1.20 Although some serious thinkers have reached this skeptical conclusion,12 the very idea that your beliefs are unjustified en masse takes us a long way from common sense, which tells us that some of our beliefs are in much better shape than others. Plus, the skeptic hasn't offered any compelling positive argument for skepticism yet, so we shouldn't be too hasty to conclude that none of our beliefs are justified. After all, doesn't the Supporting Justified Belief Rule tell us that justification is within reach? All it takes to have justified beliefs like B1 is to have more justified beliefs like B645, B646, and B87. We haven't seen any reason yet to think that these beliefs aren't justified, have we?
1.21 In the remainder of this chapter, we'll articulate and critically discuss three non‐skeptical views: infinitism, coherentism, and foundationalism. In outline form, these views maintain the following:
Infinitism: all justified beliefs are justified because of support from further justifiers. The chain of justifiers justifies beliefs only when it forms an infinite series of non‐repeating justifiers. No belief can be justified without support from a further justifier that belongs to such a series.
Coherentism: all justified beliefs are justified because they belong to a coherent set of beliefs that support them (i.e. beliefs that are mutually supporting in that they lend deductive, inductive, or abductive support to other members). No belief can be justified without support from a further justified belief.
Foundationalism: all justified beliefs are justified because of support from further justified beliefs or because they are justified without such support. Any justified belief is either a properly basic belief or it derives its justification from such beliefs.
1.2 Infinitism and the Regress Problem
1.22 Infinitism tells us that a belief is justified iff it is appropriately supported by an infinite collection of non‐repeating justifiers (i.e. justified beliefs or available supporting reasons). This is tantamount to accepting the Supporting Justified Belief Rule and taking it to its logical conclusion without ceding to the skeptic.
1.23 For obvious reasons, infinitism looks like quite a difficult pill to swallow. The elephant in the room here is that the collection of non‐repeating justifiers must be infinite. Should a view that is premised upon such a seemingly overwhelming suggestion be dismissed out of hand? Perhaps not. As proponents of infinitism John Turri and Peter Klein have suggested, the principal reason that we should accept infinitism is that whatever problems infinitism faces, the problems that face the only two alternatives are worse.13 They state this overarching “process of elimination argument” for (non‐skeptical14) infinitism as follows:
Master Argument for Epistemic Infinitism
P1 (Premise 1). There are three possible, non‐skeptical solutions to the regress problem: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism.
P2. There are insurmountable difficulties foundationalism and coherentism.
P3. Infinitism faces no insurmountable difficulties.
P4. Not having insurmountable difficulties is better than not.
C (Conclusion). Therefore, infinitism is the best non‐skeptical solution to the regress problem.15
P1 is widely taken for granted by all parties to the dispute, and P4 is likewise uncontentious.16 P2 and P3 are where the action lies. Whether P2 is true requires a careful engagement with foundationalism and coherentism (which we will turn to in more detail later in this chapter). In abridged form, though, the crux of the infinitist's defense of (2) goes as follows: our beliefs cannot be justified by some finite set of justifiers (as per foundationalism and coherentism), because all such sets will either involve (i) a belief that's not supported by further beliefs or (ii) circles of justification. If the former, the inferential beliefs cannot be justified because the non‐inferential beliefs that they depend on seem arbitrary. If the latter, the beliefs cannot be justified because the circles of justification cannot confer justification upon these beliefs.
1.24 Let's suppose for a minute that P2 is correct, and that the above‐noted (and perhaps related) difficulties to foundationalism and coherentism really are insurmountable as the infinitist insists. Even if that were so, the Master Argument for Epistemic Infinitism establishes C only if P3 can be established – viz. only if the problems that face infinitism are not equally insurmountable. Before we turn to examine the problems that face foundationalism and coherentism, let's first see how well infinitism holds up to the objections it faces.
1.3 Objections to Infinitism
1.25 The infinitist insists that a given belief is justified iff that belief is supported by an infinite set of non‐repeating justifiers. One standard complaint about this proposal is that it puts justification out of our reach because – given the kind of cognitively limited creatures we are – we simply don't have an infinite set of justifiers available to support our beliefs. If this is right, infinitism doesn't provide us with a non‐skeptical response to the regress problem. Here's the argument in outline – that is, the Argument from Finite Minds:
Argument from Finite Minds
P1. You have a finite number of beliefs.
P2. Nothing could be a justifier that supports your beliefs at any given time unless it is itself a belief.
C1. You have a finite number of justifiers that support your beliefs at any given time.
P3. Infinitism tells us that a belief is justified only if supported by an infinite set of non‐repeating justifiers.
C2. Infinitism implies that none of your beliefs could be justified.
An initial line of response the infinitist could offer here would be to contest the relevance of P1 to the truth of infinitism. As this line of thinking goes, infinitism is a thesis about epistemic justification “in and of itself” and not merely about justification that's accessible to the kinds of minds that humans happen to have.17 Accordingly, what infinitism says about epistemic justification is not beholden to anything we might discover about human minds and their distinctive limitations. Leaning on this point, though, would not be very good strategy for the infinitist, all things considered. After all, even if the reply is granted, a counterreply awaits: infinitism still implies that no human beliefs can be justified. Thus, infinitism is not a non‐skeptical response to the regress problem when it comes to the very kind of justification we're most interested in: the kind we humans (with whatever limitations we have) are capable of attaining.
1.26 A more promising line of response to the Argument from Finite Minds is that it rests on a mistaken picture of justifiers. While a justified belief might be a perfectly good justifier, maybe – and contrary to P2 – not every justifier is another justified belief.18 For instance, if we understand justifiers as justified beliefs or available reasons that an agent could cite if challenged, the set of justifiers might be larger than the set of beliefs. It might (as the infinitist says) be infinite even if what we actually believe is not.
1.27 This might seem like a decent line for the infinitist to press, though it invites a new