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1The term economic block is used generically — hence, it includes regional trade blocks, customs unions, or currency areas.
2The following four scenarios were considered in particular: (a) future nominal GDP projections are converted at end-2000 exchange rates; (b) future nominal GDP projections are converted using their fair value exchange rate estimates; (c) future nominals are converted at end-2000 exchange rates, but assume that the 2001/2002 nominal GDP paths continue for 10 years; and (d) projected GDP trends are arrived at using PPP conversions rather than estimated end-2011 current USDs.
3See for example, Baracuhy (2012) and Glosny (2010). Even Goldman Sachs came out with a volume on articles on BRICS and other emerging economies; see Goldman Sachs (2007).
4At market exchange rate, the sizes of the BRICS economies are, however, much smaller.
5In 1994, the Real Plan introduced a new currency, the Real. One real was valued at 2750 Cruzeiros Reais (the short-lived currency of Brazil between August 1, 1993 and June 30, 1994). The plan imposed restrictions on fiscal and monetary expansions and introduced price freezing.
6Since the macroeconomic identity can be written as, Y = C + I + G + X − M (where Y = GDP, C = Consumption; I = Investment; G = Government Consumption; X = Exports, and I = Imports), one would get, (Y − C − G) − I = X − M, so that it can be written as, S − I = X − M (where S = Savings). Since at a global level, aggregate exports have to be equal to global exports, current account balance at the global level has to be zero. By the mid-2000s, while the US and a few European countries had substantial current account deficits, this was matched by the surpluses of number of Asian economies led by China and oil exporters. See Ray and Nag (2017) for details.
7The areas of cooperation include: (1) BRICS Social Security Agreements; (2) Financial Framework for Sustainable Development; (3) BRICS Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility; (4) Local Capital Markets development through NDB; (5) BRICS Angels Network (for start-ups); (6) BRICS Trade Settlement in Local Currencies; (7) BRICS cooperation in Agri-business; (8) BRICS cooperation in Energy; (9) BRICS cooperation in Skill Development; (10) BRICS cooperation in Manufacturing; (11) BRICS Trade Facilitation Network; (12) BRICS Standardization Research Framework; (13) Advisory role and observer status for BRICS Business Council in NDB; (14) Cooperation and Facilitation of intra-BRICS Investments; (15) BRICS Rating Agency; and (16) New International Payment Card System for BRICS.
8Lieber (2014) was more critical and went on to say, “Other than where clear and unambiguous self-interest is present, the actual record of BRICS cooperation on a wide range of international collective action problems thus provides limited evidence of positive engagement let alone embracing of a ‘stake-holder’ role” (p. 143).
9In fact, notwithstanding their economic status, quotas of the BRICS block in the IMF have been meagre and stood as per the current quota formula as follows: Brazil 2.32%, China 6.41%, India 2.76%; Russia 2.71%; South Africa 0.64%; see https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx for details.
10https://www.ndb.int/about-us/essence/our-work/.
11Lindsay and Van Rossem (2014) argued from a neo-Weberian perspective that power in the global system is multidimensional and relational. Comparing the paths of the BRICs to integration in the global political, economic, and military networks, they argued that as the paths of the BRICS block differ fundamentally, these countries cannot be classified as a category of rising powers.