Population and regional imbalances are the legacy of the boom and bust cycles of three colonial export commodities: sugar, gold/rubber, and coffee. The scarcity of labor to fuel sugar plantations during the 16th and 17th centuries was the impetus for importing African slaves into the Northeast. In the 18th century, with the discovery of gold/rubber and the concomitant decline in sugar production, the economic and population center of gravity shifted to central and southern Brazil. This shift left the once wealthy northeastern plantation economy in ruins, and from this point on development favored southern Brazil.
It was the southern expansion of coffee exports during late nineteenth and early 20th centuries that led to the incipient industrialization of São Paulo, built first on slave and later subsidized European immigrant labor. Following the abolition of slavery in 1888, southeast coffee growers used the tax revenues from the great fortunes accumulated from coffee exports to provide the foundation to build São Paulo’s industrial economy and attracted roughly 3.5 million European immigrants. By the 1920s, São Paulo became the most advanced region of the country, and by the 1940s the state had the largest concentration of manufacturing in all of Latin America (Wood and Carvalho, 1988).
The predominantly white regions of São Paulo and the southeast remained the nation’s locus of manufacturing and finance (Kowarick and Campanario, 1986). Over time, the consequence of such cumulative effects was the sharp spatial disparities. Continued growth and diversification of the Brazilian economy lessened but did not eliminate the unequal distribution of wealth and population. From the 1950s, industrialization in south-central Brazil lured Afro-Brazilian migrants from the Northeast and rural areas to the dynamic urban metropolises, especially São Paulo. This was accompanied by notable gains in Afro-Brazilian urban employment. Between 1950 and 1980, the proportion of individuals of African descent employed in cities rose from 36% to 62% (Oliviera et al., 1985). Yet, at the same time, the occupational structure moved toward more skilled jobs.
As a result, in 1991, Afro-Brazilians continued to be disproportionately concentrated in agriculture, construction, and personal services, particularly domestic employment, and the lowest paid and most onerous jobs (Lovell, 1998). Brazil’s four decades of rapid economic expansion and substantial social and demographic change erased neither unequal population distribution nor unequal regional development. Sharp inequalities thus remained between the north and south and between the blacks and whites.
In Brazil, affirmative actions have been more successful relatively when compared with Colombia. Nationally, the Federal Supreme Court, in its effort to reduce racial discrimination, established a 20% quota of job openings for Afro-descendants by service suppliers, in addition to another 20% of public service positions to be held by Afro-descendants in the Ministries of Justice, Culture, and Agricultural Development. Nevertheless, the issue has its shortcomings as equality by law is no guarantee of equality of opportunities for Afro-descendants; also, as there is a huge gap between what is decreed on paper and what is implemented.5
One of the most important sectors where the government in recent years has focused its attention has been on education. Ensuring high-quality mass public schooling, especially at the primary and secondary levels, historically has not been a central concern of the Brazilian governments, either democratic or authoritarian. For instance, according to the HDI statistics, the average mean years of schooling for women in Brazil is 8.1 years. The Gender Inequality Index places Brazil at the abysmal rank of 92 among 160 odd countries (HDI, 2017). Brazil spends a reasonable amount of its GNP on education. In comparison to its expenditure on education (primary and secondary schooling), Brazil ranks below that of most Latin American countries expenditure (Hunter and Sugiyama, 2009, p. 37).
In the 1990s, after all other factors were accounted for, racial differences accounted for one-fourth of poverty and inequality. Brazil’s 1990s educational reforms were extending schooling rates for Afro-Brazilians between 7 and 13 years of age, which was more than for the ‘whites’. But Afro-Brazilian students continued to record a higher repetition and dropout rates. At school, their exams results were worse than that of the ‘whites’, highlighting the socio-economic variables in the society (Telles and Paixao, 2013). In an ongoing effort to provide equity in education, the Brazilian government recently introduced Affirmative Action Program that includes the use of quotas in public university systems and in new scholarship programs designed to encourage low-income and marginalized students to enroll in public and private universities.
In 2001, Racial Admission Quotas were introduced in 70 public universities. In the state of Rio de Janeiro, 20% was set aside for Afro-Brazilians who needed to pass the entrance exams. Also reserved was a further 25% for ‘social quotas’ for those students whose parents’ income is less than twice the minimum wage. Through its ProUniv Program, the Brazilian government also encourages private universities to offer scholarships to low-income students with a share reserved for Afro-descendants (especially women) and indigenous students, in exchange for tax breaks. The share allotted to each minority group is proportionate to its representation in the population of each state.
On the issue of the ‘Race Quotas’ in 2012, the Supreme Court Tribunal of Brazil unanimously ruled that these quotas in public universities were constitutional. The Race Quotas were hotly debated and challenged the Brazilian ideal of ‘racial democracy’. These affirmative laws were aimed at combating discrimination and education for the historically marginalized Afro-Brazilian population (Telles and Paixao, 2013). It was an attempt to broaden opportunities for minorities in Brazil.
In the case between Acao de DEM party vs. Cotas da UNB e no Brasil (Action of Brazilian Democratic Party vs. Quotas of the University of Brasilia) which reserved 20% of its enrolment spots for Afro-Brazilian, mixed races, and indigenous students, the Tribunal passed its judgment.6 The Tribunal of the Supreme Court stated that the quotas are the best methods to remedy the racial inequalities that were confronted after the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888 (Brazil was the last country in the Western hemisphere to abolish slavery). The racial quotas are the best transitory option to close the inequality gap in the realm of higher education. The Tribunal stated that the gap is a critical issue as a large section of the Afro-Brazilians continue to live in Favelas and earn a fraction of salaries enjoyed by the prominent Caucasian class.7
On 29 August 2012, President Dilma Rousseff signed the Lei de Cotas (Law of social quotas) which instructed the federal universities in 4 years to ensure that half of the incoming class came from public schools. The spots reserved for the marginalized students will be in accordance with the percentage of the minority population in the state where each public university is located. Only 2.2% of the 70% of the Afro-Brazilians living below the poverty line access higher education. The lower echelons of the socio-economic sectors of the country also receive poor education in public primary schools. Of late, Brazil boasts one of the largest increases in expenditure on education between 2000 and 2009 among the countries for which data are available. Even though Brazil’s spending on education as a percentage of GDP is below the OECD average, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of GDP invested in education, particularly between 2000 and 2014. Brazil increased public spending on education from 10.5% of total public expenditure in 2000 to 14.5% in 2005, and 16.8% in 2009 — one of the steepest rates of growth among the 33 countries for which data are available. Brazil ranks fourth in this out of the 32 countries for which data on public spending on education is available, and it is fairly above the OECD average of 13%. The next section will focus on female education, discrimination, and the visible success of the Programma Bolsa Familia (PBF) in approaching these multiple issues of gender, education, income, and equity.
Racial Identity, Women, and Education
Demographic census and annual household surveys are the only sources of