15 15. Arctic Council, “The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder,” updated September 13, 2018, https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us.
16 16. Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola, “On Arctic Exceptionalism,” FIIA Working Paper No. 85, April 2015, p. 5, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189844/wp85.pdf; Sergey Lavrov quoted in ITAR-TASS https://tass.com/russia/755311; see also Sam LaGrone, “Russian Foreign Minister: No Need for NATO in the Arctic,” USNI, Oct. 22, 2014
17 17. Young, op. cit.
18 18. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36, 2 (1982), pp. 185–205, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520; Idem, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
19 19. Shulze, op. cit.; Smieszek, op. cit.
20 20. Piotr Graczyk and Timo Koivurova, “The Arctic Council,” in L. C. Jensen and G. Hønneland, eds., Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), pp. 298–327; Paula Kankaanpää and Oran R. Young, “The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council,” Polar Research 31 (2012), pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.3402/polar.v31i0.17176; Keskitalo, op. cit.; Congressional Research Service, op. cit.
21 21. See T. Koivurova and L. Heinämäki, “The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in International Norm-making in the Arctic,” Polar Record 42, 221 (2006), pp. 101–9, ; N. Sellheim, “The Arctic Council and the Advancement of Indigenous Rights,” in N. Sellheim, Y. V. Zaika, and I. Kelman, eds., Arctic Triumph. Northern Innovation and Persistence (Cham: Springer Switzerland Publishing, 2019), pp. 105–25.
22 22. Young, op. cit., Craczyk & Koivurova, op. cit.
23 23. Smieszek, op. cit.
24 24. E. J. Molenaar, “Governance of Arctic Shipping. Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States,” in R. C. Beckman, T. Henriksen, K. D. Kraabel, E. J. Molenaar, and J. A. Roach, eds., Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States (Boston: Brill Nijhof, 2017), pp. 24–67; Smieszek, op. cit.
25 25. Graczyk & Koivurova, op. cit.
26 26. D.L. Downie and T. Fenge, eds., Northern Lights against POPs: Combating Toxic Threats in the Arctic (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003); Smieszek, op. cit.
27 27. See Congressional Research Service, op. cit.
28 28. For a review of these groups, see Smiezek, op. cit.
29 29. Smieszek, op. cit.
30 30. Schulze, op. cit.; By this means, diplomatic misunderstandings or (violent) conflicts are avertible through a current stream of reliable information among all regime actors, and institutionalized by a system of repeat consultations.
31 31. Schulze, op. cit.
32 32. Smieszek, op. cit.
33 33. Ibid.
34 34. See, for example, Timo Koivurova, “How US Policy Threatens Existing Arctic Governance,” Arctic Today, January 17, 2020; Melody Schreiber, “As the Arctic Changes, International Cooperation May Be Put to the Test,” Arctic Today, July 25, 2018; Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, and Alexandria Hall, The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment, RAND Europe (PE-268RC), 2018.
35 35. “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus,” Speech by Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, Rovaniemi, Finland, May 6, 2019, https:// www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/.
36 36. China’s growing interest in the region has to be analyzed in the context of its aggressive behavior in maritime affairs elsewhere, namely in the South China Sea and its over-fishing activities in species rich waters such as those right on the edge of the Galápagos marine reserve. See “South China Sea: What’s China’s Plan for its ‘Great Wall of Sand’?” BBC, July 14, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-53344449; Morgan Otragus, US DoS Spokesperson, “China’s Empty Promises in the South China Sea,” September 27, 2020, https://www.state.gov/chinas-empty-promises-in-the-south-china-sea/; Dan Collyns, “Chinese Fishing Armada Plundered Waters around Galápagos, Data Shows,” The Guardian, September 17, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/17/chinese-fishing-arma-da-plundered-waters-around-galapagos-data-shows; Yuri Garcia, “Ecuador Says Some Chinese Vessels near Galapagos Have Cut Communications Systems,” Reuters, August 18, 2020, https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-environment-china/ecuador-says-some-chinese-vessels-near-galapagos-have-cut-communications-systems-idUKKCN25E2XI.
37 37. Somini Sengupta, United States Rattles Arctic Talks With a Sharp Warning to China and Russia,” New York Times, May 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/climate/pompeo-arctic-china-russia.html; Sengupta, “U.S. Pressure Blocks Declaration on Climate Change at Arctic Talks,” New York Times, May 7, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/climate/us-arctic-climate-change.html; Richard Milne, “US Provokes Fury after Blocking Arctic Council Statement,” Financial Times, May 7, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/f879ff9a-70ab-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5; Coral Davenport, “Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040,” New York Times, October 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-report-2040.html.
38 38. See also the chapters by Andreas Østhagen, Ernie Regehr, Mia Bennett, et al., Marc Lanteigne, and Nengye Liu in this volume.
39 39. Timothy M. Lenton et al., “Climate Tipping Points –Too Risky to Bet Against,” Nature, November 27, 2019 (correction April 9, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03595-0; Stephen Leahy,” Climate Change Driving Entire Planet to Dangerous ‘Tipping Point’,” National Geographic, November 27, 2019, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/11/ earth-tipping-point/; NASA, “The Study of Earth as an Integrated System,” https://climate.nasa.gov/nasa_science/science/; “More Bad News for the Arctic: The Laptev Sea Hasn’t Frozen,” The Economist, October 28, 2020, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/28/more-bad-news-for-the-arctic-the-laptev-sea-hasnt-frozen; Flora Graham, “Alarming Delay in the Annual Freeze of Arctic Sea Ice,” Nature, October 23, 2020, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03010-z.
40 40. USGS Arctic Oil and Gas Report, Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet (July 2008); Raul Pedrozo, “Arctic Climate Change and U.S. Accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ,” International Law Studies 89 (2013), pp. 757–75, esp. pp. 763–4; https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=ils. See also, Spohr, op. cit.
41 41. See Arild Moe’s chapter in this volume. Cf. Moe, “China’s Exaggerated Arctic Interests,” Reconnecting Asia, April 18, 2017, https://reconnectingasia. csis.org/analysis/entries/chinas-exaggerated-arctic-interests/.
42 42. “Russia Gathers More Data for its North Pole Bid,” The Maritime Executive, October 27, 2019, https://maritime-executive.com/article/russia-gathers-more-data-for-its-north-pole-bid. Submission by the Russian Federation (2001–2009), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm. Cf. Russian Federation, 2001–2019, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties/statefiles/rus.htm.
43 43. See Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, updated October 16, 2020, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. Cf. Jeffrey J. Smith, “Reach for the Top: Canada’s 2019 Extended Continental Shelf Claim in the Arctic,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy 4, 2 (2019), pp. 246–52, https://doi.org/10.1163/24519391-00402008.
44 44. The environmental regulations allowed under the UNCLOS are not as robust as those allowed if the Northwest Passage is part of Canada’s internal waters.
45 45. “Inuit and Canada Share Northwest Passage Sovereignty—ICC