THE HISTORY OF CUBA
CHAPTER I
When the Treaty of Utrecht was signed on the eleventh of April, 1713, the Spanish colonies in America felt as if they were entering upon a new era, an era of peace and unhindered growth and prosperity. They did not realize until the first elation over the establishment of peace had spent itself, that this treaty contained the seeds of future wars which were bound to be quickened by the powerful spirit of commercial rivalry, which had been awakened in the European nations and was alarmingly dimming the justice and righteousness of their policies. By losing the European possessions, the population of Spain had been so seriously diminished that it was entirely out of proportion to the area of her over-seas dominion. While the Bourbon king had nothing more to fear from France, even her pirates having palpably decreased their operations against the Spanish colonies in America, he had in England a rival and enemy whose power he had reason to dread. For all the maritime and commercial agreements of the treaty favored England.
George Bancroft justly characterizes the spirit of the period in the second volume of his "History of the United States" when he says (Chapter XXXV, p. 388):
"The world had entered on the period of mercantile privilege. Instead of establishing equal justice, England sought commercial advantages; and, as the mercantile system was identified with the colonial system of the great maritime powers of Europe, the political interest, which could alone kindle universal war, was to be sought in the colonies. Hitherto, the colonies were subordinate to European politics; henceforth, the question of trade on our borders, of territory on our frontier, involved an interest which could excite the world to arms. For about two centuries, the wars of religion had prevailed; the wars for commercial advantages were now prepared. The interests of commerce, under the narrow point of view of privilege and of profit, regulated diplomacy, swayed legislation, and marshalled revolutions."
Concerning the mooted problem of the freedom of the seas, discussed as ardently and widely then as at the present time, Bancroft had this to say in the same chapter (p. 389):
"To the Tory ministry of Queen Anne belongs the honor of having inserted in the treaties of peace a principle which, but for England, would in that generation have wanted a vindicator. But truth, once elicited, never dies. As it descends through time, it may be transmitted from state to state, from monarch to commonwealth; but its light is never extinguished, and never permitted to fall to the ground. A great truth, if no existing nation would assume its guardianship, has power—such is God's providence—to call a nation into being, and live by the life it imparts."
The great principle first formulated by the illustrious Dutch historian and statesman Hugo Grotius was touched upon in the treaty of Utrecht in the passage saying—"Free ships shall also give a freedom to goods." The meaning of contraband was strictly defined; the right of a nation to blockade another's ports was rigorously restricted. As to the rights of sailors, they were protected by the flag under which they sailed.
But whatever credit belongs to England for her upholding of this principle was obscured by her exploitation of a monopoly, created by a special agreement of the same treaty. The "assiento," which established that most ignominious traffic in negro slaves, was to have disastrous effects, political, economic and racial, upon the American colonies, whether British, French or Spanish. The agreement had been specially demanded by the British representatives and had been approved by Louis XIV, who saw in its acceptance not only an advantage for England, but justly hoped his own colonies on the Gulf of Mexico to profit by it. It was worded simply as follows:
"Her Britannic Majesty did offer and undertake by persons whom she shall appoint, to bring into the West Indies of America belonging to his Catholic Majesty, in the space of thirty years, one hundred and forty-four thousand negroes, at the rate of four thousand eight hundred in each of the said thirty years."
The duty on four thousand of these negroes was to be thirty-three and a third pesos. But the assientists were entitled to introduce besides that number as many more as they needed at the minor rate of sixteen and two third pesos a head. However, no Frenchman or Spaniard or any individual of another nation could import a negro slave into Spanish America.
This trade in human flesh was duly organized and carried on by a stock company which promised enormous profits. King Philip V., sorely in need of money with which to execute all his plans for the reconstruction of his kingdom, anticipated great gains from such an investment and bought one quarter of the stock. Queen Anne was the owner of another quarter and the remainder was sold among her loyal subjects. Thus the sovereigns of these two kingdoms became the leading slave-merchants in the world and by the provisions of the agreement "her Britannic Majesty" enjoyed the somewhat dubious distinction of being for the Spanish colonies in the Gulf of Mexico, on the Atlantic and along the Pacific coasts, the exclusive slave-trader.
No trade required as little outlay in capital as the slave-trade. Trifles, trinkets and refuse stock of every possible kind of merchandise including discarded weapons, were exchanged for the human cargoes on the African coast; who, crowded into vessels, crossed the seas, and upon their arrival in the New World were sold to the colonists who wanted cheap labor and a cheaper service. A fever of speculation which had in it no little touch of adventure, seemed to sweep over England and to delude the people with visions of wealth to be acquired by a conquest of the Spanish possessions from Florida south, including Mexico and Peru. Wild schemes of colonization promised to open Golcondas on the fields of sugar-cane and tobacco, and in the mines holding inestimable treasures of gold and silver. For the realization of those plans negro labor was needed. Even in the West Indies it was welcomed especially by those settlements engaged in the raising of sugar cane.
That the Assiento opened the door to all sorts of clandestine commercial operations, as also to insidious political intrigue was soon to become evident. Agents of the Assiento had the right to enter any Spanish port in America and from there send other agents to inland settlements; they had the right to establish warehouses for their supplies, safe against search unless proof of fraudulent operations, that is importations, was incontestable. They could send every year a ship of five hundred tons with a cargo of merchandise to the West Indies and without paying any duty sell these goods at the annual fair. On the return trip this ship was allowed to carry products of the country, including gold and silver, directly to Europe. The assientists urged the American colonies to furnish them supplies in small vessels. Now it was known that such vessels were particularly favored by the smuggling trade. Hence British trade in negro slaves was indirectly used to encourage smuggling and thus undermine Spanish commerce.
To estimate the extent of the smuggling trade directly traceable to the loop-holes which the Assiento offered, was impossible. Jamaica, the stronghold of British power in the West Indies, and ever a hotbed of political and commercial intrigue against the Spanish neighbors, became a beehive of smuggling activities. In places formerly used as bases of buccaneer operations a lively business was carried on with contraband goods. The danger to legitimate commerce in and with the West Indies became so great that the Cuban authorities were forced towards the end of Governor Guazo's administration to adopt strenuous methods in dealing with such offenders. D. Benito