whenever they kill an adulteress at the command of the husband, it necessarily follows that the distinction of Caballus is not a true one, nor is it accepted in practice. For if they are mandatories, we cannot deny that they may kill with their own hands; and nevertheless, not to speak of the other decisions cited above, Clar. [Citation] testifies such a decision favourable to the accused was handed down, contrary to the opinion of Caballus.
If, therefore, Blasio and his fellows are not to be punished with the death penalty for affording aid in the murders, vain is the question whether they can be subjected to the torment of the vigil for the purpose of having the very truth from their own mouths. For this procedure demands two requisites: one that the most urgent proofs stand against the accused, and the other that the crime be very atrocious, according to the prescript of the Bull. [Citations.]
And although the powers of this Tribunal are very great for the dispensing with one of the said requisites, yet I have never seen the said torment of the vigil inflicted unless when there was no doubt that the crime, for which the Fisc was trying to draw confession from the accused, deserved the capital penalty. We cannot believe that the prosecution expects to make a case to this end because of the pretended conventicle; since those who are assembled are not to be held under the penalty for conventicle, but only the one who assembled them is so held, as Baldo well asserts. [Citations.] Nor in this case can the penalty for the asserted conventicle be made good against Count Guido himself, since the cause for which he assembled the men aids him in evading the penalty; inasmuch as one may assemble his friends and associates for the purpose of regaining his reputation. [Citations.]
For this has been well proved, that whenever any one for just grievance assembles men to avenge his injury, he has not incurred the crime and penalty of conventicle.
And although Farinacci, quaest 113, n. 55, declares that this holds good provided the vengeance be immediate, but that it is otherwise if the vengeance be after an interval, yet I pray that it be noted that in either case, if it concern vengeance for a personal injury (in which conditions he himself speaks), and therefore when for an injury which wounds the honour, such vengeance is at all times said to be taken immediately. For such an injury always urges and presses, because it should be termed the restoration and reparation of honour (which the one injured in his reputation could not otherwise accomplish), rather than vindication and vengeance, as we believe was satisfactorily proved in our other plea in behalf of Count Guido.
But all further difficulty ceases with this consideration: prosecution can be brought for conventicle, if the men were assembled for an evil end and no other crime followed therefrom; but when, according to the sense of the Fisc, they have been called together for committing murders, and these are really committed, no further action can be taken as regards the prohibited conventicle, but rather for the murders themselves; for the assembling of the men tended to this same effect. [Citations.] And it is for this reason more particularly; because when the beginning and the end of an act are alike illegal, the end is given attention, and not the beginning, as Bartolo teaches us. [Citations.]
It is to be added still further, that the assembling of men is not illegal in itself; indeed it is possible for it at some times to be both permissible and worthy of approval, as in the cases related by Farinacci. But it is illegal because of its evil consequences and the base end for which it is usually made. Hence, as the assembling of men is prohibited, not in itself, but because of something else, the end ought to be considered rather than what precedes the end.
Nor should the rigorous penalty of death be inflicted at all upon Domenico Gambassini and Francesco Pasquini for the pretended carrying of arms of illegitimate measure; because they are foreigners and had not stayed long enough in the Ecclesiastical State so that their knowledge of this law could be taken for granted. Nor ought it to be inflicted upon the others; for even if the death penalty is threatened by the Constitutions and Banns for the bearing or retention of them; yet since the carrying of this kind of arms is not prohibited for reasons in itself, but because of the pernicious end which follows it, or can follow it; and because this bearing of arms was looking towards the said murders; and because these, although they are not entirely permissible, are not utterly without excuse, the crime of carrying such arms should be included with the end for which they were carried; because the one is implied in the other, nor may the means seem worse than the end. And although, according to the opinion of some persons, the penalty for carrying arms is not to be confused with the crime committed with them, whenever the latter is the graver, yet this seems to be so understood when a crime is committed with them which is entirely illegal and without excuse. But this is not so when the crime is deceased and extenuated, and indeed excused in part, because of the reason for which it was committed.
In any case, the bearing of arms, according to common law, is but a slight crime. [Citations.]
Although by special Constitutions and Banns the penalty has been increased almost to the highest possible point, yet this kind of increase does not change the nature of the crime. And just as in the eyes of the common law, torture is not inflicted for getting the truth from those indicted for the said carrying of arms, in view of the insignificance of the crime, in like manner it cannot be inflicted by the force of Constitutions and Statutes which have increased the penalty. [Citations.]
And this