At this point it is also necessary to clarify whom we categorize as an intellectual and explain the basis for these claims. There has been and continues to be a lot of discussion about who is and who is not an intellectual. As we see with authors like Gramsci, Mannheim, Foucault, and Said, the conceptualizing of who or what is an intellectual is often tied to the role and responsibilities these authors believe intellectuals should adopt and adhere to. We are wise to reject the narrow and arguably prescriptive conception of the intellectual offered by authors like Said and Foucault, where the intellectual is someone existing on the margins of society.63 More apt is the inclusive approach like that promoted by Gramsci. In this book, an intellectual is understood to be anyone who uses ideological apparatuses like the print and mass media and digital technologies to produce and disseminate representations of Wahhabism.
Whereas those adopting a more narrow definition of the intellectual may distinguish between a commentator, understood as someone who expresses a written opinion on a subject in the public sphere, and an intellectual, a relatively more inclusive approach means a commentator is treated as an intellectual. While Gramsci’s ideas are hugely influential, it should be noted that the conceptualization of the intellectual used in this book is not Marxist, in that there is no reliance on any determinist assumptions about the work of the intellectual in relation to their class origins or affiliation. We can however associate our understanding of an intellectual to a particular group, including those writers promoting liberal and neoconservative values and beliefs.
I am also interested in the broader question about the role intellectuals play in creating what Anderson calls Imagined communities and what Said calls Imagined geographies.64 These scholars, in addition to those like Eric Hobsbawm, Anthony Smith, Ronald Suny, and Michael Kennedy, are among those to recognize the important roles intellectuals play as catalysts in a variety of nationalist ideologies and movements.65 Animating and legitimating this book is the desire to understand and make sense of the role intellectuals representing Wahhabism play in socially constructing a community that is imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group, and the way intellectuals use text to create a perception of space that has helped inspire the global war on terror. It is in this sense that intellectuals play crucial roles in shaping the politics of modern societies.
The nature of the political is a second wider intellectual problem at stake. How we are to understand politics, including how we define it and what we think the aims and goals of politics are, has been the focus of much scholarly debate. Early twentieth-century authors like Carl Schmitt and Max Weber offered challenging accounts of the political, controverting the then-conventional liberal framework. Weber and especially Schmitt questioned why this tradition had too readily assumed the legal, rational, and ethical norms undergirding the legitimacy of liberal democracies, a position that had long been accorded a hegemonic conceptual status in the West.66 In more recent times authors like Bernard Crick and Simon Critchley have contributed to a different kind of critique of the liberal tradition.67 For Crick and Critchley, politics is about helping to end injustice and wrongs suffered by the Other.68 Like these scholars, it is important to understand that intellectuals representing Wahhabism make different assumptions that influence their representations. This matters when we begin to consider the influential role these representations can play in the policymaking process.
The relation between intellectuals’ representations of Wahhabism and the policy- and decision-making process is the third key intellectual problem animating and legitimating this book. Bacchi provides an important and revisionist account of policy as a product of processes that lead to a particular way of representing political or policy problems. Her work is important because it helps show how policy works, how we are governed, and how the practice of policymaking implicitly constitutes us as subjects. Bacchi highlights the integral role intellectuals play in this process as it is them who are framing, choosing to highlight or ignore, particular aspects of problems in their representations that are informing the policy-making process.69
This raises some very important questions when we think that these intellectuals’ representations of Wahhabism have the ability to influence foreign policy in an age where Western liberal governments are obsessed with the (real or imagined) threat posed by radical Islam. This circumstance requires that we ask, what are the bases for these representations? What are intellectuals choosing to emphasize and ignore, and why? What particular claims to truth are intellectuals relying on to support their assessments of the situation?
This takes me to my fourth and final problematic animating and legitimating this book, which is making sense of and dealing with the relation between truth and politics. This issue has been raised by a number of writers, including Hannah Arendt. Arendt writes that we live in an age of mass manipulation where even the status of factual truth is likely to be challenged.70 We have, as Stephen Toulmin and John Caputo more recently pointed out, moved beyond a conception of truth framed in terms of timeless and universal propositions, without needing to give up on the idea of truth itself.71 This entails that we still find ways of dealing with different claims to truth, particularly those that are religious and political in origin or substance.
Unable to make certain assumptions about truth that would then require defending a particular view and testing the veridicity of particular representations of Wahhabism against this view, I instead deal with the role prejudice plays in truth claims. I follow Arendt’s advice and deal with the relation between truth and politics by identifying and unpacking the prejudices attached to and inspiring these truth claims.72 This speaks to the much larger problem of how we should treat truth claims in the political sphere, which has major implications for things like foreign policy-making.
In this book I have decided to focus on intellectuals belonging to two traditions, namely liberalism and neoconservatism. I have identified these traditions because they are among the most prominent traditions in the political theory and international relations fields and because they have arguably had the most influence on governments in the modern political world. Neoconservatives, for example, played a major role in the George W. Bush presidency (2001–08), an administration determined to both wage and lead the global war on terror project that continues to dominate the international political context.73 Liberalism has long provided a large framework of political vocabulary and ideas, which have informed Western governments and international and local activists keen on transforming totalitarian Middle Eastern regimes into liberal democratic states.74
To access the work of intellectuals from these traditions, I have chosen to analyze texts from a variety of sources, including books, journal articles, mainstream US newspapers, online magazines, and think tanks. Part of my reasoning for deciding to focus on US newspapers when analyzing texts written by neoconservatives is that neoconservatism tends to be US-centric.75 Its effects are certainly global, especially when neoconservatives have positions of influence within the US government like they did during the George W. Bush administration; however, its intellectuals write articles primarily aimed at an American populace responsible for electing its political representatives.
There are a number of reasons why I have selected a range of articles appearing in scholarly literature, newspapers, online magazines, and from think tanks. First, these different forms can be conceptualized as providing key parts of what we can call a public sphere. This means that they are sites where information can be translated from an intellectual to a wider audience. For example, large numbers of people read newspaper articles written by liberal and neoconservative intellectuals appearing in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Times, Washington Post, and USA Today.76
I have also chosen to include some lesser-known and less popular sources. Sometimes this has been a deliberate choice and other times it has been a necessity. An example