In brief, even the earliest Greek writing indicates an emerging awareness of the relationship between human thought and the processes by which such thoughts and sentiments can be symbolically expressed. Three terms help to express the relationship between thought and expression: heuristic, eristic and protreptic discourse. Heuristic discourse is seen as a generative (helping to discover or learn) capacity to construe and apply some structuring of language. Heuristics has been a major concern not only of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (see Enos and Lauer, “Meaning”) but also throughout the history of Greek rhetoric, as even a cursory reading of George Kennedy’s The Art of Persuasion in Greece will reveal (e.g., 10). The importance of this notion was clearly apparent to Latin rhetoricians, such as the unknown Roman author of the Rhetorica Ad Herennium (1.3ff.) and Cicero (De Inventione ff.), both of whom labeled it “inventio” and gave it primacy among the canons of rhetoric. In fact, Kennedy’s 1980 article in Philosophy and Rhetoric (185–89) demonstrates that the concept of heuristics was a central component to the Byzantine canons of rhetoric with Hermogenes’s On Invention receiving great attention (see also Kustas 42, note). Eristic discourse is the advocacy for a particular point of view. The term “eristic” came to be synonymous with argumentative discourse and received commentary from both Plato (Euthydemus 272C; Lysis 211B) and Aristotle (Rhetoric 1371a, 1402a). Eristics was not only considered the “art of disputation” but was used to label philosophers of the Megarian school who were noted for their argumentative mode of discussion (Diogenes Laertius 2.134). Plato eventually labeled the techne of eristic discourse as Sophistry (Sophista 231E, 225C). Protreptic discourse is both directive and didactic but also associated with rational inquiry. Contrary to the notion of wrangling associated with eristics, protreptic discourse is seen as a didactic process whereby minds are “directed” for some instructive purpose (Skousgaard 379–80; Kustas 49, note). Protreptic discourse was strongly encouraged for philosophy by Plato (Euthydemus 278C, D; 288D, E; 282D) because it provides direction for thought leading to knowledge.
Plato characterized the instruction of Sophists as misdirection. He believed that they taught eristic methods to subvert the truth in order to succeed at any cost, and thus had nothing to do with the more noble ends of protreptic discourse. Plato mercilessly lampooned Sophists in his Euthydemus as not caring if they “talk nonsense” (288B, see also 277D–E, 278 B–C) and was very clear in his belief that speechwriters who do not know the distinct technai (techniques or skills) of generating and employing philosophical argument, or dialectic, will be severely constrained in their knowledge of the composing processes of discourse (Euthydemus 289 D–E). Their Sophistic “art,” Plato went on to say, is like a “wizard’s art”; that is, sorcery “involves a wizard’s charming venomous spiders and scorpions and other wild beasts and evil things,” while Sophistry “involves charming and persuading the ears of juries, assemblies and other mobs” (Euthydemus 289E, 290A). Plato’s point clearly drives a wedge between the charm—and almost sensual enrapturement—of Sophistic discourse and the philosophical inquiry toward knowledge characteristic of protreptic discourse. In brief, rhetoricians who engage in bantering eristic argument only provide a “ridiculous display of their particular effort” and should be overlooked when seeking didactic discourse associated with protreptic procedures (Euthydemus 307B, see also 307A–C).
This chapter examines the dominant modes of Homeric discourse—heuristic, eristic and protreptic—and relates them to the notion of the divine “gift” of eloquence. This examination will show that conceptual processes of discourse synonymous with the formalization of rhetoric in the fifth century BCE were already emerging three hundred years earlier. Awareness of the evolution of these conceptual processes will provide a more accurate understanding of both the history of rhetoric and an enriched understanding of the foundation of our discipline.
The concept of “heuristic” is present throughout the Iliad and Odyssey and is used to express some process of discovery. Homer freely uses the concept to indicate the discovery of persons, places, and gods (Iliad 5.169; Odyssey 10.252; Iliad 24.98). Frequently this is done by an individual such as Athena “discovering” the proud suitors, or Odysseus “discovering” the house of Circe, or Hector “finding” Archeptolemus (Odyssey 10.210; Iliad 8.127). In this sense, a heuristic capacity that expresses the notion of discovering a physical event or entity does not discriminate between god or man. In fact, the notion of heuristics as discovered is refined to the extent that there is even a collective capacity to discover, such as in the statement “if we find a herd of oxen or a great flock,” and personification as a lion would “discover” a deer or a wild goat (Odyssey 12.300; Iliad 3.24).
Homer also attributes a psychological capacity for heuristic discovery not confined to sensory awareness and uses the term “heuristic” to discuss the capacity of subjective self-awareness. Often, this discovery is in terms of projected emotive responses not associated with “rational” self-consciousness, such as “and they discovered Myrmidons delighting his heart with a clear-toned phorminx [lyre]” or Odysseus, who “discovered” himself sitting in the front hall of his home (Iliad 9.185–186; Odyssey 14.5). The use of “heuristic” in self-awareness and discovery is not limited to reflective self-consciousness. Homer often uses the term “heuristic” to indicate a potential capacity for joy or sorrow and even a concept of the negative as when they “did not find the gates boarded” (Odyssey 9.535; Odyssey 13.43; Iliad 12.120–121). Evidence of the bridge between the physical and psychological sense of “heuristic” is evident in Homer’s passage where the suitors “found the spirit of Achilles” in the sense of its representation as a physical form (Odyssey 24.15).
All of the examples mentioned indicate mortal heuristic capacity for a range of power that extends from its use in the most physical sense to the most esoteric, futuristic modalities of subjective expression. This human techne for heuristics is central to understanding the inventive processes of the discovery and relationship of thought and discourse—that is, the human techne to discover and express complex thought and sentiments. Homer frequently discussed the power or human faculty of heuristics for discourse (heuremena dunamai), and several general modalities of heuristic processes are revealed (Odyssey 4.374, 467; Odyssey 19.157–158). Specifically, Homer discusses the human power to discover and contrive through words. Clearly evident is the idea of appropriate or suitable expression that can be “discovered.” Nestor is characterized as being particularly sensitive to effective schemes for discourse and quick to point out shortcomings, as when he says, “For some time do we quarrel, nor do we have any capacity to discover any contrivance, for all our time here” (Iliad 2.342–343). Nestor’s criticism is a revealing one, for he expects his colleagues to demonstrate a faculty to discover some ability to devise a sign or technique through deliberation to resolve strife (Odyssey 12.393; Odyssey 19.157–158; Iliad 16.472). Language is viewed as an awareness to discover a solution to a problem. This discovery process can not only occur collectively among individuals but even in a self-dialogue, as when Odysseus “took counsel with myself” so that he could invent a solution to outwit the Cyclops (Odyssey 9.421–423).
There is a clear association