Finally, the involvement of third states in the process of nuclear arms limitation should be based on an objective assessment of their forces and programs and on an agreement on the sequence, principles, and objects of multilateral arms limitation agreements.
It is extremely important to note that the abstract discussion of the modern meaning of strategic stability will remain fruitless, as demonstrated by years of the recent dialogue on this topic between the United States and China,50 as well as between Russia and the United States. The proposals that have emerged in recent years for multilateral discussions on nuclear issues and strategic stability as an alternative to specific negotiations do not provide a clear answer to the direct questions of format, subject, and expected results of such intellectual exercises.51 Such ideas are no doubt attractive to those military and political leaders who are prejudiced against nuclear arms control agreements, do not understand their importance, and do not know the history of the issue. In reality, however, the alternative to time-consuming and sometimes exhausting negotiations is not strategic discussion in the “clubs of interested parties,” but an unrestricted arms race for all, at great cost and with the growing danger of war.
Another extreme was the approval of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) by the UN General Assembly on July 6, 2017.52 Without calling into question the good intentions of supporters of this treaty, it must be admitted that the treaty is completely unrealistic, both in theory and in practice, if only because all nine of the nuclear powers that would have to ratify it, in a rare act of solidarity, did not support the UN initiative.
But along with the many technical and economic shortcomings of this project, the main omission in the treaty is that it does not address the military and political roles that states associate with nuclear weapons, besides deterrence of nuclear attack: preventing conventional aggression or attacks with other types of WMDs and systems based on new physical principles; maintaining international prestige and status (especially if economic and political assets are lacking); providing security guarantees to allies living near strong opponents; obtaining a bargaining chip for negotiations on other issues; and so on. Over the past seventy years, nuclear weapons have become an integral part of international politics, military strategy, and security. Without changing this environment, it is impossible to simply excise the nuclear factor as a malicious entity from international relations: the system would turn into chaos and the existing security norms and institutions would collapse.
Only consistent and step-by-step treatment is applicable: disarmament measures, in parallel with positive changes in the international political and strategic environment. And it is only in the context of substantive negotiations on arms limitations, reduction, and prohibition that these updated principles of stability can be formulated.
The first priority is to salvage the essence of the INF Treaty. Russia and the United States should jointly develop additional means of verification, using confidence-building measures and on-site inspections, in order to eliminate mutual suspicions. Technical solutions have been around for several years,53 and only the ambiguous attitude of the parties toward this agreement—and the overall negative atmosphere in their relations—have prevented them from sorting out these disagreements. Now, after the treaty was abrogated, the two powers should as a minimum make a commitment not to deploy missiles formerly prohibited by the agreement on the European continent, and agree on appropriate transparency measures. For the time being this would give Washington a leeway in addressing its Asia-Pacific concerns and alleviate Moscow’s fears of surprise short-warning decapitating attack from its European neighborhood.
Then, if New START is not extended beyond March 2021, negotiations should be started as soon as possible on a follow-on treaty. New ceilings on the maximum number of launchers and warheads are not so important; they can be lowered marginally, even by just 100–200 launchers and warheads. What is far more important is the scope of the next agreement, which should address new threats to strategic stability described above. Besides limiting as usual ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, a follow-on treaty should count air-launched nuclear cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs, as well as conventional cruise missiles (with longer than 600 km range) according to the actual loading of the deployed heavy bombers. In addition, it should put under overall ceilings the new ground-based intercontinental cruise missiles, as well as land-based boost-glide hypersonic systems (with ranges longer than 5,500 km) as well as sea- and air-based systems of this type (with ranges beyond 600 km), regardless of the type of warheads—nuclear or conventional—that they carry. (The range cut-off definition is borrowed from the former SALT/START treaties, but may certainly be renegotiated.)
Restrictions or bans on fractionally orbital ICBMs and long-range autonomous underwater drones could be exchanged for measures of transparency and delineation of missile defense systems. For example, the sides could limit (by mutually acceptable parameters) strategic defense against ICBMs and SLBMs but allow regional missile defense and air defense systems for protection against medium- and short-range ballistic and cruise missiles.
In parallel, negotiations on space weapons should be initiated, beginning with the prohibition of testing any antisatellite systems against real orbital targets and establishing strict rules for rendezvous and proximity maneuvers of satellites. It is also essential to move on to discussing a mutual pact not to develop capabilities and methods of cyber attack against strategic command-and-control information systems.
Concurrent with intensified negotiations on the issues of nuclear disarmament and the limitation of non-nuclear weapons systems, it might be eventually possible to include other states in this process in a phased and selective way. All of these measures are necessary to provide a foundation for the real intensification of cooperation between leading powers in the fight against the threat of nuclear terrorism, which will otherwise inevitably increase.
Amid the current deplorable political and strategic situation, it may seem that the above proposals are utopian. However, experience shows that the situation can change very quickly—both for the better and for the worse. To avoid the latter, every effort must be made to achieve the former. The main prerequisite is the recognition by political leaders and elites of the leading powers that the task of saving and updating the system and regimes of nuclear arms control is the top priority, just as the preceding generation saw it after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The dynamic changes in the world order, military technology, and strategic thinking do not mean that nuclear arms control is no longer needed. On the contrary, these changes make arms control an even more essential condition for the survival of human civilization than it was during the past Cold War.
Alexey Arbatov is the Head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow.
1 An earlier version of this study was published at © Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Arbatov, Alexey. 2019. “Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee or Threat to Strategic Stability?” Carnegie Moscow Center, March 22, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/2019/03/22/nuclear-deterrence-guarantee-or-threat-to-strategic-stability-pub-78663.
2 The USA and Russia have reached an agreement on the extension of the “New Start” treaty under the new U.S. administration of President Biden in January 2021. Nevertheless, the negotiations on all the mentioned treaties to be extended or revised retain great relevance (note by O. Schmies).
3 Dvorkin, Vladimir. 2019. “Preserving Strategic Stability Amid U.S.-Russian Confrontation.” Carnegie Moscow Center, February 8, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/2019/02/08/preserving-strategic-stability-amid-u.s.-russian-confrontation-pub-78319.